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1What Goes Around Comes Around
The Circulation of Proverbs in Contemporary Life
Kimberly J. Lau, Peter I. Tokofsky, and Stephen D. Winick
IntroductionWhen it comes to proverb scholarship, we have all been 
taught by the same master, Wolfgang Mieder, without question 
one of the greatest paremiologists of all time. His body of work 
on proverbs is so extensive as to make it nearly impossible to 
say anything new, but we nonetheless dedicate our efforts in this 
collection to that very purpose as a way of thanking him for his 
brilliant leadership in the fi eld of international proverb scholar-
ship, his unsurpassed intellectual generosity, and his incredible 
humor, kindness, and spirit. We only hope that the essays in this 
volume do justice to the ever-increasing ways he has inspired us 
to think about proverbs in all their various contexts and mani-
festations. Thus, the title of our book, What Goes Around Comes 
Around, is meant fi rst to honor Wolfgang Mieder, to convey our 
deep appreciation not only for his intellectual infl uence on our 
work but also for his wonderful presence in all of our lives.
The circulation of proverbs in our everyday lives reminds us 
that folklore is, indeed, a truly dynamic process. The vitality of 
proverbs—the constant emergence of new proverbs, together with 
their continual expression in new contexts—captures the ways 
in which folklore draws together our gravest concerns and our 
strongest commitments, our most precious values and our wisest 
perspectives, at times even our coarsest humor and our basest
beliefs, thereby structuring the world around us. In this collection,
we look specifi cally at proverbs as they go out into the world
beyond their usual contexts (“what goes around”) as well as the 
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ways in which the world beyond traditional folklore comes into
being through the creation and recontextualization of new prov-
erbs (“what comes around”). The diverse perspectives and analyses 
in these essays raise the question of what, precisely, is meant by 
proverb. Thus, we begin by reviewing the long tradition of scholar-
ship that endeavors to defi ne this dynamic genre of folklore.
Proverbs: What They Are and What They Do
One of the great paradoxes of the proverb is that it is gener-
ally understood to epitomize simplicity and common sense, but it 
turns out to be both complex and hard to defi ne. Although most 
people can list many examples of proverbs, few can accurately
defi ne what makes them proverbial. Scholars have discussed 
proverbs for hundreds of years, and hundreds of different defi ni-
tions have been advanced, making it impossible to provide even 
a cursory summary of them. Instead, we offer a brief overview 
of some of the classic scholarship on proverbs, and then touch 
briefl y on recent and more unconventional defi nitions.
Because proverbs are both linguistic items (possessing con-
crete elements of verbal and logical structure) and behaviors
(possessing motives, strategies, and outcomes), it is imperative to 
discuss not only what they are in linguistic and structural senses 
but also what they do in social and behavioral ones. Proverbs are, 
fi rst of all, messages passed between and among people. They are 
principally expressed in speech, though they can also be trans-
mitted through writing, visual arts, and electronic communica-
tion. In their verbal form, they are brief and pithy, wise and witty, 
rhetorically forceful but discreetly indirect. They include old say-
ings like “A rolling stone gathers no moss,” as well as recent ones 
such as “You snooze, you lose.” They can be as short as two words 
(“Money talks”), or they can be thirty times as long (“For want of a 
nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe, the horse was lost; for 
want of a horse, the rider was lost; for want of a rider, the message 
was lost; for want of a message, the battle was lost; for want of the 
battle, the war was lost; and all for the want of horseshoe nail”).
But aside from memorizing lists of proverbs, how can we tell 
if any given utterance can be considered a proverb? In some cul-
tures and situations, we are lucky that proverbs are preceded by 
a framing device: “You know what they say”; “As someone once 
said”; or, in some locales, “We have a proverb for that.” In most 
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cases, though, we need to look for other clues. Sometimes pro-
verbial messages are metaphorical so that, for example, being
circumspect in signing a mortgage can be described as “look-
ing before you leap.” Sometimes proverbs are poetic, featuring 
rhyme (“No pain, no gain”; “Early to bed and early to rise makes 
a man healthy, wealthy, and wise”), near rhyme (“Honesty is the 
best policy”; “A stitch in time saves nine”), regular meter (“There’s 
many a slip twixt the cup and the lip”; “A bird in the hand is worth 
two in the bush”), or alliteration (“Where there’s a will, there’s a 
way”; “Love laughs at locksmiths”). Sometimes they use unusual 
or archaic syntax (“He who hesitates is lost”; “Here today, gone 
tomorrow”; “It’s an ill wind that blows nobody good”). Although 
all of these attributes apply to many proverbs, none of them is 
present in every one. How, then, is it possible to determine what 
constitutes proverbiality?
This problem has been discussed since ancient times; phi-
losophers like Plato and Aristotle had much to say about prov-
erbs, though they were not always referring to the same kinds of
expressions we call proverbs today. For instance, Aristotle calls 
the phrase “an Attic neighbor” a proverb, though today it would 
be considered an idiom at best. Still, classical and medieval defi ni-
tions of the proverb do include statements of intuitive and descrip-
tive power, such as Michael Apostolius of Byzantium’s dictum: 
A proverb is a statement which conceals the clear in the unclear, or 
which through concrete images indicates intellectual concepts, or 
which makes clear the truth in furtive fashion. And further in this 
fashion, a proverb is . . . a trite phrase constantly used in popular 
speech . . . or a saying that has become thoroughly habitual in our 
daily customs and life. (Apostolius, quoted in Whiting 1994, 65)
Two American scholars, writing in the 1930s, ushered in the 
modern era of proverb study by summarizing and evaluating the 
centuries of scholarship before them. The fi rst, Archer Taylor,
rejected out of hand the possibility of creating a strict and orderly 
defi nition in a famous passage from his book The Proverb:
The defi nition of the proverb is too diffi cult to repay the un-
dertaking; and should we fortunately combine within a single
defi nition all the essential elements and give each its proper empha-
sis, even then we would not have a touchstone. An incommunicable
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quality tells us this sentence is proverbial and that one is not. 
Hence no defi nition will enable us to identify positively a sentence 
as proverbial. . . . Let us be content with saying that a proverb is a 
saying current among the folk. At least so much of a defi nition is 
indisputable. . . . (Taylor 1985, 3)
Taylor’s infl uence on other defi nitions began almost immediately.
Spurred to action by his colleague’s statement, B. J. Whiting 
published “The Nature of the Proverb” in 1932. Whiting’s article 
draws ideas about proverbs from classical authors, medieval writ-
ers, and a whole host of English men of letters. Out of these varied 
ingredients, Whiting constructs his own defi nition of the proverb, 
which stands today as an often-quoted and much-admired state-
ment about the nature of proverbiality:
A proverb is an expression which, owing its birth to the people, 
testifi es to its origin in form and phrase. It expresses an apparently 
fundamental truth—that is, a truism—in homely language, often 
adorned, however, with alliteration and rhyme. It is usually short, 
but need not be; it is usually true, but need not be. Some proverbs 
have both a literal and a fi gurative meaning. . . . A proverb must
. . . bear the sign of antiquity, and, since such signs may be coun-
terfeited by a clever literary man, it should be attested in different 
places at different times. (Whiting 1994, 80)
Both passages proceed from an intelligent recognition of the 
diffi culties inherent in the nature of proverbs, but both also have 
their weaknesses. Taylor uses the vague term “saying” to describe 
the type of expression that may be a proverb but never explains 
what he means by it. The lack of a more precise description of 
proverbs boils Taylor’s defi nition down to one feature: “currency” 
among “the folk,” but even that is problematic; the concept of “the 
folk” is not elucidated, either. Currency, in Taylor’s sense, appar-
ently means that the proverb is repeated frequently—though just 
how often it must be repeated is again undefi ned.
Whiting’s passage, while it is more thorough, can be reduced 
to a similar result: Where Taylor uses “saying,” Whiting calls the 
proverb an “expression,” but what exactly does he mean? Surely 
every utterance owes its birth to people; what does he mean by 
“the people”? All the concrete characteristics Whiting mentions 
(rhyme, alliteration, brevity, truth, and double meaning) are
optional, not present in every proverb. Every point of this
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defi nition is therefore either very vague or so specifi c it applies 
only to some proverbs. The only easily defi ned characteristic 
Whiting claims proverbs must unequivocally have is age, and the 
proper test of age, he tells us, is repetition.
Like Taylor, then, Whiting fi nds that belonging to a cultural 
canon of repeated sayings is the most essential quality defi ning 
proverbiality. While Taylor uses currency to express this idea, 
Whiting uses age. For both scholars, the test of this feature is the 
same: If the proverb can be found in multiple places, it is likely 
to have both age enough for Whiting and currency enough for
Taylor. In this, Taylor and Whiting were following an old tradi-
tion in English-language scholarship; the fi rst defi nition of the 
proverb in English seems to be that of Thomas More, who in 1528 
called it simply “an old said saw” or a saying long said (Whiting 
1994, 69).
Whiting also contributes one more crucial idea to our un-
derstanding of proverbs: The proverb, he tells us, “expresses an
apparently fundamental truth.” This characteristic, combined 
with age and currency, is essentially the basis of many, if not 
most, proverb defi nitions. One of the world’s fi nest proverb schol-
ars, Wolfgang Mieder, for example, follows his own teacher Stuart 
Gallacher (1959, 47) and adapts that scholar’s defi nition to “a 
Proverb is a concise statement of an apparent truth that has [had, 
or will have] some currency among the people” (Mieder 1993, 14). 
This then, at its basic level, is what the proverb is: a saying en-
capsulating a culturally recognized truth, repeated until it is rec-
ognized as traditional.
However, most scholars are not satisfi ed with this level of
description, and many have tried to provide a more concrete or rig-
orous defi nition. In particular, citing logical and structural compo-
sition has become an important means of defi ning proverbs. This 
has resulted in a rich literature, but also a broad and disparate 
one, with such ideas as “analogic structure” (Crépeau 1975), “topic-
comment structure” (Dundes 1981), and “quadripartite structure” 
(Milner 1969a), all advanced as possible defi nitional models. (For 
other structural possibilities, see Seitel 1981; Priebe 1971; Mil-
ner 1969b; Barley 1972; Permiakov 1979; Cram 1994; Grzybek
1994). Because proverbs exhibit such a variety of structures on 
the surface, and because there are many kinds of structures
(e.g., syntactic, logical, conceptual, etc.), scholars must resort 
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to analyzing deep structures. These they derive themselves from 
the proverbs they analyze, interpreting them as they see fi t. This 
leaves a lot of room for other scholars to disagree, and, predict-
ably, their work has not led to widely accepted defi nitions.
Some scholars have approached the problem from a different 
angle, asking, “Is there some other way we recognize the tradi-
tional nature of the proverb, besides by having heard it before?” 
Shirley Arora (1994) found that among Spanish speakers poetic 
features such as rhyme were as important as a previous hearing in 
people’s decisions about what a proverb was. But poetic features, 
as already explained, are not present in every proverb, and thus it 
is diffi cult to defi ne a proverb by their presence or absence.
Since proverbs cannot easily be defi ned by what they are, 
scholars have also tried to defi ne them by what they do. Instead of 
analyzing the linguistic or logical structure, these students of the 
proverb analyze its rhetorical and social functions. This approach
also has a long history. Hermogenes of Tarsus, a Sophistic rheto-
rician of the second century C.E., wrote that “a proverb is a sum-
mary saying, in a statement of general application, dissuading 
from something or persuading toward something, or showing 
what is the nature of each” (Hermogenes, quoted in Whiting 1994, 
59). This essentially rhetorical defi nition still describes many in-
stances of proverbial speech today, making it one of the earliest 
proverb defi nitions still recognizable in the modern world.
Hermogenes’ defi nition does not account for every proverbial 
utterance, however. Proverbs can persuade and dissuade, but 
they can also accomplish many other rhetorical goals: They can 
express deference or confi dence or worry, instill fear or respect, 
or even mock the listener. Recognizing this, modern proverb 
scholars tend to follow philosopher of language Kenneth Burke, 
who describes proverbs as “strategies for dealing with situations” 
(Burke 1957, 296).
Burke points out that proverbs name and sum up certain re-
current social situations. For example, a man is taking a long time 
to make up his mind, and we think he needs to act more quickly.
This is a commonly recurring situation, and we have many
proverbs to deal with it. We can say, “He who hesitates is lost,” or 
“When opportunity knocks, answer the door,” or “Strike while the 
iron is hot,” or “Shit or get off the pot,” or even “You snooze, you 
lose.” All these send the same message: Act now.
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As Burke’s theory suggests, proverbial speech is a complex 
process. First, we recognize a situation in our life as a special in-
stance of a social situation or context that recurs. Then we realize 
that there is a proverb for that recurrent situation. We speak the 
proverb in an attempt to contribute to the conversation. Our goal 
is to recast the specifi c, unique situation as a version of the gen-
eral, recurrent one, and if we are successful, our hearer will un-
derstand the implied advice. Burke’s approach to proverbs, fi rst 
published in 1941, has been very infl uential and informs the work 
of such scholars as Abrahams (1968, 1972), Seitel (1981), Kirsh-
enblatt-Gimblett (1981), Briggs (1994), Yankah (1989), Prahlad 
(1996), and Winick (1998, 2003), all of whom have contributed 
to our understanding of proverbs as rhetorical strategies and de-
vices of communication.
Ideally, a successful proverb defi nition would answer both of 
our initial questions: What are proverbs (how they are internally 
constructed?), and what do they do (how do they communicate or 
make meaning?)? A few, like Crépeau’s defi nition of the proverb 
as “a sentence with analogic structure and normative function” 
(1975, 303), touch on both questions, but more often proverb def-
initions address only one of the two.
In one of the more interesting defi nitions that does discuss 
both what proverbs are and what they do, Richard P. Honeck 
(1997) describes proverbs as “a discourse deviant, relatively con-
crete, present (nonpast) tense statement that uses characteristic 
linguistic markers to arouse cognitive ideals that serve to catego-
rize topics in order to make a pragmatic point about them” (p. 18). 
In pointing out that “characteristic linguistic markers” are part 
of the way proverbs function, Honeck makes such markers part 
of the defi nition. Thus, rhyme, meter, alliteration, metaphor, and 
other poetic features are re-incorporated into this modern prov-
erb defi nition. At the same time, Honeck also includes the fact 
that a proverb categorizes topics and makes points about them, 
clearly a derivation of Burke’s theory.
Honeck’s point that the proverb “uses characteristic linguistic 
markers to arouse cognitive ideals” suggests an important aspect 
of “proverbial markers,” such as rhyme, alliteration, and meter. 
These are not only part of what proverbs are but also part of what 
they do; they are not only physical features of the proverb but also 
serve a rhetorical function. 
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Winick (1998, 2003) also combines poetic, structural, and 
functional approaches, together with entextualization theory and 
intertextual theories of genre, to defi ne the proverb:
Proverbs are brief (sentence-length) entextualized utterances, which 
derive a sense of wisdom, wit and authority from explicit and inten-
tional intertextual reference to a tradition of previous similar wis-
dom utterances. This intertextual reference may take many forms, 
including replication (i.e., repetition of the text from previous con-
texts), imitation (i.e., modeling a new utterance after a previous 
utterance), or the use of features (rhyme, alliteration, meter, ascrip-
tion to the elders, etc.) associated with previous wisdom sayings. 
Finally, proverbs address recurrent social situations in a strategic 
way. (Winick 2003, 595)
Like Honeck’s defi nition, this one addresses what proverbs are 
(short utterances with features that act as intertextual references) 
and what they do (address social situations).
Where does this exploration get us? How do these disparate 
defi nitions relate to each other? Most scholars agree on certain 
features of the proverb: its brevity, its ability to sum up social 
situations and encapsulate principles held true and important 
by the culture that speaks them. Most also believe that sentenc-
es require another ingredient to make them proverbial. Taylor, 
Whiting, and Mieder call for age or currency. Some scholars in-
stead look for characteristic structures (e.g., Dundes), linguistic 
markers (e.g., Honeck), or forms of intertextual reference (e.g.,
Winick).
What all of these scholars are trying to describe is the prov-
erb’s relationship to tradition. For Mieder, Whiting, and Taylor, 
tradition is the process of handing down the item from person 
to person and perhaps generation to generation. For structural-
ists like Dundes, certain structures are traditionally associated 
with proverbs, while for scholars like Arora, Honeck, and Winick, 
certain poetic features are. These traditional associations are im-
portant to the transmission and reception of proverbs. Although 
their theories of tradition are quite different, these scholars would 
all agree on at least the following: Proverbs are short, traditional
utterances that encapsulate cultural truths and sum up recur-
rent social situations. This, then, becomes our working defi nition 
of what proverbs are and what they do.
9What Goes Around C
o
m
e
s
 A
ro
u
n
d
The Circulation of Proverbs in(to) Contemporary Culture
The circulation of proverbs and proverbial speech into and out 
of popular culture—to and from vernacular oral tradition—has 
reached a fevered pitch over the past decade. Indeed, the present 
age is one in which the proverb has reasserted itself as a basic form 
of expression (cf. Jolles 1930), rather than one in decline. Consider, 
for example, the following list of popular (proverbial) phrases:
Where’s the beef?
You’re off the island.
Is that your fi nal answer?
It takes a village.
No soup for you.
You’re fi red!
If you build it, they will come.
I’ve fallen, and I can’t get up.
This list contains items which originated in commercial media 
and then entered vernacular speech, as well as items imported 
into popular culture from living vernacular (both American and 
foreign), which then migrated back into active oral usage with new 
connotations and associations. The list includes phrases associ-
ated with popular movies, television broadcasts, advertisements, 
and best-selling books. Most notably, all of the items in the list 
appear so frequently in various discursive contexts that they are 
certainly part of American vernacular speech. The generation and 
circulation of such phrases have become so much a part of con-
temporary life that a current series of television commercials for 
Burger King depicts a group of employees debating the possibility 
of spontaneously coining a “catchprase” to describe a new burger
—a metaproverbial advertisement, so to speak.
We do not offer this set of examples to ignite debate over the 
ultimate source of any individual phrase, nor do we wish to dem-
onstrate a static borrowing among domains of creativity, nor even 
the priority of one medium over another in terms of signifi cance or 
precedence. Rather, we wish to demonstrate that, although many 
of the phrases vary in their usage, they have all become traditional
utterances that, for their speakers, encapsulate cultural truths 
and sum up recurrent social situations. Moreover, the dynamism 
of form and fl uidity in the creative domains exhibited by these
examples verify the ongoing negotiation of meaning to which 
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speakers subject popular phrases. We hope this list, and the fol-
lowing descriptions of how some of the items have been used, af-
fi rms the necessity of the contemporary paremiologist remaining 
attuned to the comings and goings of proverbial speech. We live 
in an era “after the great divide” (Huyssen 1986), when gaps be-
tween high and low—elite, popular, and folk—no longer defi ne the 
fl ow of cultural and discursive practices. Indeed, as Winick (1998) 
argues in his dissertation, The Proverb Process: Intertextuality and 
Proverbial Innovation in Popular Culture, it is precisely in this in-
tertextual gap between domains that we can frequently locate the 
meaning of proverbial utterances.
Several of the items in our list are most readily associated 
with the recent crop of “reality” television shows. “You’re off the 
island”—meaning “you’re out” or “you’re eliminated”—references 
Survivor, one of the fi rst successes in this broadcast genre. The 
phrase quickly spread beyond the confi nes of the television set. 
For instance, one UCLA folklore student reports the phrase being 
used in his dorm room in spring 2000: Following the annoying 
intrusion by an unpopular hallmate into a private conversation 
among several students, one of the members in the group re-
marked, “I wish we could just kick his ass off the island and be 
done with him!” The folklore student goes on to comment that 
the speaker “used the phrase to mean that [the unpopular resi-
dent’s] presence was no longer desired within our group, and he 
should be barred from returning, just as if we were contestants 
on Survivor, voting him off the show.” Completing the circular 
fl ow, the comings and goings, the student adds that he has seen 
the phrase on the Web site www.espn.com, where a poll asked, 
“If these eight athletes were on Survivor Island, who would be the 
fi rst to be kicked off the island?”
A contrasting example of the phrase appeared in an advertise-
ment the United Way of Greater Los Angeles placed in the Los
Angeles Times (21 August 2000). The copy inverts the saying in 
its headline, “None of These People Will Be Voted off the Island.” 
Below this banner, presumably intended to draw attention to the 
work of the United Way in an unexpected fashion, the full-page 
ad lists all donors who contributed a thousand dollars or more to 
the organization.
Two other recent catchphrases associated with television 
programs also rapidly found their way into other media as well 
11
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as popular usage. Both “Is that your fi nal answer?” and “You’re 
fi red!” existed in American vernacular prior to their fi fteen min-
utes of fame in the mass media, but at this writing, most Ameri-
cans associate them with Regis Philbin, host of the game show 
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, and Donald Trump, host of The
Apprentice. The former is a quiz show where contestants attempt 
to answer a series of increasingly diffi cult multiple-choice ques-
tions leading up to the ultimate million-dollar question. To un-
nerve contestants, Philbin occasionally urges them to reconsider 
their tentative response: “Is that your fi nal answer?” On 31 May 
2000, a two-inch headline across the front page of the Los Ange-
les Times sports section declared, “That’s no fi nal answer.” Imme-
diately above this banner, readers could see that it referred to the 
score in game fi ve of the western conference fi nals of the National 
Basketball Association: Portland 96, Lakers 88. Just as the Unit-
ed Way advertisement attracts attention by invoking a popular 
television show, this headline achieves much of its effect through 
its intertextual reference to Philbin’s phrase, even though the two 
phenomena have no apparent relationship.
On the recently completed fi rst season of The Apprentice, a 
group of aspiring businesspeople competed to convince entrepre-
neur Donald Trump that he should hire them into a manage-
ment position with a six-fi gure salary. Each week Trump put the 
contestants through various tasks designed to demonstrate their 
suitability for the prize, and at the end of the hour, he told one of 
them, “You’re fi red!” While Trump did not, of course, invent this 
phrase, he did bring it to proverbial status, inspiring an upsurge 
in its use in various contexts beyond employment. Indeed, Trump 
is reportedly even attempting to obtain a trademark on it (ABC 
NewsOnline, 3 March 2004), providing perhaps the ultimate evi-
dence of the phrase’s widespread circulation.
Another instance of proverbial speech circulating among me-
dia and the vernacular appears in a Los Angeles Times head-
line over a story about football players who endorsed Campbell’s 
Chunky Soup having bad luck (either injuries or slumps): “Curses 
. . . No Soup for You!” (Los Angeles Times, 8 December 2002). 
There was no need for this column even to mention the television 
show Seinfeld. By the time the story appeared, the phrase was cir-
culating independently and with new, metaphorical meanings. In-
deed, the humor of the newspaper story and the headline derived 
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from this circulation. What began as a literal admonishment by a 
chef to the character Elaine in the notorious “Soup Nazi” episode 
of Seinfeld became a locution for denial in popular speech. By re-
connecting the phrase to a story about soup, the columnist uses 
its intertextual resonances to suggest humorously that football 
players should focus on the sport rather than endorsements. “Al-
ready, the Chunky Soup curse is part of NFL folklore,” the story 
reports as it ponders why the soup is “nowhere to be found on the 
league’s list of banned substances.”
As our fi nal two examples, we take phrases associated with 
a movie and an advertisement. In The Proverb Process, Winick 
treats cinematic proverbial speech in depth, particularly phrases 
associated with Forrest Gump. One fi lm not mentioned by Winick 
is Field of Dreams, starring Kevin Costner. In the fi lm, Costner’s 
character gets the notion that he must construct a baseball fi eld 
on his farmland. The message mysteriously reaches him in the 
words, “If you build it, they will come.” In the years since the 
release of the fi lm, the phrase has become part of political dis-
course during the past two presidential administrations, as well 
as an element of other discursive domains. To cite some timely ex-
amples from the many available, it is ironic that during President 
Clinton’s second term of offi ce, national security advisor Sandy 
Berger employed the phrase to declare that if then-Iraqi leader 
Saddam Hussein rebuilt the nuclear reactor destroyed in an Is-
rael air strike, the U.S. would intervene: “If he rebuilds it, we will 
come.” Even though Saddam did not rebuild it, the United States 
still came.
Although Clinton’s vice president, Al Gore, did not take offi ce 
as a result of the 2000 election, the phrase still found its way into 
the next administration. In 2001, political cartoonist Margulies 
depicted the current president (identifi ed by a W on his base-
ball cap) surrounded by an array of incoming missiles. A grinning 
Bush reads from a document entitled “Missile Defense” and de-
clares, “Build it and they WON’T come. . . .” Margulies reveals his 
commentary in the caption: “Shield of Dreams.”
The baseball-fi eld metaphor rose to the level of national po-
litical debates, but commentators also found it useful to describe 
local controversies. For instance, a radio commentator in Los An-
geles summed up his opinion about expanding the freeway inter-
change between the San Diego and Ventura Freeways (Interstates 
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405 and 101) with the remark, “If they build it, traffi c will fl ow.” 
The phrase lent itself to a Los Angeles debate over a different 
mode of transportation as well. In a 26 May 2002 article review-
ing the merits of utilizing smaller regional airports (a potential 
alternative to expansion of Los Angeles International Airport), Los
Angeles Times travel columnist Jane Engle summarized, “If you 
build it, they won’t come. If they come, you had better build it.”
A less lofty example of the circulation of proverbial speech 
comes from a low-budget television commercial for an emergency 
communication device. The advertisement promotes the necessity 
of the device by depicting an elderly woman who has fallen out-
side her home. She retrieves the device and tells the helpful voice 
which responds that “I’ve fallen, and I can’t get up.” Like the other 
examples, this one has experienced a healthy second life in the 
vernacular. The graphic image of a fl oundering body has made 
the phrase attractive to sportswriters:
“The St. Louis Rams have fallen, and there’s no telling when they’ll 
get up” (Los Angeles Times, 24 September 2002).
“Twins Are Falling and Can’t Get Up” (Los Angeles Times, 16 
August 2001).
“I’ve Fallen—and I Can’t Get Up” (caption on a photo of a speed 
skater whooshing by a fallen opponent in the Canadian Olympic 
trials; Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2001).
In a delightful proverbial twist, this last example comes from a 
regular feature in the Times sports section entitled “1,000 Words’ 
Worth,” which features unusual and compelling sports photos. 
Ironically, the photos frequently require substantial captions to 
clarify what they depict to readers.
A number of folklore students have also documented this 
phrase in contexts unrelated to sports. One describes throwing her 
pencil to the ground in frustration during a calculus study group 
and telling her peers that she has fallen and can’t get up, mean-
ing she cannot solve the practice problems. In another instance, 
which suggests the wide appeal of the phrase, a male student
reported to class that he employed it in a sexual situation. Nota-
bly, this vocal student went on to become a professional football 
player and made a name for himself by not falling down when 
catching a desperation “fourth and twenty-six” pass from Dono-
van McNabb in a recent NFL playoff game.
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This somewhat haphazard set of examples clearly indicates 
the comings and goings of proverbial speech in our contemporary 
discourse. These phrases circulate in diverse domains of popular 
media, folk speech, and political debate. They appear in various 
incarnations, shifting, as proverbs do, to account for the immedi-
ate context but retaining textual and contextual features, which 
endow them with proverbiality. Reporters, headline writers, and 
admen can assume a wide familiarity with these popular phrases 
among their readers, and politicians, comedians, commentators, 
and ordinary conversationalists can evoke the intertextual rela-
tionships contained in these phrases to enhance communication 
in culturally resonant ways.
What Goes Around Comes Around
The following essays explore the wide-ranging comings and 
goings of proverbs in(to) and out of contemporary culture through 
close historical, literary, and sociocultural analyses of diverse 
proverbs, proverb (re)usage, and proverbial speech. We open our 
collection with Charles Doyle’s “‘In Aqua Scribere’: The Evolution 
of a Current Proverb.” Doyle reminds us that proverbs come into 
literary expression with the same frequency that literary quota-
tions go into proverbial use. While many English speakers prob-
ably identify the phrase “written in/on water” with the poet John 
Keats, Doyle fi nds references to the phrase in early Greek and 
Latin writings and offers strong evidence to suggest that these 
references indicate fairly wide vernacular use. Thus, “written in/
on water” moves from ancient proverb into classic literature, then 
from classic literature into nineteenth-century literary circles 
(though through much more vernacular expression in Keats’s 
spoken desire that his epitaph read, “Here lies one whose name 
was writ in water”), and eventually from literary circles back into 
vernacular expression as proverbial speech.
The process of evolving into proverbs occurs in numerous 
contexts and often represents the particular interests and mo-
tivations, the needs and desires, the passions and anxieties of 
the people whose cultural practices give rise to such innovative 
linguistic expressions. In their essay, “‘From One Act of Char-
ity, the World Is Saved’: Creative Selection of Proverbs in Sep-
hardic Narrative,” Isaac Jack Lévy and Rosemary Lévy Zumwalt 
demonstrate the ways in which Sephardic storytellers employ
15
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traditional proverbs as a rhetorically powerful means of ordering 
their narrative performances. Lévy and Lévy Zumwalt detail the 
strategic choice of proverbs in structuring and commenting on 
traditional narratives, thereby allowing the storyteller to render 
indisputable any potential ambiguity in the narrative’s meaning 
in the immediate context of its telling. In these cases, then, the 
intended meaning of the narratives evolves into proverbial ex-
pression through the use of proverbs in titles, introductions, and 
conclusions and closes the possibility of alternative meanings 
through the proverb’s power to signify uncontested cultural wis-
dom.
Shirley Arora’s “Baseball as (Pan)America: A Sampling of 
Baseball-Related Metaphors in Spanish” and Stephen Winick’s 
“‘You Can’t Kill Shit’: Occupational Proverb and Metaphorical 
System among Young Medical Professionals” both offer excellent 
examples of how specifi c cultural (and subcultural) drives fi nd 
their way into proverbial expression over time. Arora details the 
innumerable ways in which common baseball referents and im-
ages have given rise to fi gurative proverbs and proverbial speech 
in a diversity of Latin American countries. Here, then, baseball 
achieves proverbial expression as a sign of the widespread pas-
sion for the sport, and new proverbs and folk expressions drawing 
on its jargon and imagery capture baseball’s centrality in Latin 
American cultures, not only as a sport but as a way of thinking 
and a way of making meaning.
Similarly, Winick focuses on the medical proverb, “You can’t 
kill shit,” the related acronym SHPOS (subhuman piece of shit), 
and other medical folk speech to show how the demands of medi-
cal culture, particularly the stress and anxiety that young doc-
tors experience as they realize the impossibility of controlling all 
aspects of the hospital environment, fi nd expression through oc-
cupational proverbs and group folk speech. Winick’s extensive 
analysis of both of these proverbial expressions, as well as the 
previous scholarship on medical subcultures, foregrounds the 
boundaries of medical folk expressions like “You can’t kill shit” 
within the immediate contexts of their use while simultaneously 
drawing attention to their fl exibility within the unarticulated (per-
haps subconscious) logical system of the young doctors.
While these essays reveal the ways cultural meanings, prac-
tices, beliefs and worldviews evolve into expressive existence 
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through (often new) proverbs and proverbial speech, and the
motivations driving the use of these expressions, the remaining 
essays examine the movement of proverbs into new contexts. In 
his essay, “‘Cheaters Never Prosper’ and Other Lies Adults Tell 
Kids: Proverbs and the Culture Wars over Character,” Jay Mech-
ling follows proverbs as they move from traditional, vernacular 
contexts into the rarifi ed realms of “cultural literacy” (a concept 
fully entrenched in an elitist view of what constitutes education) 
and neoconservative attempts to help children build character. 
Here, proverbs are no longer folk expressions of cultural wis-
dom invoked in specifi c performative contexts which create their 
meanings, but rather become concrete adages expressing un-
changing and unquestioned “truths” and values. As such, hun-
dreds of proverbs fi nd themselves on lists children are encour-
aged to memorize as a character-building exercise devoid of the 
classical rhetorical skill of situating and manipulating proverbial 
speech.
In addition to pointing out the absurdity of considering prov-
erbs out of their everyday, oral contexts, Mechling emphasizes the 
fact that proverbs are rarely used by children in their own folklore 
(though they do, sometimes, parody them) and, consequently, are 
likely to be ineffective as character-building devices. These new 
uses to which proverbs are put, however, do tell us something 
about the adults who continually enlist tradition in their attempts 
to address the supposed crisis in character among children, es-
pecially boys, and Mechling does a superb job of laying bare their 
rhetoric as well as their neoconservative motivations.
Just as proverbs are put to work by neoconservative tradi-
tionalists, so, too, are they mobilized in advertising campaigns for 
an extensive range of products, services, lifestyles, and ultimately 
to promote American hegemonic ideals, as Anand Prahlad dem-
onstrates in his essay, “The Proverb and Fetishism in American 
Advertisements.” Prahlad does far more than identify proverbs 
and their strategic placement in magazine advertisements; he 
also suggests that the deep entanglements of proverb and adver-
tisement produce an altogether new cultural form, what he calls 
the “ad/altar,” at the heart of which is the altered proverb itself. 
Through close readings of several proverb ad/altars, Prahlad be-
gins to build a new theory of the fetishized proverb in American 
advertising (itself something of a fetish), a theory that emerges 
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from the proverb’s movement (and incorporation) into new con-
texts and cultural confi gurations.
At the same time, however, traditional proverbs in traditional 
contexts also fi nd innovative ends. Jan Brunvand’s essay, “‘The 
Early Bird Is Worth Two in the Bush’: Captain Jack Aubrey’s 
Fractured Proverbs,” is an incredible survey of the intentionally 
fractured proverbs invented by novelist Patrick O’Brian in creat-
ing the quirky, though entirely believable, character of Captain 
Jack Aubrey, hero of O’Brian’s vastly popular series of maritime 
novels set during the Napoleanic War. In keeping with the spirit 
of much of Mieder’s own work, Brunvand has combed O’Brian’s 
full series to compile a list of fractured proverbs and misspoken 
proverbial expressions attributed to Aubrey and some of the other 
characters in the series who either intentionally or accidentally 
offer versions of fractured proverbs, Wellerisms, or clever puns 
and witticisms. Most impressive, perhaps, is Brunvand’s ability 
not only to recognize various proverbs and proverbial expressions 
but also to trace them to their origins and offer correct versions.
We close our collection of essays on proverbial circulation with 
Alan Dundes’s “As the Crow Flies: A Straightforward Study of 
Lineal Worldview in American Folk Speech.” Dundes assembles a 
seemingly infi nite number of proverbs and examples of proverbial 
speech, folk metaphors, and traditional expressions that detail 
the American cultural preference for the linear over the circular. 
As Dundes demonstrates, a vast range of proverbs and folk ex-
pressions come into existence—into articulation—as refl ections of 
an American cultural ideology and worldview rooted in the lineal. 
While our own emphasis on circularity both in proverb scholarship 
and circulation may seem to fl y in the face of the straight-minded 
crow in Dundes’s title, we should also reiterate that the proverb in 
our title is also very frequently used to comment negatively on an-
other’s behavior (as in “He’ll get his”) and, thus, is fully consistent 
with Dundes’s masterful delineation of a lineal worldview in Ameri-
can folk speech. In his essay, Dundes shows that at the broadest 
level, we arrive at proverbs and proverbial speech from the cultural 
expanse that gives meaning not only to specifi c performative utter-
ances but to our entire mental map of the world around us.
As these essays collectively argue so persuasively, proverbs 
may come, and proverbs may go, but the roles they play and the 
tendencies they reveal about the people who employ them are 
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hardly insignifi cant. Just as we are certain that proverb usage 
will continue to engage and fascinate, we know, too, that the 
name Wolfgang Mieder shall never be writ in water.
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“In Aqua Scribere”
The Evolution of a Current Proverb
Charles Clay Doyle
T he name Wolfgang Mieder is not written in water. Like the names Archer Taylor and B. J. Whiting, it will long endure 
wherever paremiologists labor—if not chiseled in granite or cast 
in bronze, then fi rmly inked on high-quality acid-free paper. How-
ever, if Wolfgang Mieder did assert, with unmerited modesty, that 
his name might prove to be “written in water,” what would be the 
implications, proverbially speaking?
The old expression is much alive at the beginning of the twenty-
fi rst century. A well-read portion of English speakers may associ-
ate the phrase specifi cally with the poet John Keats, who is re-
ported to have asked, on his early deathbed in 1821, that his epi-
taph read, “Here lies one whose name was writ in water.” Even as 
a literary aphorism, however, the expression has been subject to 
the variability that tends to characterize proverbs and anecdotes. 
For instance, references to the epitaph often give the form “writ 
on water”—a small variation indeed; yet the difference between 
the two prepositions can suggest a fundamental difference in the 
imagery. With the preposition on, we imagine Keats’s name being 
inscribed on the surface of a pool or stream. With the preposition 
in, the expression can be interpreted that same way, but “writ 
in water” also permits us to imagine the name being written on 
paper with a pen dipped in water instead of ink. Either way, of 
course, “writ in water,” like “writ on water,” signifi es invisibility 
or (symbolically) oblivion for the name and fame of the individual 
whose appellation is so scripted.
Keats’s wish was carried out. Carved in the stone over his 
anonymous grave in the Protestant Cemetery in Rome appears 
“In Aqua S
c
rib
e
re
”
21
this inscription: “Here lies One/Whose Name was writ in Water” 
(a legible photograph appears in Rogers 1957, facing 33). The 
story of the poet’s deathbed utterance depends on a letter of 14 
February 1821—Keats died February 23—from his friend Joseph 
Severn to Charles Armitage Brown; the two of them oversaw the 
design and placement of the stone (Brown 1937, 85; see also 
Brown 1966, 91).
There persists some question as to whether Keats actually 
requested “writ in water” and not “writ on water”—both of these 
forms, with “writ” often modernized to “written,” are still cur-
rent in writing and in oral tradition. Prior to the carving of the 
gravestone, Keats’s friend and publisher John Taylor reported the 
poet’s request in the form, “Here lies one whose Name was writ 
on Water” (Blunden 1940, 88). A fragment of poetry by Keats’s 
confi dant Shelley, possibly intended for some version of the el-
egy “Adonais,” bears the title, “On Keats who desired that on his 
tomb should be inscribed ‘Here lieth one whose name was writ on 
water’”; it appeared in Mary Shelley’s posthumous edition of her 
husband’s verse (1969, 82), sent to the publisher in 1823, prior 
to the erection of Keats’s gravestone.
Innovator of expressive images though he was, Keats hardly 
invented the conceit of writing in (or on) water. In English, the 
expression was prevalent in Elizabethan times, while Latin and 
Greek versions extend back to antiquity.
Pivotal between those two ages was the great polymath Eras-
mus of Rotterdam, whose Adagia transported (and translated) so 
much of ancient learning to the culture of a newer Europe. Fol-
lowing the procedure used throughout his magisterial compila-
tion, Erasmus gave the adage in Latin—whether or not it was 
current in that form at the end of the Middle Ages—followed by 
one or more versions from the Greek.
In 1500 he included the proverb “In aqua scribes” in the fi rst 
of the many expanding editions of his Adagia (Erasmus 1993–, 
1:450; my English translations are based on Erasmus 1974–, 
1:359). The Latin translates g_e pumlautb_okn al_v ¡fn or (alternatively) 
¡fvn pumlautbtl al_v ¡fn. Next, Erasmus quoted and translated (into Latin) 
a Greek analog from Lucian: “Are you joking, Charon, or are you, 
as they say, writing on water . . . ?” [. . . in aqua, quod aiunt, 
scribes]; one from Plato: “Will he not then write these things care-
fully on black water, sowing with his pen?” [. . . in aqua scribet 
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nigra seminana calamo]; one from “the Greek maxims” [sententias
Graecas], of Menander: “You should write the oaths of wicked men 
on water” [Hominum improborum inscribe iusiurandum aquae]; 
a version “misquoted” [deprauat] by Xenarchas, which Erasmus 
added in the edition of 1517–18: “. . . a woman’s oath is writ-
ten with wine” [Inscribo vino si qua iurat foemina]; Erasmus may 
have been unaware that Xenarchas was parodying a line in a 
fragment by Sophocles, which gives the normative “water” version 
(Sophocles 1994–96, 3:362–63); and fi nally an occurrence in the 
Latin of Catullus, added in the 1520 edition: “What a woman says 
to her ardent lover should be written on the wind and running 
water” [in vento et rapida scribere oportet aqua].
Not included by Erasmus were some other early versions (cited 
by Lahr [1972–73, 17–18] and corrected by Woodman [1975, 12–
13]; both of those Keats scholars were apparently unaware of the 
central role Erasmus would have played in transmitting the proverb 
to educated English speakers): In the Greek prose of Philostratus, 
“. . . this is no dream, nor are you writing this love of ours in water” 
(Philostratus 1921, 160–61); and in the Latin of St. Augustine’s 
The City of God, purporting to translate the Greek of Porphyry, 
who consulted Apollo regarding the means to convert his previ-
ously Christianized wife back to paganism—the oracle declares, 
“You may perchance more easily write in lasting letters on water [in
aqua impressis litteris scribere], or spread light pinions and fl y like 
a bird through the air” (Augustine 1957–72, 6:214–15).
Versions of the Greek adage can also be found in the second-
century collection of the Greek paremiographer Diogenianus (ad-
ages 2.59 and 5.83), in a group of sayings ascribed to Plutarch 
(adage 5), among the “paroimiai” of Macarius (adages 4.95 and 
5.50), among the proverbs of Mantissa (adage 1.74), and in the 
tenth-century lexicon associated with the name Suïdas (adages 
3283 and 327); the adage also appeared among the late-fi fteenth-
century Apothegmata of Michael Apostolius (adages 6.56 and 
6.80) (Leutsch and Schneidewin [1839–87] 1958–65, 1:344, 2:27, 
176, 184, 267, 379, 387, 756; Suïdas [1928–38] 1967–71, 2:431, 
543). Erasmus had access to at least some of those compilations. 
(A few other early versions are cited by Boissonade [1829–33] 
1962, 1:5, 96, 394.)
Erasmus interpreted the adage “In aqua scribes” [You write on 
water] to mean “You are wasting your time” or, more literally, “You 
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are doing nothing” [nihil agis]. However, some of the examples that 
he (and I) have quoted pretty clearly carry the more recent sense 
of “Your utterance, your resolve, or your reputation is transitory, 
ephemeral,” an application that Erasmus acknowledged when he 
glossed the same proverb in another place: “de re euanida” [of 
something that will vanish] (Erasmus 1993–, 2:128). Other quo-
tations illustrate the meaning, “Your words are unreliable, not to 
be credited.” St. Augustine used the proverb as a paraphrastic 
expression of impossibility—like numbering the stars or counting 
the sands of the beach.
Regarding the ambiguity of the English wording “writ in wa-
ter”: No such ambiguity exists in Latin. With the Latin preposition 
in—as in Erasmus’s main entry, “In aqua scribis”—the phrase 
means “You write on water.” With the noun aqua alone, the abla-
tive case (or, less commonly, the dative aquae) signifi es “by means 
of”—that is, without the preposition, “Aqua scribis” means “You 
write with water (instead of ink).” As the quotations show, both 
versions—both images, presumably—occurred in antiquity.
The disparate imagery appeared again when Elizabethan 
Englishmen adopted or adapted the old saying. The two earli-
est known instances in English both appear in publications from 
1580. Austin Saker, in Narbonus: The Laberynth of Libertie, obvi-
ously thought of water as a substitute for the ink that a docu-
ment would ordinarily be written with: “. . . my warrante shall bee 
written with water, and sealed with sauce: put into the Paper of 
obliuion, and deliuered with the hande of forgetfulnesse” (Saker 
1580, 119). In the same year, 1580, the proverb appeared with 
the other sense in John Lyly’s Euphues and His England : “. . . the 
care that I haue had of thee . . . hath beene tried by the counsaile 
I haue always giuen thee, which if thou haue forgotten, I meane 
no more to write in water[;] if thou remember imprint it still” (Lyly 
1902, 2:187; cited by Tilley 1950, W114). The edition of 1597 al-
ters (corrects?) the last phrase to read “imprint it in steele” (Lyly 
1916, 412); this more concrete antithesis clarifi es that water is 
the medium written on. Whether he intended “still” or “in steele,” 
Lyly contrasts remembrance with the forgetfulness of writing on 
water.
In 1598 Nicolas Ling, in Politeuphuia: Wits Common Wealth,
gave—in the category of aphorisms concerning oaths—“Wicked 
mens oaths are written in water” ([Ling] 1598, fol. 146v; Tilley 
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[1950, W114] cited the 1597 edition, which does not contain the 
saying—nor is Tilley’s attribution of the book to John Bodenham 
to be credited).
Dating sixteenth and seventeenth century proverbs can be 
problematic. The composition of a book, which would be the date 
of the actual use of a proverb, could precede the publication date 
by some years. For plays, the situation is more complicated still, 
since early performances would probably have omitted matter 
that appears in the texts that were eventually published. Be that 
as it may, the next datable instance of our proverb occurs in an 
epilog, “To the Reader,” after Ben Jonson’s Poetaster, published in 
1616 (Jonson 1981–82, 2:226; cited by Dent 1984, W114):
. . . I could stamp
Their foreheads with those deep and public brands
That the whole company of barber-surgeons
Should not take off, with all their art, and plasters.
And these my prints should last, still to be read
In their pale fronts: when, what they write ‘gainst me,
Shall like a fi gure, drawn in water, fl eet,
And the poor wretched papers be employed
To cloth[e] tobacco. . . .
In this passage, the fl eeting “fi gure” can be interpreted according 
to either reading of “in water.”
In some lines traditionally ascribed to the poet and musician 
Thomas Campion (an attribution that Campion’s modern editor 
deems “doubtful”), fi rst published about 1623, a lovelorn singer 
laments, “My object now must be the aire,/To write in water words 
of fi re,/And teach sad thoughts how to despaire” (Campion 1969, 
455). With a probable pun on “aire” (in the sense of “song”), the 
poet embellishes the proverb with further elemental imagery to 
create the paradox of writing “in water” (in the sense of “on water,” 
most likely) “words of fi re”—suggesting not only the invisibility of 
his professed passion but also its inevitable cooling.
In Beaumont and Fletcher’s tragedy Philaster, published in 
1620, the title character exclaims, “Your memory shall be as foule 
behind you/As you are living: all your better deeds/ Shall be in water 
writ, but this in Marble” (Beaumont and Fletcher 1966–96, 1:469); 
the parallelism suggests that in means on. A similar sentiment
occurs in Henry VIII by Shakespeare, probably in collaboration 
“In Aqua S
c
rib
e
re
”
25
with Fletcher, fi rst printed in the 1623 folio of Shakespeare’s plays: 
“Mens euill manners, liue in Brasse, their Vertues / We write in 
Water” (Shakespeare 1968, 579; cited by Dent 1981, W114). In 
1630 appeared another version of the proverb with the “water”/
”brass” antithesis; John Taylor (nicknamed the “water poet”) paid 
tribute to King James I in a “funerall elegie”: “His anger written 
on weak water was,/His Patience and his Loue were grau’d in 
Brasse” (Taylor 1630, 324 [2nd series of pagination], sig. Iii [1st 
such signing] 2v).
A year earlier, in 1629, an English poem loosely adapting or 
paraphrasing a long epigram from The Greek Anthology (epigram 
9.359, where the adage itself does not appear) was published in 
Thomas Farnaby’s Florilegium epigrammatum Graecorum; the lines 
have been attributed to Francis Bacon: “The world’s a bubble. . . ./
Who then to fraile mortality shall trust,/ But limmes the water, or 
but writes in dust” (Farnaby 1629, sig. A5v). To make a connec-
tion with Keats’s circle of acquaintances: Mary Shelley employed 
the quoted couplet as the epigraph to volume 1, chapter 10 of her 
novel Lodore in 1835 (1996, 6:54).
The same connection between inscribing water and the equal-
ly futile attempt to write on another substance occurs in Philip 
Massinger’s play The Maid of Honour, published in 1632: “but all 
that I had done,/My benefi ts, in sand or water written,/As they 
had never been, no more remember’d!” (Massinger 1813, 4:101). 
Separate instances of the proverbial phrase “to write in sand” have 
been recorded; both Tilley (1950, W114) and Dent (1981, W114; 
1984, W114) consider it the same proverb as “to write on water.” 
Another paralleling of images occurs in a poem titled “The Ex-
postulation,” which has been attributed to both John Donne and 
Ben Jonson, fi rst published in 1633; like the Roman Catullus—
behind whom stood Xenarchus and Sophocles—it focuses on fe-
male fi ckleness: “Are vowes so cheape with women, or the matter/ 
Whereof they’are made, that they are writ in water,/And blowne 
away with wind?” (Donne 1965, 94). Catullus had likewise linked 
the images of wind and water. Still another proverbial associa-
tion occurred in 1635 in John Reynolds’s The Triumphs of Gods 
Revenge: “But this is to write upon the water, and to build Castles 
of vaine hopes in the ayre” (Reynolds 1635, 364). In 1638, Henry 
Adamson’s The Muses Threnodie said of nations, “Yet time hath 
overturn’d them, and their names/Are past, as Letters written
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on the streames,/To tell us, here we have no constant biding” 
(Adamson 1638, 84).
The traditional antifeminist application of the proverb is re-
versed in Argalus and Parthenia by Henry Glapthorne, published 
in 1639, where a female character decries male infi delity: “And let 
their words, oaths, teares, vowes, passe,/As words in water writ, 
or slippery glasse” (Glapthorne 1639, 35; cited by Tilley 1950, 
W114). Those lines are quoted (with attribution) as one of the 
“Formulae Majores. Or, Common Places” in Thomas Blount’s The
Academy of Eloquence, 1654 (115–16). In a play of doubtful au-
thorship, The False One, which fi rst appeared in the 1647 folio of 
Beaumont and Fletcher, a character employs the “wine” variant 
anticipated by Xenarchus’s parody of Sophocles: “And though I 
had killd my Father, give me gold,/I’le make men sweare I have 
done a pious Sacrifi ce/ . . . /And my brave deed shall be writ in 
wine, for virtuous” (Beaumont and Fletcher 1966–96, 8:149). In a 
play published in 1654, Revenge for Honour, doubtfully attributed 
to George Chapman, we return to the antifeminist use of our prov-
erb (this time spoken by a female character): “Of what frail temper 
is a woman’s weakness!/Words writ in waters have more lasting 
essence/Than our determinations” (Chapman 1961, 2:726).
By 1658 the proverb was demonstrably familiar enough to 
be adapted in a wittily allusive way: “Write in water” is used to 
mean “paint in watercolors,” as an anonymous poet (in a com-
mendatory poem) praises a treatise on painting by Sir William 
Sanderson, in the process explicitly identifying the expression 
as a proverb and recording one of its applications, one that spe-
cifi cally anticipates Keats’s epitaph on the meaninglessness of a 
writer’s life: “Your fame shall (spite of Proverbs) make it plain, To 
write in Water’s not to write in vain” (Sanderson 1658, sig. b1v). In 
1659 Henry More’s treatise The Immortality of the Soul gave an in-
novative twist to the old “water”/”wind” pairing: “For when a man 
is so fugitive and unsetled, that he will not stand to the verdict of 
his own Faculties, one can no more fasten any thing upon him, 
then he can write in the water, or tye knots of the wind” (More 
1987, 24). In 1692 Richard Hollingsworth, paying belated trib-
ute to King Charles I (beheaded in 1649), echoed the “limming” 
version of the proverb in the 1629 epigram attributed to Bacon; 
during his trial, the king had “minded them of what he had done 
. . . and wherein can it justly be blam’d? Especially considering 
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all he had done, was but a kind of Limming the Water, to them” 
(Hollingsworth 1692, 73).
Between the seventeenth century and the death of Keats in 
1821, I can fi nd no record of the proverb, except as it appeared in 
translations of Catullus or in The Restauration by George Villiers, 
second Duke of Buckingham, fi rst published in 1715 (though Vil-
liers had died in 1687); Buckingham’s play, however, is nothing 
but an adaptation of Beaumont and Fletcher’s Philaster (Villiers 
1715, 1:64). This seeming absence may result, partly, at least, 
from three factors:1) compilers of proverb dictionaries have more 
assiduously searched medieval and Renaissance works for Eng-
lish proverbs than works from the eighteenth century; 2) the in-
valuable online databases of full-text documents represent the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries more abundantly than ear-
lier periods; 3) my own literary expertise lies in the literature of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. To be sure, nineteenth-
century men of letters were well read in literature of earlier times, 
and they could have revived an archaic or dormant saying. How-
ever, the prevalence of the proverb—apparently independent of 
Keats’s infl uence—in nineteenth-century records suggests that it 
had remained in oral tradition, if not much in literary use, during 
the interim.
Although I know of no interesting examples of the proverb from 
1700 to 1821, I have on fi le some fi fty instances from the remain-
ing decades of the nineteenth century, the majority of them Amer-
ican—a predominance, again, which may result from the bias of 
the available databases or scholars’ sampling procedures—even 
though the saying has no entry in Archer Taylor’s 1958 Dictionary
of American Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases, 1820–1880. About 
a third of the nineteenth-century mentions make direct reference 
to the death or the grave of Keats or allude to Keats in some other 
obvious manner. The remainder suggest that the proverb was go-
ing along its own way, as if in uninterrupted popularity.
In 1829 Sarah Josepha Buell Hale, like several of her early 
predecessors—but unlike Keats in 1821—used the proverb in an 
antithesis: “But it should be remembered that though the hu-
man heart is like water when we would write thereon lessons of 
virtue, it is like the rock to retain the impressions of vice” (Hale 
1829, 55). Other nineteenth-century writers vary the terms of the 
antithesis:
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. . . The fi gures, the motions, the words of the beloved object are not 
like other images written in water, but, as Plutarch said, “enamelled 
in fi re.” (1841—Ralph Waldo Emerson 1971–, 2:102)
[Of the “Negro” race:] Our slightest faults are engraven on stone, and 
our brightest virtues written on water. (J. H. Perkins 1849, fol. 1r)
“Crowns and sceptres,” says one, “do not secure us from the incon-
stancy of changes; and we may better trust unto the wind, or to let-
ters written upon water, than unto human felicity.” (Rev. J. Leonard 
Corning 1857, 156)
The angels are so near us in our infancy, that the troubles of the 
world, which are afterward engraved in marble, are then only writ-
ten in water. (William Henry Holcombe 1870, 19)
Woman’s love is writ in water!
Woman’s faith is traced on sand!
(William Edmonstoune Aytoun circa 1870, 140)
The men who group around Leicester square are the exiles without 
a fame, . . . the men who come like shadows, and so depart; the 
men whose names are writ in water, even though their life-paths 
may have been marked in blood. (Justin McCarthy 1872, 202)
The name of the man who so beautifi ed and enriched this city [Par-
is] that he loved is writ in water, while that of the great scourge of 
his country is carved in the hearts of his people. (Helen B. Mathews 
1877, 63)
One lesson the rubric of confl ict has taught her [the city of Boston]:
Though parted awhile by war’s earth-rending shock,
The lives that divide us are written in water
The love that unites us cut deep in the rock.
(1880—Oliver Wendell Holmes 1892–1908, 13:230)
In 1833 Theodore Fay seems to have playfully literalized the 
proverb’s metaphor to suggest impossibility: “A person standing 
on the brink of a running stream on a cold day, seriously employed 
in ‘writing his name in water,’ would be accounted insane—the 
attempt to write munifi cence and generosity on the coachman’s 
mind is equally futile” (Fay 1833, 2:147). Like Fay, other nine-
teenth-century writers enclosed some version of our expression in 
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quotation marks, presumably thus marking it as either proverbial 
or allusive: for example,
She loved—he deserted her—she followed him to a great city and 
died there. That was all the father could tell. But her name was not 
“written in water,” so far as he was concerned. (William H. Bushnell 
1867, 15)
. . . The good men who labored to give us equitable laws and happy 
homes[:] . . . Let not our children search for their names and fi nd 
them “writ in water.” (J. Ross Browne 1875, 347)
There are those to whom the work might well be one of love . . . 
telling us something also of the men whose names were “writ in wa-
ter”—in the most shifting, quickly-running stream that fl ows. (E. L.
Burlingame 1877, 406)
Again like Theodore Fay in 1833, several nineteenth-century 
writers ironically made the image in the proverb somewhat literal, 
as if assuming the readers’ familiarity with the expression in its 
standard, fi gurative sense:
[Explaining a whaler’s ability to “track” his prey:] . . . This hunter’s 
wondrous skill, the proverbial evanescence of a thing writ in water, 
a wake, is to all desired purposes well nigh as reliable as the stead-
fast land. (1851—Herman Melville 1967, 453–54)
A stream or a fountain survives many successive buildings, and a 
local superstition attached to either has the best chance of perma-
nence. A tradition, to be lasting, must be writ on water. (William 
George Clark 1858, 286)
[When the stalwart Warwick has dissolved in a none-too-manly fi t of 
weeping:] He yielded to it, letting the merciful magic of tears quench 
the fi re, wash the fi rst bitterness away, and leave reproaches only 
writ in water.” (1864—Louisa May Alcott 1991, 131)
And mark how full of grace and ease the running water is. . . . The 
motion of the brook, indeed, is music written in water. (N. H. Cham-
berlain 1865, 209)
In most of these quotations, whether in the form “on water” 
or “in water” (“in” construed in either sense), the proverb—like
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Keats’s epitaph—expresses impermanence or oblivion. So do oth-
er instances:
That race upon whose sepulchre we rear
Our temples and our hearth-stones, and whose names
Written in water, still as Time rolls on
Are deep ingulphed within the rushing stream,
Whose sweep is onward to Eternity.
(Gretta 1849, 291)
. . . Men’s lives for the most part have been written in water, and 
that of the muddiest. (Samuel Phillips 1852, 19)
. . . Those grand ideas . . . are small beside the simple Bible truths 
. . . that shall stand for ages, while others will prove to have been 
written in water. (Mary A. Denison 1863, 72)
. . . This little waif makes me feel that the story of human life and 
hope is writ in water. (Theodore Tilton 1874, 264)
A kindness shown seems written in water. (Thomas Dunn English
1894, 637)
It is more than conceivable that important discoveries in experi-
mental physics were made by men whose names and works were 
written on water. (Rev. George McDermot 1900, 392)
One particular sense of the proverb, which became increas-
ingly prevalent in the twentieth century, was anticipated by early 
uses in reference to the promises of lovers or of “wicked men”: 
An insincere vow or resolve—or an unenforceable command or 
rule—consists of words “written in water”:
. . . There will come a time in these colonies when the king’s com-
mands will be as if written in water, and the king’s threats will 
make no man tremble. (Mary A. Denison 1860, 145)
His sudden impulse, his enthusiastic vow, were not as words writ-
ten in water. (“A Son of the Crusaders” 1873, 434)
. . . let the glorious name be said,
Lest mine oath in the water be written, and I wake up, vile and 
betrayed,
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In the arms of the faint-heart dastard. . . .
(1876—William Morris 1910–15, 211)
. . . But these pledges as we know were writ in water. (James D. 
Phelan 1896, 108)
The popular currency of the saying has continued through the 
twentieth century and into the twenty-fi rst, although it failed to 
gain entry into Whiting’s Modern Proverbs and Proverbial Sayings
(1989). With the more extensive availability of searchable full-
text databases (articles in newspapers and popular magazines, 
law-review articles, judicial decisions, scholarly articles, literary 
works) and the World Wide Web itself, I have collected more than 
a hundred “modern” examples, about a third of them (again) mak-
ing some fairly clear allusion to Keats. Among the remainder, a 
few uses of the phrase “write on water” that were formerly rare 
seem to have gained prominence—although the Oxford English 
Dictionary’s assertion that it can mean “to spend money” (2d ed., 
s.v. “water,” sb. 1f) has never been exemplifi ed at all, as far as I 
can ascertain. 
Frequently encountered is the concept that the words one 
writes, literally—not just one’s name or reputation—will prove 
especially ephemeral because of the genre in which the writer 
works. In the fi rst of these, the metaphor is oddly mixed:
The [newspaper] editor, no matter how distinguished, writes in wa-
ter; his page is a palimpsest on which he expends all his talents, 
wit, learning and judgment for the day alone, to be erased with the 
next sun. (Allan Nevins 1928, v)
. . . Like all the words of man, our own words [those of historians] 
will be writ on water. (J. H. Hexter 1954, 221)
“I used to say reporters write on water, but now I see that we write 
on paper. Which crumbles.” (Richard Stout, quoted in Kernan 1978, 
B1)
“My efforts with Hollywood are like things written in water,” she 
said. (Brian D. Johnson 1992, 66)
As someone once said, theater is written on water. (Jackie Campbell 
1994, 26D)
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Potter dedicated himself to the medium at a time when to write for 
television was to write in water. (Allison Pearson 1995, 15)
Even more prevalent—accounting for about a fourth of all the 
non-Keatsian references—is the use of the proverb to suggest the 
unenforceability or disregard of a rule, law, agreement, or oth-
er written promise—adapting the conceit which extends back to 
antiquity (and taking more literally the image of writing) that a 
lover’s vow is like words written in water:
The trial has often been made[,] and the agreements which have 
been elaborated, signed, ratifi ed, seem to have been written in wa-
ter. (James Brown Scott 1908, 128–29)
If the Court does not abide by its Rules, how can it expect the bar 
to do so? Standards must be enforced to be respected. If they are 
merely left as something on paper, they might as well be written on 
water. (Felix Frankfurter 1957, 352 U.S. 521)
No one would want a presidential decision written in water. Yet 
must it be carved in stone? (“Adrift from Sea Law” 1982, 24).
Gramm-Rudman defi cit-reduction requirements were written on 
water and are about to be relaxed. (George Will 1987, 82)
It allows for fl exibility, precisely because arrangements are “written 
on water” rather than in stone. (Rachel Kelly 1994, 43)
Unless the Constitution is “fi xed,” its limits are writ on water. (Raoul 
Berger 1997, 524)
His pronouncements [Buffalo’s mayor’s] are written on water, not 
carved in stone. He’s got a preservation policy nobody follows, a 
residency policy everybody ignores. . . . (“Pick a Mayor” 2002, B1)
In reference to the arid American West, “written in water” (or 
“with water,” but not “on water”) has acquired a distinctive new 
meaning, fi gurative in a wholly different way: It means “deter-
mined by (or in regard to) the availability (or absence) of water.” 
About 1940 the Colorado poet Thomas Hornsby Ferril wrote, “Here 
is a land where life is written in water”—a line now engraved on a 
plaque in the Colorado state capitol (a photograph can be seen at 
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http://www.archives.state.co.us/cap/murals.htm). In 1995 The 
Newsletter of the Colorado Water Resources Research Institute 
published an article with the punning title, “Agreements Writ-
ten with Water: Prospects for Integrated Watershed Management 
in the Cache Le Poudre Basin” (Graf and Williams 1995, 17). A 
newspaper report from Oregon in June 2002 notes, “The history 
of the American West is written in water, and no federal agency 
has had a greater role in writing it than the US Bureau of Recla-
mation” (Brad Knickerbocker 2002, O2).
So the dying poet Keats spoke a proverb in a particular verbal 
and situational context, and such were the pathos and power of 
his request that the proverb has often clung to Keats, in ironic 
contradiction to the prophecy and wish expressed by him. Per-
haps Keats’s reported inclusion of the already-archaic verb form 
helped perpetuate the frequent occurrence of the word “writ” in 
the phrase even today. However, in that version and others, the 
proverb—already old when Keats uttered it—has continued to 
function in a variety of changing contexts.
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World Is Saved”
Creative Selection of Proverbs in Sephardic Narrative
Isaac Jack Lévy and Rosemary Lévy Zumwalt
P roverbs are used to speak the message in Sephardic narra-tives, and they do so with “the authority of generations” (Mie-
der and Mieder 1981, 310). The taletellers weave proverbs into 
their stories with creative selection in a variety of ways. They may 
choose a proverb as the opening or closing frame and link it in the 
telling to the heart of the message; they can cement the appeal 
to the past of the narrative, which begins “many years ago”1 and 
ends with the wisdom of the ages; and, in literary fashion, they 
can even title their narrative with a proverb. Through the cre-
ative use of proverbs, the listeners join in active dialogue, indeed 
in some instances even in dispute, with the narrator. The power 
then in the use of proverbs in Sephardic narratives lies in the 
combination of the authority of the past as spoken in proverbs to 
summarize a moral message and the narrator’s ability to craft the 
message creatively by choosing just the right proverb.
In his essay, “Proverb Speaking as a Creative Process: The 
Akan of Ghana,” Kwesi Yankah emphasizes the need to focus on 
the “situated uses of proverbs”; this approach includes “a close 
study of the proverb in interaction situations” and a critique of 
“the view that proverb use is essentially an exercise in quotation” 
(1986, 195, 196). Yankah emphasizes the dynamic possibilities of 
the proverb, for as he says, the proverb “is subject to creative de-
formation during performance, even as the proverb retains its his-
torical identity.” He remarks on the importance of tradition and 
history “in lending acceptability to the proverb,” and he continues,
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“for knowledge of history and tradition is, in several cultures, a 
privilege that may be used to key and heighten performance, au-
thenticate, validate, as well as confer power and authority; and it 
is to the performer’s advantage to invoke this knowledge to aug-
ment his word.” However, for Yankah the appeal to tradition and 
history is not a static hold, a weight of ages past, but rather a gift 
to the narrator to reshape and reinterpret by creatively changing 
and elaborating on the summation of wisdom in the form of the 
proverb. “Creativity,” Yankah says, “. . . may be interpreted in 
three senses:1) the creation of novel proverbs, 2) the timely invo-
cation of an effective proverb in a fi tting rhetorical context, and 3) 
the adaptation and manipulation of existing proverbs” (p. 197).
Our emphasis will be on creative selection of proverbs, rather 
than Yankah’s “creative deformation.” We agree with Yankah’s po-
sition that the use of proverbs is much more than “an exercise 
in quotation” (p. 196). While our work is informed by Arewa’s 
and Dundes’s article, “Proverbs and the Ethnography of Speak-
ing Folklore,” we differ in our emphasis on creative selection of 
proverbs. Arewa and Dundes write that the one using the proverb 
“is but the instrument through which the proverb speaks to the 
audience” (1964, 70). We will see that the Sephardic audience is 
not so passive in receiving the wisdom of the tale in proverb form. 
In many instances, not only does the narrator choose a specifi c 
proverb to summarize the tale but the audience actively critiques 
his choice. There is nothing static or uncontested about the ap-
peal to tradition through the use of a proverb, for there are a va-
riety of appeals that can be made and a plurality of proverbs from 
which to draw. The process of narration and proverb use is, in 
sum, a creative, dynamic process. As Barre Toelken writes,
All folklore participates in a distinctive, dynamic process. Constant 
change, variation within a tradition, whether intentional or inad-
vertent, is viewed here simply as a central fact of life for folklore, 
and rather than presenting it in opposed terms of conscious artistic 
manipulation or forgetfulness, I have sought to accept it as a defi n-
ing feature that grows out of context, performance, attitude, [and] 
cultural tastes. (1979, 10)
The Sephardic konsejas (folktales) are drawn from those col-
lected by Isaac Jack Lévy over a period of forty years (1960–2000) 
from his grandmother, Sarota Amato Musafi r; his mother, Caden 
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Lévy Israel; his father, Baruch Israel;2 and other relatives and close 
family friends. All of these people originated in Turkey and Rhodes 
(Greece). They all shared in the rich traditions of Sephardic life. The 
language of the home was Judeo-Spanish, and the chief entertain-
ment in the evenings was the telling of konsejas. Isaac remembers 
such storytelling sessions from his childhood in Rhodes:
I recall that on wintry rainy evenings, men and women gathered in 
a neighbor’s house, shared a meal, and told one story after another 
until they had to retire for the night. The telling of stories was also 
popular during the cool summer evenings when people gathered in 
the patios, seated among the blooming fl ower pots and under the 
lattice with its hanging vines. . . . There was no stopping once the 
narration of tales began. Time was of no consequence, especially 
when the master tellers took the fl oor. Many a time, I recall how 
the stories mesmerized those present. In our family circle, the nar-
ratives began with serious—didactic, moral, religious—themes and 
as the night advanced, they took a lighter vein. All present were 
ready for some laughter, and the stories dealing with Djuha, mari-
tal affairs, and the frivolous, were welcomed. There was humor in 
the air. In this atmosphere of gaiety, when everyone was oblivious 
of the daily problems, men and women would join with their tales, 
hilarious jokes, even with obscene stories. Of course, by now all the 
children were asleep. (Lévy 1989, 69–70)
Years later, when as a college student, Isaac began to collect 
all manner of Sephardic folklore, his family members were doubly 
willing to share with him. Ballads, proverbs, folktales, folk beliefs 
were all a natural part of their daily lives. They responded to Isaac’s 
keen interest in collecting the folklore with a somewhat shocked 
and appreciative wonder as if to say, “Why should anyone—and 
especially our Isaac who is studying in college—be interested in 
such things?” As our mother, Caden Lévy Israel, remarked when 
both Rosemary and Isaac together collected materials from her, 
“I can’t say anything, but they write it down!” The transcribed 
and translated texts of the konsejas show clearly the comfort of 
family members—father, mother, and grandmother—in sharing 
their stories with their son and grandson; and sharing more than 
stories, for in these texts are lessons in wisdom, clearly conveyed 
in the wise words of proverbs.
In his classic work The Proverb, Archer Taylor discusses the 
relationship between proverbs and narrative. Taylor particularly 
Comes Around
W
h
a
t 
G
o
e
s
 A
ro
u
n
d
40
focuses on the origin of proverbs—whether this be the proverb 
deriving from a narrative, or a narrative giving story to a proverb. 
While the question of origins is a hapless and frustrating enter-
prise that we eschew, we fi nd provocative Taylor’s comments on 
the connection between the proverb and the fable: 
There may perhaps be certain classes of stories which yield prov-
erbs more readily than others. The Aesopic fable, for example, 
stands godfather to many a proverb: Sour grapes; A dog in the man-
ger; Don’t kill the goose that lays the golden eggs; Don’t count your 
chickens before they are hatched. . . . I am not sure that the Latin 
proverb We lose the certain things, while we seek the uncertain ones
. . . alludes to the fable of the dog which lost its meat by snapping 
at the refl ection in the water. (1962, 28)
As if continuing a conversation with Taylor on the link be-
tween fable and proverb, Ruth Finnegan observes in “Proverbs in 
Africa,” “A moralizing story may end with, or imply, a proverb to 
drive home its point” (1981, 12). She notes the “close connection 
between proverbs and other forms of oral literature” and specifi -
cally refers to the work by H. Chatelain among the Kimbundu of 
Angola in the latter part of the nineteenth century: “Proverbs are 
closely related to anecdotes, so much so that anecdotes are some-
times just illustrations of a proverb, while a proverb is frequently 
an anecdote in a nutshell” (p. 12).3
For the Sephardim, proverbio comes from the same Latin root 
as the English word “proverb”: “prô- forth + verbum word, (origi-
nally) a speaking, speech” (Barnhart 1974, 2:1661), an etymology 
which places the emphasis squarely on the process of speaking. 
Additionally, a proverb may be referred to as refran, or refl an,
meaning “adage, saying, proverb, maxim” (Nehama 1977, 469).4
Joseph Nehama, in his Dictionnaire du Judéo-Espagnol, even 
quotes a proverb about proverbs—or a metaproverb—“Refran
mentirozo no ay” (There is no lying [false] proverb) (p. 469). 
In Prolegomena to the Study of the Refranero Sefardi (1969),
Lévy notes the lack of a specifi c term for proverb in medieval 
Spain. “Instead, an author quite regularly used a formula, a word, 
or an adjecctive when quoting a common or classical phrase ad-
opted by the people. In the exempla and other philosophical and 
didactic works, when the authority of a sage was desired, the 
author preceded the saying by a formula, Los antiguos dicen [The
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ancestors say], or Como dize el sabio [As the wise one says]” (p. 
18).
Still, a range of terms often replaced the formulaic opening. In-
cluded among these was retraire, retrayre or retraere, in common 
usage from 1250, “which means to go back, to repeat, to tell, to 
think or to recall an old story or teaching worthy of remembrance” 
(Lévy 1969, 19). There were also other terms—“brocardi[c]o, cas-
tigo, conseja, dicho, escritura, exemplo, . . . sentencia, verbo, verso, 
. . . and vulgar”—which all “imply a lesson or judgment derived 
from a fable” or a folktale (Lévy 1969, 18). One of the most im-
portant terms which Lévy identifi es, fabla, was also glossed as 
“fabiella, fabilla, fabriella, fabrilla,” and most interestingly, as 
habla (language, talk), which again emphasizes the importance of 
speaking (p. 18). Lévy continues, “These terms, found as early as 
1200, denote not only a fábula but also the lesson obtained from 
it, and in time the reference condensed into a proverb: ‘Esta fabla
compuesta de Yosete sacada (Libro de buen amor, Qtr. 96)” (Lévy 
1969, 18–19).5
The Judeo-Spanish folktale—known as kuento or konseja,
the latter derived from konsejar, to advise, to teach—may itself 
be framed by proverbs as Isaac’s mother did in her narration of 
“Marido, maredo” [Husband, Log].6 She began, “Ken kon peros se 
echa kon pulgas se alvanta [He who goes to bed with dogs wakes 
up with fl eas]”; and she closed, “Ansi es ke ‘Antes ke te kazes, 
mira lo ke azes’” [Thus it is that ‘Before you get married, see what 
you are doing’]. The tale opens with Simha, a widow, drinking 
Turkish coffee with her friend Rebeka: “When Simha mentioned 
the name of Avraam, the deceased, Rebeka, as was customary, 
said, ‘May he rest in peace. May we be among the living.’ But 
Simha jumped and said [of her husband], ‘El guerko se lo yevo i 
el guerko ke se lo guadre!’ [The devil took him and may the devil 
keep him!].”
There ensues a discussion about the worth of husbands, with 
Simha saying they are all worthless, and Rebeka saying hers is an 
“alma del Dyo” [a saint]. Simha says,
”Look, let’s play a trick. I’m going to give you a potion that is going 
to make you as if you are dead. When your dear one comes home, 
I’m going to talk to him, and you listen to the conversation.” . . . 
When [Rebeka’s husband] came home and saw that his wife was 
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lying in bed, all white and lifeless, he started . . . to cry big tears. 
Simha took his hand . . . and told him that before dying, Rebeka 
begged her not to leave him alone [but] to [marry] Avram. Avram 
replies with great sighing, “And she said it to me, and she said it 
to me.” At that moment, Rebeka opened her eyes and [yelled at her 
husband], “Son of a jackass, when did I tell you that?” Thus it is 
that “Antes ke te kazes mira lo ke azes” [Before you get married, see 
what you are doing.]
The same proverb that begins this story concludes the story of 
“La media ermana” [The Half Sister]:
One day, the son of Djuha comes to see his father. He says, “Papa, 
I have found the most beautiful girl, and I am going to marry her.” 
Djuha asks, “Who is she?” And his son replies, “She is the daughter 
of the butcher.” Djuha says, “You can’t marry her; she is your half 
sister.”
Each time that the son comes to the father to tell about meeting 
a young woman he wishes to marry, Djuha tells him that he can’t 
because she is his half sister. Finally, the mother asks her son why 
he is so sad. He says, “Each time that I talk with my father and I 
say who I am going to marry, he tells me that I can’t because she is 
my half sister. I don’t know what I’m going to do!” The mother says 
to him, “Son, you can marry anyone you choose. Djuha isn’t even 
your father.”
The narrator concludes the story, “See how Djuha ‘se echo kon peros 
i se levanto kon pulgas’ [Djuha ‘lay down with dogs and got up with 
fl eas’]. That is to say that Djuha lay down with other women without 
knowing that his own wife was also having her own affairs.”7
The narrator may elect to open the narrative with a formulaic 
phrase, which serves to alert the listener that a story is to follow, 
end with a proverb, and sandwich a proverb in the midst of the 
narration. Isaac’s father, Baruch Israel, did just that in his story 
of “The Anti-Semite.”8 He began, “In the time of old Russia, there 
was a Jew who was a peddler. . . . He used to go to all the villages 
to sell [clothes]. There was a village at a distance where every-
one was an anti-Semite, and they were against the Jews. He was 
afraid of that village.” The peddler met a man who encouraged 
him to come to his village, the one of the anti-Semites. “When 
a week passed, two, the business was going poorly. This Jew
remembered that person who told him to go to the village. Even 
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though he knew that ‘Di lus malus nu se aspera dinguna bondad’ 
[From evil people no one expects any goodness], even so he took a 
little chance.” The peddler had “to earn a living [so] he decided to 
go to the village of the anti-Semitic people.” 
Isaac’s father continued with the story, but pointedly asked 
him if he understood:
Well! When he went to that village, the people already saw that he 
was a Jew. Do you understand? [Directed to Isaac] They took him, 
they grabbed him, they accused him. The man says, “What have I 
done?” “Oh, you,” he says, “are the one who killed Christ,” he says. 
“I?” he says. “I don’t have any news about it; I was not he.” “No?” he 
says. “You’re not Jewish?” “Yes,” he says, “I’m Jewish, but—“ ”You 
are the one who did the killing,” he says.
The villagers took him before a tribunal, and the verdict was that 
“the Jew killed Christ. So. ‘You who are a Jew, you are of the same 
race, and the guilt falls on you.’” The man engaged a lawyer who 
“instead of helping him, told him, ‘They’re right . . . because you are 
of that race, and you must pay for the sin that they have commit-
ted.’” The peddler saw that there was no remedy and asked for one 
last wish. “He says, ‘I want to go to church.’”
When he entered the church, he went to the Christ, and he spoke 
to him in his ear. Everyone is looking at him. “Is he crazy, this one? 
What is it?” He spoke in the ear, [and] then he put his own ear to 
the Christ so that [Christ] may speak to him. When he fi nished 
speaking to Christ, he started to laugh. He started to laugh, he 
came down [from the crucifi x], [and] says, “All right. Let’s go now,” 
he says. “Now I’m happy,” he says. They say, “What is happening 
that you are happy now?” He says, “That is for me to know.” “No,” 
they say. “You must tell it to us.”
“The truth is that I spoke with Christ; he told me, ‘What they 
are doing to you,’ he says, ‘they did to me also, to me,’ he says. 
‘When I was alive, nobody loved me. Everyone wanted to kill me. 
They are going to kill you,’ he says. ‘They are going to hang you, 
and then they are going to ask for forgiveness. They, their children, 
their grandchildren—they are all going to ask you to forgive them, 
and they are going to throw themselves at your feet.’” “Ah!” [the 
people] say, “That’s what you want to do, eh? It’s not enough that 
we already got duped by one,” they say, “and now we are going to 
be duped by another,” they say. “To the street. Throw out this bas-
tard.” And they took him and they threw him into the street, and 
the man saved himself.
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Isaac’s father concludes, “This proves that ‘Kun il djidio ni el 
guerku la kita’ [With the Jew, not even the devil succeeds].” And 
then he turned to Isaac and said, “Do you know, ‘Para un dimzis 
si keri un kademsis’ [For a bastard, you need a son of a bitch]. 
That’s how the good Jew saved himself.” And Isaac’s mother, who 
was listening, added, “Kon el djenio se salva del fuego” [With inge-
nuity, one saves oneself from the fi re (trouble)].9
In some instances, the narrator used a proverb as a way of 
summarizing the wisdom of the tale. Isaac’s mother began the 
story of “El Hap” [The Pill]:
I’m going to tell you about a very unhappy marriage in which ev-
ery time that the husband came home from a hard day’s work, he 
would hear his wife complain without end. This poor man didn’t 
know what else to do. Every day that God created, he would listen 
to his companion of many years speak evil of one thing or another. 
She always complained of her unfortunate destiny. Tired of life, he 
tells her that it was time to see the chief rabbi of the city about giv-
ing him a divorce.10
Together the husband and wife petitioned the rabbi for a divorce. 
After listening to their complaints, the rabbi spoke to each one sepa-
rately. “To the wife, he gives some pills and tells her to take one half 
an hour before the arrival of her husband.” These, he said, would 
make her happier and allow her to tolerate her husband for another 
month, “but he warns her that if she would open her mouth before 
one hour had passed after she had taken the pill, she would die 
because the pill had poison inside.”
For thirty days, the man came home from his work and sat in 
his armchair with a meze, an appetizer, resting after a long day at 
work. Meanwhile, the wife did not say a word and continued cook-
ing for her husband. She, frightened of dying, did not open her 
mouth at all. In such a manner, the thirty days passed, but neither 
one nor the other fought. 
At the end of the month, neither wanted a divorce. The rabbi ex-
plained to the wife that the pills had not been poison but were just 
made of sugar water. It was necessary, he said, for her to give her 
husband thirty minutes to rest after his day at work.
Isaac’s mother concluded the narrative, “The two thanked the 
rabbi for his good advice and understood that in life each person 
must have a little solitude in order to rest and to think and that 
this does not mean that one does not love his wife.” And then she 
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remarked directly to Isaac, “The konseja tells us that in a mar-
riage, as in everything one does in life, we have to give our dear 
ones a moment to breathe and that paying ‘Muncha atension i 
posesion atabafa al ombre’” [Too much attention and possession 
suffocates an individual]. When her daughter concluded the sto-
ry, Isaac’s grandmother turned to him and said, “Muncho avlar, 
muncho yerrar [The more one speaks, the more one errs], and she 
added, “For this reason, the human being has to guard against 
what he says and when he says it.”11 At another telling, Isaac’s 
mother concluded the story with the following proverb: “El mun-
cho avlar arrebuelve” [A lot of talk agitates]. When Isaac asked 
his father what arrebuelve meant, he explained it with another 
proverb, “El muncho avlar dezrepoza” [A lot of talk upsets]. The 
third time Isaac collected this story, the narrator concluded, “Ken 
mucho avla poko el repoza” [He who talks much, rests little], and 
then immediately explained this with the proverb, “Poko avlar, 
salud para el kuerpo” [Little talk is healthy for the body]. Thus, 
each time this konseja was told to Isaac, the narrator encapsu-
lated the moral as he or she saw it by voicing a different proverb.
In the story about “The Rabbi and the Sinner,” Isaac’s father 
concluded on one occasion with a single proverb, and on another, 
with four. The konseja begins,
There was once a much-sainted rabbi who was highly respected 
both by Jews and Turks. There was nothing in the world that he 
would not do for God’s children. He spent every hour of the day 
helping his fl ock and reading the Law of Moses. His fame was so 
well known throughout the lands. This rabbi had only one con-
stant concern. For several nights, he dreamt that upon dying, they 
buried him at the foot of the city butcher, who was an evil person, 
a shameless person, a thief, a liar. He could never understand the 
reason for the dream and why the Master of the Universe paid him 
back with this dishonor.12
The rabbi went to the butcher and asked him to tell his life story. 
The butcher said that “there was nothing to tell and, as everyone 
already knew, he had no friend.” As he represented himself, he was 
an evil person with one purpose in life: “to make a lot of money.” 
Persistently, the rabbi questioned the butcher and begged him not 
to leave out a single incident. 
As Isaac’s father recounted,
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The butcher continued with his darshar (narration).13 Finally, he 
tells the rabbi that one Friday . . . he was passing through a wood 
where he saw some thieves who were trying to abuse a young girl. 
He felt so upset for the poor thing that he begged them to let [her] go 
and that he would give them all the money that he had on him in or-
der for them not to touch her. The thieves, seeing that this rich Jew 
was carrying so much money, agreed to what he said; they took the 
moneybag and ran away. The rabbi did not want to hear any more. 
He got up, kissed the hand of the butcher, and told him with great 
emotion, “You, my son, are blessed by the Holy God. God knows 
what he does. For me, it is a great honor to be buried at your feet.”
Isaac’s father concluded, “This teaches us that man, no mat-
ter how evil he may always be, he can be redeemed. Among all 
the evil that he may cause, if he does one action to save his fel-
lowman, the Master of the World takes this action as kapara (sac-
rifi ce), a substitute, and forgives all his sins. Thus it is, ‘Azi lo 
bueno i toparas lo bueno’ [Do good, and good will come to you]. 
Isaac’s mother, who was listening to the story, clearly desired to 
make a more literal connection between a proverb and the tale. 
She remarked, “This proverb is not correct. It should be, ‘Aun al 
malo, el Dyo lo rihme’” [Even to the evil person, God redeems].
Three years later, in March 1972, Isaac asked his father to tell 
the tale once again. Isaac’s father concluded the story with the 
same proverb, “Azi lo bueno i toparas lo bueno” [Do good and good 
will come to you], and then explained, “Es ansi ke ‘Azi bien i no 
mires a ken’ porke ‘Por un zahut, por una sola mizva, se salva el 
mundo’” [It is thus that ‘Do good and don’t pay attention to whom 
you do it’ because ‘For one good deed, for a single mizva, the world 
is saved’]. In the latter proverb, Isaac’s father combined two prov-
erbs with the same meaning: “Por un zahut se salva el mundo” 
[For a good deed, the world is saved] and “Por una [sola] mizva, 
se salva el mundo” [From one act of charity, the world is saved]. 
Thus, Isaac’s father ended the tale with one proverb, encapsu-
lated the meaning of the narrative with another, and explained its 
meaning with two other proverbs. 
Isaac’s mother began the following story by saying, “I’m going 
to tell you the story of ‘Sfuegra, ni di baru buena’” [Mother-in-
Law, Not Even of Clay Is Good]. Then she anchored it in the au-
thority of the family: “This is a story my mother told to me.” She 
continued,
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A daughter-in-law did not care for the mother-in-law and spoke 
badly about her to a neighbor. This neighbor did not have a mother-
in-law, and she, to see, would say, “All [women] have mothers-in-
law, and I shouldn’t have one!” What did she do? She took clay and 
made a mother-in-law and placed her in a corner. Every time she 
passed, walked, she bumped into it. She would remove it from this 
place; she would place it in another. She would pass by there, and 
by there would bump herself. Finally, she got angry, took [it], and 
threw it into the river. When she threw it into the river, she said, 
“The river splashed me and soiled me all over with clay.” And at the 
end, she said, “Sfuegra, ni di baru buena [Mother-in-law, not even 
of clay [is] good]. Even though I threw her into the river, she still 
caused me harm.”14
Isaac’s mother concluded, “This means that no one wants a moth-
er-in-law.” 
As was his custom when collecting narratives, Isaac asked 
his mother to repeat this story half an hour later. This time she 
prefaced her story with, “This is the proverbial hate for a mother-
in-law,” showing her conscious link between the proverb and the 
moral of the story. The narrative was almost precisely the same, 
save for the ending, in which Isaac’s mother intensifi ed the harm 
caused by the mother-in-law: “When she threw her into the river, 
the sand splashed her and dirtied her all over with clay. She fi -
nally said, “Mother-in-law, not even of clay is good. Even though 
I threw her into the river, she harmed me. Even though I threw 
her into the sea, she still hurt me.’” She concluded in the same 
fashion as the fi rst time: “This means that no one wants a moth-
er-in-law.”
In his article on the Judeo-Spanish proverb, Jesús Cantera 
Ortiz de Urbina remarks, “Of the various interpretations that were 
given in order to explain the proverb, Suegra, ni de barro buena, 
the most credible . . . is the one that tells, . . .” and here Cantera 
proceeds to recount in truncated form what must be another ver-
sion of the previous narratives. A married man had a clay statue 
as a memento of his mother, and when it broke, “the delighted 
daughter-in-law exclaimed, ‘Mother-in-law, not even of clay is 
good’” (Cantera 1997, 154). Tracing this proverb back to the Span-
ish Middle Ages, Cantera attributes it to the Marqués de Santilla-
na’s Refranes que dicen las viejas tras el fuego and to several me-
dieval authors. Cantera also lists the following rhyming variation
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of the proverb: “Suegra, ni de azúcar buena; nuera, ni de barro ni 
de cera” [Mother-in-law, not even of sugar good; daughter-in-law, 
not even of clay nor of wax]. 
Cantera continues, “Moreover there is another magnifi cent 
one” from the work of Gonzalo Correas, Vocabulario de refranes 
y frases proveriales. “It says, Suegra, ninguna buena; hícela de 
azúcar, y amargóme; hícela de barro, y descalabróme (Mother-in-
law, none good; I made her of sugar, and she made me bitter; I 
made her of clay, and she cracked my skull).” Cantera continues 
quoting Correas:
A married woman without a mother-in-law, writes Correas, heard 
it said that mothers-in-law were evil. Not believing it, she desired 
to try out a mother-in-law. Her husband told her that she was bet-
ter off without one. To satisfy her craving, she made one of sugar. 
The husband in the dark [secretly] coated it with aloe [a bitter sub-
stance]. The daughter-in-law embraced it and kissed it, and found 
it bitter. She said, “This one did not come out good. I want another 
one of clay.” She made another and stood it up; she wanted to em-
brace her. And as the statue was heavy, it fell on her, and cracked 
her skull. And she remained disillusioned with mothers-in-law. 
(Cantera 1997, 154)
Right after his mother had fi nished telling him the story of 
“Mother-in-law, Not Even of Clay Is Good,” Isaac asked her to 
tell the tale of the hazelnut. His mother began the story, “The 
same way, another daughter-in-law did not care for her mother-
in-law.” She continued,
One day, the mother-in-law got up and began to toast some hazel-
nuts in the oven. To see if they were well toasted, she placed one in 
her mouth. The poor woman, since she could not eat [did not have 
any teeth], she moved it from one side [of her mouth] to the other. 
In the evening, when her son arrived, he asked his wife, “And my 
mother, what is she doing?” The daughter-in-law said of her moth-
er-in-law, “All day long she is eating and chewing.” When the son 
asked her, “Mother, what are you eating?” the mother replies, “My 
son,” she said, “I do not have any teeth. From the morning, when I 
placed a hazelnut in my mouth, I have moved it from one side to the 
other, and I am not able to eat it.” And this is what the unfortunate 
mother-in-law is eating, and the daughter-in-law cannot see it. She 
did not care for her. And this is proof that ‘Una madri es para mil 
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ijos i mil ijos para una madri no’” [A mother for a thousand sons, 
and a thousand sons not for one mother].
Isaac’s mother ended the story with a variant of the following 
proverb, which is better known and which she used frequently to 
remark on a mother’s devotion to her children and, concomitant-
ly, on children’s neglect of their mother: “Una madri para sien ijos 
i no sien ijos para una madri” [A mother for one hundred children, 
but not one hundred children for one mother]. On another telling, 
Isaac’s mother ended the tale with the proverb, “Ilmuera, dolor di 
muela” [Daughter-in-law, pain in the molar].15
In still another tale, it is the child who teaches the parents 
how they should care for their parents. As well as his father, sev-
eral Sephardim told this tale to Isaac. Its power lies in its parallel 
to specifi c situations in life, for at least two individuals told Isaac 
that they had known of such cases of neglect, and Isaac recalls 
one from Rhodes in the late 1930s.
An old man lived with his son and daughter-in-law. This woman 
could not stand her father-in-law. She always treated him badly. 
She fed him in a corner of the kitchen and spoke to him as if he 
were a donkey. The husband was hurt to see how his wife treated 
his father but did not say anything because he was afraid of her.
One day, when the son and his wife came home, they saw their 
son seated on a small bench with a knife in his hand, cutting a 
piece of wood. They asked him, “What are you doing?” The child 
replied, “I am making a fork and a spoon for you when you are old.” 
The father asked him, “Why are you doing this?” The child replied, 
“I love you a lot and because of it, I am preparing a fork and a spoon 
for when you will get old. I want you to have the same as grandfa-
ther has.”
The husband looked at his wife and said, “‘Look what you are 
doing. Our future will be such as my father’s.’ From that day on, 
the life of the old man changed as if it were a miracle. From this 
moment on, they treated him as a balabay (the master of the home). 
They set him at the head of the table; they gave him the best to 
eat.” Isaac’s father concluded, “The proverb says that ‘Uno tiene ke 
tratar a otros komo kere ke lo traten a el mizmo’” [One has to treat 
others as he wants to be treated].16
Proverbs are employed in another way to frame narratives: as 
the title of the story. At fi rst, this seemed the perfect example of 
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an opening frame, a proverb that named the narrative to follow. 
We, however, came to realize that this, itself, was a literary infl u-
ence. Written stories are given titles, and so the literate person 
would give a title to the story. Perhaps even more to the point, we 
often entitled the narrative with the proverb at the end of the tale. 
Our own desire for classifi cation in written form led almost intui-
tively to using proverbs for the title. There is, of course, nothing 
wrong with giving narratives a title. Our good friend and colleague, 
Matilda Koen-Sarano, as she told us, also gives proverbs as titles 
to the narratives she publishes so prolifi cally.17 However, for us in 
this work, the pitfall lies in assuming that the people themselves 
did that. Indeed, it helps to return to the words of the people. In 
telling a story, a narrator would say, “Lis vo a kontar la konseja de 
. . .” [I am going to tell you the story about . . . ], and the listener 
would ask the narrator to “Kontime/Kontimos la konseja de . . . “ 
[Tell me/Tell us the story about . . .]. Thus, both the narrator and 
the listener placed the emphasis on the act of narration.18
So well did the Sephardim know the proverbs, they didn’t 
even have to complete them. The narrator telling the story, “Los 
chapines apretados” [The Tight Shoes], of a father who no longer 
complained about his tight shoes after seeing a man without legs 
ended in elliptical fashion:19 “The father realized that ‘La persona 
ke no se kontenta kon lo suyo . . .’ [The person who is not happy 
with what he has . . .]. In similar fashion, Kwesi Yankah observes, 
“The proverb’s already condensed form is subjected to further 
abbreviation on the assumption that both speaker and listener 
share the same socio-cultural history and do not require the use 
of elaborated codes for mutual understanding” (1986, 210).20
Proverb use in Sephardic narratives is the essence of creativ-
ity. When Isaac asked Shaul Angel Malahi if tales always ended 
with a proverb, he responded, “Generally it ends with a proverb; if 
there is no proverb, I invent one!”21 This remark followed Malahi’s 
personal narrative about his grandmother catching him smoking 
cigars in the outhouse when he was young and convincing him 
never to smoke again by telling him something “very beautiful.” 
The grandmother took a branch from a fi g tree and told Malahi to 
make it stand straight. He said to her, “How can I make it stand 
straight when it has been crooked for so many years?” Then she 
showed him a pine tree and told him to bend it down. He re-
sponded, “The pine tree has grown straight, and no one can make 
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it bend down.” His grandmother concluded, “Thus it is with a 
person: ‘Kuando krese tuguerto, grande no se puede enderechar’ 
[When one grows up twisted, once grown, one cannot straighten 
up]. Now promise me to smoke no more; thus, [be] like the pine 
tree. No one can do you harm, no one. Because as the Bible says, 
‘La persona es komo el arvol del kampo’” [The person is like the 
tree of the fi eld]. 
While Malahi’s remark about inventing proverbs was more 
likely in the spirit of humor, still he pointed to the fl exible use of 
proverbs, the choice and selectivity of making the proverb fi t the 
way one chooses with the spirit of the narrative as one wishes to 
interpret it. Kwesi Yankah remarks specifi cally on this:
The speaker’s creative genius may be measured on the basis of his 
discreet choice of a proper mode of proverb use in a fi tting argu-
ment or discourse. Creativity here is defi ned in terms of propriety 
of proverb choice, or rather proverb congruence in an appropriate 
context. But creativity in proverb use also consists in the conscious 
embellishment and manipulation of proverb form and meaning. 
(1986, 203)
This creative pairing of the proverb with the narrative shows 
the integral link between what folklorists designate as two sepa-
rate genres. For the Sephardim, there are no rigid categories for 
narrative genres: The emphasis is on the process of narrating, the 
process of speaking the proverb, the process of telling the tale. 
While they would recognize the distinction between a konseja and 
a proverbio or refran, they would see using proverbs in narrative 
as simply a way to drive home the message, and quite explicitly 
so. Isaac was told two versions of the story about the father who 
was teaching his foolish son to behave by having him imitate ev-
erything he did.
One night, he saw that his father went to bed with his mother, and 
he went to bed with his grandmother. On seeing this, the father 
grew upset about not being able to do anything with his son; he 
called him, and, full of fury, he commanded him not to do this 
again. The son couldn’t understand the words of the father and 
seeing his red face, he said, “Well! Look at my father. He goes to bed 
every night with my mother, and I don’t say a word. I go to bed one 
night with his mother, and he is burning up.”
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The narrator ended, “You know that in this world, ‘Ken hamor 
nase, hamor muere’” [He who is born a jackass, dies a jackass). 
Years later, Isaac’s father told him the same story and end-
ed, “You who already know about proverbs must know, ‘Palo tu-
guerto nunka se enderecha’” [A crooked branch will never grow 
straight].22 His father, of course, was directly referring to Isaac’s 
work on proverbs—“You who already know about proverbs.”
This assumption of shared knowledge was not singled out 
for Isaac alone. Following Richard Bauman’s remarks on perfor-
mance, we can say that the Sephardim form a “speech commu-
nity” and that they draw on “a structured set of distinctive com-
municative means . . . in . . . culture-specifi c ways to key the 
performance frame,” and thus set off as performance all “that 
takes place within that frame” (1984, 16). Also referring to shared 
knowledge, Gregory Bateson observes that “the quality and char-
acteristics of metacommunication” between individuals depend on 
the degree to which they know each other and the extent to which 
they are mutually aware of “each other’s perceptions” (1987, 209–
10). Our focus on the creative use of proverbs in narratives and 
the way in which the tellers select the proverbs to communicate 
the message as pointedly as the pine tree that has grown straight 
is not in our view metanarration, as Bateson defi nes it and others 
discuss it. There is nothing meta or above or outside of the nar-
rative process in the conjoining of proverbs and narratives. The 
proverbs are an integral part of the performance. The essence of 
the konseja and the proverb is on the conveying of wisdom and 
making wise the foolish.
Notes
1.  The Judeo-Spanish orthography differs from modern Spanish. Sev-
eral phrases were used to begin the narrative: “Andi avia di ser” 
[Once upon a time/There was once]; “Al tiempo” [In the past]; “Aze
antanyos” or “Antanyo” [Many years ago/In ancient times]; “Un dia 
de los dias” [Once upon a time]; “Savesh komo un dia [. . . una vez]”
[Do you know how some time ago/ . . . once]; “Segun muestros padres 
[. . . dezian muestros padres]” [According to our ancestors/As our 
ancestors said]; “Les vo a kontar. . .” [I am going to tell you . . . ].
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  There were several phrases to end the narrative. For happy oc-
casions: “Eyos tengan bien i mozotros tambien” [May they have 
good fortune, and we also]; “I bivieron alegres toda la vida” [And 
they lived happily all their life]; “Eyos dukados, mozotros salvados” 
[They (should receive) ducats, and we be saved]. For sad occasions: 
“Leshos de mozotros” [May it be far from us/It should not happen 
to us]; “Eyos ayi, mozotros aki” [They (should remain) there, and we 
here]. See Crews 1935.
2.  Isaac’s grandmother, Sarota Amato Musafi r, was born circa 1889 in 
Milas, Turkey; she died in 1970 in Atlanta, Georgia. His mother, Ca-
den Lévy Israel, born in Milas in 1905, moved with her mother, who 
was widowed at the age of eighteen, to Rhodes, then Turkey, circa 
1920. Widowed with two sons at the age of twenty-fi ve, Caden Lévy 
left Rhodes with her son, Isaac, her mother, her father-in-law, and 
other family members to go as refugees to Tangier, Morocco, in 1939; 
and from there to Atlanta, Georgia, in February 1945. In 1947, she 
remarried Baruch Israel, who was born in Rhodes circa 1900 and 
had immigrated to New York City in 1910. Baruch Israel died in At-
lanta in 1978, and Isaac’s mother died in Atlanta in 2000. 
3.  As Finnegan writes, 
This is sometimes apparent in the local terminology, for proverbs are not 
always distinguished by a special term from other categories of verbal art. 
The Nyanja mwambi, for instance, refers to story, riddle, or proverb, the 
Ganda olugero means, among other things, a saying, a story, a proverb, 
and a parable, and Mongo bokolo is used of all poetic expression including 
fable, proverb, poetry, and allegory . . . the Limba mboro refers to story, 
riddle, and parable as well as to sayings which we might term proverbs, 
while the Fulani tindol can mean not only a popular moral story but also a 
proverb or maxim. (1981, 12)
4.  Translated from the French by the authors.
5. For a fuller discussion of the terms for proverb, see Chapter 1, “The 
Spanish Proverb: The Semantic History of the Term,” in Lévy 1969, 
15–32. See also O’Kane 1950.
6.  Told to Lévy by his mother, Caden Lévy Israel, in Atlanta, Geor-
gia, in March 1968. AT 1350, “The Loving Wife” (Thompson 1973, 
400–401); see also Haboucha 1992, 555–56.
7.  Told to Lévy by his mother, Caden Lévy Israel, in Columbia, South 
Carolina, in April 1974. In the fall of 2002, at the American Folklore 
Society, a fellow folklorist told us the following variant of this story, 
which had been told to her in April 1998 by a relative. On 10 Janu-
ary 2001, the colleague sent it to us by e-mail: 
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One Sunday morning, Chelsea burst into the living quarters at the White 
House and said, “Dad! Mom! I have some great news for you. I am getting 
married to the greatest hunk in Washington. He lives in Georgetown, and 
his name is Matt.” After dinner, the president took Chelsea aside. “Honey, 
I have to talk with you. Your mother and I have been married a long time. 
She’s a wonderful wife, but she’s never offered much excitement in the 
bedroom, so I used to fool around with women a lot. Matt is actually your 
half brother, and I’m afraid you can’t marry him.”
Chelsea was heartbroken. After eight months, she eventually started 
dating again. A year later, she came home and very proudly announced, 
“Robert asked me to marry him. We’re getting married in June.” Again her 
father insisted on another private conversation and broke the sad news, 
“Robert is your half brother, too, honey. I’m awfully sorry about this.” 
Chelsea was furious. She fi nally decided to go to her mother with the 
news. “Dad has done so much harm. I guess I’m never going to get mar-
ried,” she complained. “Every time I fall in love, Dad tells me the guy is my 
half brother.” Hillary just shook her head. “Don’t pay any attention to what 
he says, dear. He’s not really your father.”
8. Told to Lévy by his father, Baruch Israel, in Atlanta, Georgia, in 
January 1965.
9. Estar en fuego: “to be in the middle of fi re/to be in trouble.”
10.  Told to Lévy by his mother, Caden Lévy Israel, on several occasions 
over a period of years. The quoted passages are from the version 
told on 15 April 1984.
11.  For the importance of the use of words, see the chapter on “The 
Power of Speech,” in Lévy and Zumwalt 2002, 74–93.
12.  Told to Lévy by his father, Baruch Israel, in Atlanta, Georgia, in 
August 1969.
13.  Darshar, Arabic: “to preach”; darsar, Hebrew: “to deliver a sermon.”
14.  For a different version, see “Suegra” in Saporta y Beja 1978, 180; 
AT 903C (Thompson 1973, 312). For a superb, scholarly annota-
tion of this tale type, see Haboucha, “Not Even in Pictures” (1992, 
379–80).
15.  Told to Lévy by his mother, Caden Lévy Israel, in Atlanta, Georgia, 
in 1965. See also Nehama 1977, 386; Perahya et al. 1994, 127.
16.  Told to Lévy by his father, Baruch Israel, in Atlanta Georgia, in 
December 1972. AT 980A, “The Half Carpet.” “A man gives his 
old father half a carpet to keep him warm. The child keeps the 
other half and tells his father that he is keeping it for him when 
he grows old” (Thompson 1973, 344). See Haboucha for other 
Judeo-Spanish variants (1992, 492–94). In a similar vein, but
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without chagrin, the father could see himself refl ected in his son. 
Elijah was old. One day, the son went with his father to the mosque in 
order to see where he was going to bury him. The son showed the father 
the corner where he was going to place him. The father told him to choose 
another corner because he already placed his own father in the fi rst spot. 
It is already known that they both are the same. As the proverb says, “Tal 
padre, tal ijo” [Like father, like son]. 
 Told to Lévy and Zumwalt in Ramat Gan, Israel, in May 1990 at Bet 
Avot Recanati.
  For more narratives, see Alexander and Noy 1989; Crews 1935; 
Koen-Sarano 1986, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2003; Kolonomos 
1978; and Molho 1960,118–33.
18.  The proverb, “No mires lo ke te dizen, azi lo ke mejor saves” [Don’t 
pay attention to what they say; do what you know best], which was 
used to title one of our narratives, is rendered in similar fashion 
by Don Juan Manuel in El Conde Lucanor for the folktale entitled, 
“Lo que aconteció a un buen hombre con su hijo” [What Happened 
to an Honest Man with his Son]. The proverb is, “Por miedo de las 
críticas, no dejéis de hacer lo que más conveniente pareciere ser” 
[For fear of criticism, don’t fail to do that which would seem to be 
the most convenient] (1945, 17).
19.  Told to Lévy by Regina Levy, originally from Antalya, Turkey, in 
1951 in the Bronx, New York. For a different version, “Todo es rela-
tivo” [All Is Relative],see Koen-Sarano 1995, 148.
20.  Here are some other elliptical sayings: “Una madre para sien ijos . . .
(i no sien ijos para una madre)” [A mother for a hundred children
. . . (and not a hundred children for a mother)], “Aharva kulo . . . (ke
no pedo)” [Strike the ass . . . (that did not fart)], “Kemar en la shorva
(for ‘ken se kema en la shorva’) ashopla en el yogurt” [He who gets 
burned by the soup blows on the yogurt], “A gota a gota . . . (se 
inche la bota)” [Drop by drop . . . (the barrel gets full)].
21.  Told to Lévy and Zumwalt by Shaul Angel Malahi in Jerusalem, in 
July 1985.
22.  Told to Lévy by a resident of the Sephardic Old Age home in Brook-
lyn, New York, in 1968, and by his father, Baruch Israel, in 1972 
in Atlanta, Georgia. This proverb is a variation of the one used by 
Malahi’s grandmother: “Kuando krese tuguerto, grande no se pu-
ede enderechar” [When one grows up twisted, once grown, one can-
not straighten up]. A popular saying used as sarcasm was, “direchu 
komu il kuerno” [straight as the horn].
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Baseball as (Pan)America
A Sampling of Baseball-Related Metaphors in Spanish
Shirley L. Arora
Baseball as America is the title of major exhibition of baseball-related memorabilia organized by the Baseball Hall of Fame 
and Museum in Cooperstown, New York, and currently touring 
the United States, with stops at ten cities around the country. The 
exhibition, which opened in New York City in March 2002 and will 
end in Houston, Texas, in August 2005, offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to view some fi ve hundred artifacts that until now 
could only be seen by people who could visit Cooperstown. The 
offi cial web site of the exhibition stresses the close links between 
baseball and the cultural history of the United States, including 
the broad claim that “nearly all Americans participate in our Na-
tional Pastime [sic] . . . often without knowing it.” To back up that 
statement, there is mention of certain baseball-related expres-
sions (e.g.,”ballpark estimate,” “Three strikes, and you’re out”) 
that are commonly used in everyday discourse, often by persons 
who have no particular interest in or familiarity with the sport 
itself.1
Many other examples come to mind: the assertion that certain 
individuals will “never get to fi rst base” with a proposed undertak-
ing, or that they are “way off base” in their claims or suggestions; 
complaints by one person that someone else “threw him a curve,” 
or that he—the speaker—“had two strikes against him” at the out-
set, and so on. It is only natural, given the position of baseball as 
“our national pastime,” that its popularity and infl uence should 
be manifested in our everyday speech. What is perhaps less ex-
pected is the extent to which baseball has become a source of 
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popular metaphors in the Spanish speech of the Americas, a sign 
that the game itself is no longer to be regarded as simply “Ameri-
can” but is indeed “Pan-American.”2
A detailed account of the origin of baseball and its subsequent 
spread to other countries of the Western Hemisphere is not rel-
evant to my purpose, which is to examine the linguistic result, not 
the process, of its increasing popularity. A few benchmarks will be 
useful, however. It was long held that baseball as we know it was 
originated by Abner Doubleday, a respected Civil War veteran, in 
Cooperstown in 1839, but further investigation has determined 
that the rules governing the modern game were fi rst drawn up 
in 1845 and that the following year saw the fi rst organized game 
played under those rules. By 1856 baseball was being referred to 
as our national pastime, and in 1869 the Cincinnati Reds became 
the fi rst “professional” baseball team.
Baseball is also the “national game” of Cuba; its introduction 
and development in that country followed fairly soon after its es-
tablishment in the United States and remained unaffected by po-
litical considerations. According to Roberto González Echevarría, 
the fi rst baseball bat and ball arrived in Cuba in the luggage of 
one of a trio of young men returning to Havana after six years of 
study at Springhill College, Alabama (González Echevarría 1999, 
90). The year was 1864, the American Civil War was drawing to 
a close, and Cuba was still a colony of Spain. What is generally 
(though inaccurately) recognized as the fi rst organized baseball 
game in Cuba was played ten years later in the city of Matan-
zas between a team from that city and one that had traveled 
there from Havana (pp. 75–77). By the mid-1890s, the game had 
evolved from largely amateur to predominantly professional and 
had become deeply rooted in Cuban popular culture (p. 105). As 
González Echevarría observes, while noting the sporadic popular-
ity of soccer (formerly in disfavor because of its association with 
Spain), “. . . on the whole, growing up Cuban meant growing up 
with baseball as an integral part of one’s life. Baseball was played 
since the beginning of the nation; hence it was part of the nation” 
(p. 110). It is not surprising, then, that—as we shall see—by far 
the richest repertoire of baseball-derived metaphors and sayings 
in Spanish is found in Cuban popular speech.
Cubans were also involved in spreading baseball throughout 
the Caribbean area, whether as visiting teams or members of local
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clubs, to whom they passed on their skills as well as their knowl-
edge of the rules and fi ner points of the game. According to Alan 
M. Klein, two Cuban brothers named Aloma introduced the game 
to the Dominican Republic in 1891, and it was already being 
played in Puerto Rico and Panama (1991, 16). Klein, who titles his 
history of Dominican baseball Sugarball, observes that in Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic, baseball “grew up” in 
the sugar refi neries (p. 6), and González Echevarría offers a fas-
cinating description of “sugarmill baseball” in Cuba in the fi rst 
half of the twentieth century (1999, 192–200). In some instances, 
U.S. naval or military presence or U.S. commercial interests also 
contributed to the establishment of the game. 
Although Róger Matus Lazo, in his study of the use of baseball-
derived metaphors in Nicaragua, does not provide specifi cs about 
the history of the game in his country, he refers to the “enormous 
preference” for the sport there and maintains that metaphorical 
language drawn from baseball “is in essence the speech of the 
people, or rather its soul” (my translation) (Matus Lazo 1998, 9). 
According to Tito Rondón, baseball in Nicaragua was given its 
start in the 1880s by American businessman Albert Addlesberg 
in Bluefi elds, the capital of the Atlantic coastal region, then un-
der British occupation. Addlesberg imported the necessary equip-
ment from New Orleans and persuaded two cricket teams (cricket 
being the dominant sport in the British-controlled area) to switch 
to baseball.
In Venezuela, as in Cuba, baseball owed its inception to the 
enthusiasm of young men returning from their studies in the Unit-
ed States, though the introduction took place in the early 1890s, 
considerably later than in Cuba. By 1895 Caracas had a Base-
ball Club, started by four brothers and their socially upper-class 
friends, and the fi rst offi cial game was played in May of that year. 
The Baseball Club fi elded both teams, and they included three Cu-
bans who were living in Caracas. “Baseball talk,” consisting of the 
essential terminology of the game, became something of a fad and 
was soon picked up by the local press. In 1912 the sport received 
an important boost from an American department-store owner in 
Maracaibo, William H. Phelps, who imported baseball equipment 
only to fi nd that it remained unsold because apparently no one 
there knew how to play. He then set about organizing three teams, 
and by 1920 there were at least ten ballparks in the city.3
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The introduction of baseball into Panama coincided with the 
hiring of the fi rst workers on the Panama Canal project early in 
the twentieth century, and there is even speculation that some, at 
least, were hired for their baseball skills in recognition of the im-
portance of providing recreation for the large population of work-
ers. Baseball remains today the most popular sport in Panama, 
Nicaragua, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and 
of course Cuba. Elsewhere in Latin America, soccer—fútbol in 
Spanish—dominates by a wide margin, although baseball is also 
played.4
As can be seen, baseball’s popularity is greatest in the Carib-
bean area, and strong links have developed between major league 
baseball in the United States and teams of various Caribbean 
countries. In the years before the integration of the major leagues, 
the Negro Leagues in the United States were an important source 
of opportunity and experience for Latin American players, many 
of whom are of mixed African descent. Klein, in his study of Do-
minican baseball, asserts that 
to any of the tens of thousands of gifted players in the Dominican 
Republic, pelota (baseball) is an opportunity to escape a life of pov-
erty; while to the major league franchises there, the country is a 
seemingly endless source of cheap and genuine talent. . . . There 
is nothing comparable to it in the United States, nothing as dearly 
held as baseball is for Dominicans. Americans may love the game 
of baseball as much as Dominicans do, but they do not need it as 
much (1991,1). 
The same observation may apply, though not necessarily to the 
same degree, to the other nations linked geographically to the 
United States by proximity and the waters of the Caribbean. In-
deed, approximately 30 percent of current major league players 
in the United States are Latinos, most of them foreign born.5 The 
list of outstanding Latino players includes Hall of Famers Ro-
berto Clemente (Puerto Rico), Martín Dihigo (Cuba), Juan Mar-
ichal (Dominican Republic), Luis Aparicio (Venezuela), Rod Carew 
(Panama), Orlando Cepeda (Puerto Rico), and Tony Pérez (Cuba). 
Home-run record breaker Sammy Sosa, no doubt a future Hall of 
Famer, is from the Dominican Republic.
The extent to which baseball has had an impact on everyday 
Spanish speech is no doubt affected by such factors as the general
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popularity of the sport in the particular country; the length of 
time the game has been part of the national culture; and the in-
fl uence of various media, such as sports journalism and televi-
sion and radio broadcasts. That impact is not easy to assess. 
Relatively few examples of baseball-related expressions can be 
found in dictionaries of “regional speech,” and even fewer studies 
have devoted specifi c attention to them. (Cuba is, of course, the 
great exception.) Nor do we have much information on who uses 
such expressions, whether they are employed primarily by young 
people, or by men and boys rather than by women, or in urban 
environments as opposed to the countryside.
Initially, of course, baseball terminology in Spanish was strict-
ly utilitarian, enabling sportswriters, broadcasters, and announc-
ers, as well as fans, to describe and discuss the action of the 
game. In a study published in 1954, Seymour Menton identifi es 
three ways in which baseball vocabulary has been incorporated 
into Mexican Spanish: adopted directly from English and writ-
ten with English spelling, e.g., “fl y”; written phonetically so that 
the Spanish pronunciation replicates or at least approximates the 
English word (fl ai); and translated using existing Spanish words 
(elevado, an “elevated” hit). In some cases, all three processes 
may be applied to the same term, as in the example just given, 
although one or more of the three may eventually fall into disuse. 
Menton points out that the process by which English words are 
Hispanized is an oral one, based on the way a particular term 
sounds to the speaker of Spanish; the written form of the word 
does not enter into the process (1954, 478–79). His observation 
is well illustrated by a term such as the Cuban ampaya, which
at fi rst glance seems undecipherable but which, when read with 
Spanish pronunciation, achieves a fairly close approximation to 
its English equivalent, “umpire.” Occasionally new terms are cre-
ated in Spanish to translate some of the less common elements of 
the game, e.g., tira-tira [literally, a “throw-throw”], a “rundown,” 
when a runner is trapped between bases by two opposing players 
who toss the ball back and forth as the runner tries to reach the 
safety of a base (pp. 478–79).
I shall not concern myself with the literal vocabulary of base-
ball in Spanish but with the fi gurative use of certain baseball 
terms and particularly with their incorporation into proverbial 
phrases and proverbs. This article is, as the subtitle indicates, 
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merely a sampling of baseball-related expressions in popular 
speech and represents a portion of a longer study on which I have 
been working for some time. The expressions fall into four gen-
eral categories:1) single words (mostly verbs) that have acquired 
a fi gurative meaning in addition to their literal use in relation 
to baseball; 2) baseball-related phrases that have become part of 
everyday speech; 3) full-fl edged proverbs; and 4) proverb parodies 
that may or may not be used in actual discourse. For the annota-
tions, I have used primarily published sources, with a few refer-
ences to the Internet and items recorded in the fi eld, and I have 
included multiple annotations when these come from different 
authors or regions, since such references indicate the popularity 
of the expression. The sources vary from the abundant publica-
tions of José Sánchez-Boudy, a Cuban now residing in the United 
States, and Samuel Feijóo of the Universidad Central de Las Vil-
las in Cuba—both of whom devote specifi c attention to baseball-
related expressions—to more typical compilations of regionalisms 
or Anglicisms from various Spanish-speaking countries that in-
clude only a scattering of baseball terms or metaphors that have 
become part of popular speech. Sánchez-Boudy’s collections of cu-
banismos are especially interesting because he frequently makes a 
point of identifying expressions that have emerged in the commu-
nity of exiled Cubans in the United States, thus providing a useful 
time frame; and he specifi cally identifi es expressions as derived 
from baseball, a helpful practice in cases that involve certain non-
specifi c terms such as bola and pelota (both of which mean “ball” 
but not necessarily a baseball) or that refer to less familiar aspects 
of the game. Feijóo’s work, based in Cuba itself, covers a wide va-
riety of verbal folklore and includes material collected, at Feijóo’s 
request, by a number of other individuals in various localities. 
Feijóo was also the editor of the folklore journal Signos (1969–89),
in which a number of items included here were published. 
The following list of sayings is arranged by keyword, using 
the principal word specifi cally related to baseball. Thus, batear
trescientos, “to bat .300,” is under batear; coger a alguien fuera de 
base, “to catch someone off base,” under base; and jugar en grandes 
ligas, “to play in the big leagues” (to be very intelligent), under liga.
Although a good many collections list proverbial phrases in the 
infi nitive form, I have chosen to use infl ected verbs to provide a 
better sense of how the phrase actually sounds. For each entry, I 
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have provided fi rst a literal translation and then a fi gurative inter-
pretation. Some expressions, such as estar en tres y dos (to be at 
three and two, i.e., in a diffi cult position) presuppose a familiarity 
with at least the basic rules of baseball; others do not. However, 
in Spanish as in English, once an expression has become fi rmly 
established in popular speech, it can be used and understood by 
speakers and listeners regardless of their knowledge of its back-
ground. Proverb parodies, on the other hand, can be fully appre-
ciated only by those who are familiar with the original proverb. I 
have included in the annotated list a number of parodies quoted 
by Sánchez-Boudy from the exile periodical Zig-Zag Libre, pub-
lished in Miami, Florida. Their precise status in Cuban popular 
speech is not clear, although Sánchez-Boudy indicates that he 
has heard them used within the exile community in Florida.6
Annotated List
ABANICAR (v.), to fan, strike out
1. Nunca abaniques la brisa aunque sea con majagua [Never fan the 
breeze (strike out) even with a bat made of majagua (wood)]. Don’t 
ever fail. Majagua is a hardwood used for baseball bats in Cuba; the 
word often refers to the bat itself. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 81.
2. Prisa abanica la brisa [Haste fans the breeze]. Haste causes failure. 
Compare to the English proverb, “Haste makes waste.” Cuba: Sán-
chez-Boudy 2000, 80.
ALUMINIO (n.), aluminum
 Partió el aluminio [He split the aluminum (i.e., the bat)]. Said of 
someone who has performed any kind of task exceedingly well. Al-
though more appropriate to bats made of wood, the phrase has car-
ried over to modern metal bats. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 103.
AMPAYA (n.), umpire
 Muerto el ampaya, se acabó el “strike” [Once the umpire is dead, 
there are no more (called) strikes]. Once the cause is eliminated, 
the effect ceases also. A parody proverb modeled on the widely used 
“Muerto el perro, se acabó la rabia,” [Once the dog is dead, the 
rabies is over with]. The Anglicism “strike” is often Hispanized as 
estrai or estraik. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 52
AO/AUT (n.), out
1. Es un aut vestido de pelotero [He’s an out dressed as a ballplayer]. 
He’s a failure. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 269.
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2. No es un ao fácil [He’s not an easy out.] Said of someone diffi cult to 
deceive. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 198.
3. No te atrevas, que eres aut [Don’t dare (run), or you’ll be out]. Don’t 
take the risk because you’ll fail. The expression images an attempt 
to steal a base without being caught by the pitcher’s throw. Cuba: 
Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 426.
ÁRBITRO (n.), umpire
 El que a buen árbitro se arrima, buena decisión le cobija. [He who 
gets close to a good umpire is covered/sheltered by a good deci-
sion]. A parody of the well-known Spanish proverb, “El que a buen 
árbol se arrima, buena sombra le cobija” [He who gets close to a 
good tree is sheltered by a good shade]. Árbitro is the standard term 
for someone offi ciating at a game (not necessarily baseball). Cuba: 
Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 52.
BASE (n.), base
1. A veces hay que pasar a alguien con tres en base antes de que te 
batee un “jonrón” [Sometimes you have to walk someone with three 
men on base, rather than have him hit a home run off you]. Some-
times one has to accept an unfortunate situation to avoid a worse 
one (in this case, it is better to walk in a run rather than risk a 
four-run “grand slam”). Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 68. Sánchez-
Boudy describes this saying as “very popular.”
2. En base, y próximos [sic] a home [On base, and close to home]. 
Said of a woman in an advanced state of pregnancy. Mexico: Gó-
mez Maganda 1963, 2:120. The plural form used by the collector 
appears to refer back to the term estados grávidos (pregnant condi-
tions) in the preceding sentence. See also the next entry.
3. Hay seis hijos y uno en tercera base—con un jit sale [There are six 
children and one on third base—a hit will bring him home]. He has 
six children and another due any time now. A runner on third is 
in scoring position and likely to reach home plate on any single. 
Mexico: fi eld. 
4. Lo cogieron/agarraron fuera de base [They caught him off base]. Said 
of someone caught redhanded in some kind of wrongdoing. If a run-
ner takes a lead off a base, ready to run to the next one, and the 
pitcher throws the ball to the player covering that base so that the 
runner is tagged before he can get back to the base, the runner is out. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 78; Espina Pérez 1972, 17; Oraá 1973, 
94. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 36. Puerto Rico: Núñez 
de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 40; García Santos 1997, 
2297. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 59; Núñez and Pérez 1994, 58. 
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5. Tiene las bases llenas [He has the bases full]. A) He has a large 
family. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 161. B) She already has plenty of 
suitors. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 59.
6. Tú no llegas ni a primera base [You won’t even get to fi rst base]. A 
prediction that the person addressed will fail in a proposed project. 
Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 127; 
García Santos 1997, 1275. 
BATAZO (n.), a powerful hit
1. ¡Qué batazo! [What a huge hit!] Said when someone tells a big lie or 
a fantastic story. Panama: fi eld.
2. Dió un batazo [He hit the ball hard]. He was/achieved a big suc-
cess. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978:52. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 
1994, 59. See also jonrón.
3. Ése da batazos como los de Ted Williams en los buenos tiempos
[That fellow hits the ball hard like Ted Williams in the good old 
days]. He achieves one success after another in anything he under-
takes. The late Hall of Famer Ted Williams of the Boston Red Sox 
was considered one of baseball’s greatest hitters. Cuba: Sánchez-
Boudy 1978, 52. See also the previous entry.
BATE (n.), bat
1. A ése le gusta dar con el bate [He likes to hit with the bat]. Said of 
someone who likes to eat or drink at the expense of others. Nicara-
gua: Matus Lazo 1998, 19. The verb cachar (to catch) and the noun 
ca[t]cher are used in a similar fashion.
2. Bate de fongueo no sirve para batear [A fungo bat is no good for 
hitting (in a game)]. Every activity or situation has its own specifi c 
needs or equipment. A fungo bat is a soft bat used to hit balls for 
fi elding practice. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 23.
3. El que va al bate con tres en base puede tocar planchita aunque 
sea “eslóger” [He who comes to bat with three men on base may 
bunt even though he’s a “slugger”]. Always be prepared for the un-
expected. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 66.
4. Es el dueño del bate, del guante, y de la pelota [He’s the owner of 
the bat, the glove, and the ball]. He’s the chief, the one in command. 
The order of bate and guante may be reversed. In baseball games 
among neighborhood children, the one who owns the equipment is 
the boss. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 52, 189. 
5. Ése es un cuarto bate [He’s a fourth batter, i.e., a cleanup hitter]. 
He is extraordinary in any activity: working, studying, eating, etc. 
The fourth batter in the lineup is typically a strong hitter who—it 
is hoped—can clear the bases of any of his three predecessors who 
may be there. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 
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1999, 52. Cuba: Santiesteban 1997, 126. Venezuela: Núñez and 
Pérez 1994, 60. See also item 8.
6. Partió el bate [He split the bat]. He performed exceedingly well. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 103. See also aluminio.
7. ¡Qué piernas! A la verdad Marquetti con ese par de bates . . . [What 
legs! Truly, Marquetti with that pair of bats . . .]. A piropo or “street 
compliment” voiced when an attractive woman passes by. The el-
lipsis leaves to the hearer’s imagination what Marquetti would do. 
Cuba: Feijóo 1973, 47. Agustín Marquetti was an exceptionally 
strong hitter and a star member of the Havana team in the late 
1960s and 1970s (González Echevarría 1999, 373).
8. Se siente el cuarto bate [He thinks he’s the fourth batter, i.e., the 
cleanup hitter]. He is vain or self-important; he thinks he’s indis-
pensable. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 163. See also item 5.
BATEADOR (n.), batter
1. Es bateador de largo metraje [He’s a long-distance hitter]. He has a 
lot of children. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 53.
2. Es bateador designado [He’s the designated batter]. He’s the offi cial 
replacement for someone else (in a meeting, business appointment, 
etc.). In the American League, the pitcher, who is seldom a strong 
batter, is replaced by a designated hitter, who bats in his place in 
the lineup. In the National League, the pitcher bats for himself. Ni-
caragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 19. 
3. Es bateador emergente [He’s a pinch hitter]. He’s substituting, es-
pecially on short notice, for someone else in any kind of situation: 
work, social relationship, etc. Cuba: Santiesteban 1997, 57. Ni-
caragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 19. Panama: fi eld (Estoy bateando de 
emergente [I’m pinch hitting]).
BATEAR (v.), to bat, hit
1. Batea cuatrocientos en la liga de los pesados [He bats .400 in the 
league of the disagreeable]. He’s a most unpleasant person. This 
batting average (.400), which represents the proportion of hits to 
the number of times at bat is exceptional. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1978, 119.
2. Batea lo mismo en el Almendares que en el Habana [He hits the 
same on the Almendares team as on the Habana team]. He’s very 
knowledgable; he has a wide range of skills. Almendares and Ha-
bana were two leading teams and perpetual rivals throughout the 
history of Cuban baseball. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 76.
3. Batea sobre trescientos [He hits over .300]. He eats a great deal. A 
batting average of more than .300 is considered very good. Cuba: 
Espina Pérez 1972, 17; Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 53.
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4. Bateó una y perdió el juego [He hit once and lost the game]. He did 
something correctly but committed lots of errors. Cuba: Sánchez-
Boudy 1978, 53.
5. Cuando el mal es de batear, no valen bases por bolas [When the 
problem is batting, bases on balls don’t count]. When a player 
is in a batting slump, getting on base because of a walk doesn’t 
improve the situation. A parody of a well-known Cuban proverb, 
“Cuando el mal es de cagar, no valen guayabas verdes” [When 
the illness affects the bowels, green guavas don’t help]. Green 
guavas have a constipating effect. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 
52.
6. El que sabe batea solo [He who knows how bats alone]. He who is 
really skilled or knowledgeable needs no assistance from others. 
Attributed to a Havana bus driver known for his use of proverbs. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 75.
7. Está bateando/en el bate [He’s at bat]. He is triumphing, in power. 
Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 109. He’s performing well. 
Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 60.
8. No hay por donde batear [There’s no place to hit the ball, i.e., no 
place where an opposing player can’t get it]. There’s no solution to 
the problem at hand. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 53.
BOLA (n.), ball (both the object that is thrown and the pitch that is 
not within the strike zone)
1. Al que tiene buena vista no le tires bola mala [Don’t throw a bad 
pitch to someone who has a “good eye” (for judging pitches)]. If your 
opponent is an expert, don’t try to deceive him. Cuba: Sánchez-
Boudy 2000, 82. 
2. Botó la bola [He “booted” the ball]. He made an error in some kind 
of enterprise. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 21. Note the contrasting 
meaning given to this phrase in Puerto Rico (next two entries). See
also pelota.
3. Botó la bola [He hit the ball hard (walloped it)]. He was successful 
in his undertaking. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de 
Laborde 1999, 31; García Santos 1997, 2375. Dominican Republic: 
Cruz Brache 1978, 27. See also pelota.
4. Botó la bola y rompió el bate [He hit (creamed, walloped) the ball 
and broke the bat]. He was extraordinarily successful; an intensi-
fi ed version of the previous entry. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and 
Delgado de Laborde 1999, 31.
5. Cantó la bola bien cantada [He called (literally, “sang”) the pitches 
clearly]. He spoke the plain truth; he was outspoken. Cuba: Sán-
chez-Boudy 1978, 60.
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6. Dió a la bola en la costura [He hit the ball right on the seam]. He did 
things extremely well. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 61.
7. En el béisbol la bola es redonda, cualquier cosa puede suceder [In 
baseball, the ball is round; anything can happen]. An observation 
on the uncertainties of life in general. Puerto Rico: García Santos 
1997, 1271.
8. Es una bola de humo [He’s a fastball (literally, “smoke ball”)]. A) 
He’s very intelligent. B) You can’t trust him. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1978, 62. C) A diffi cult question in a contest, exam, etc. Dominican 
Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 27.
9. La bola se va . . . , se va . . . , se va . . . , y se fue! [The ball is going, 
going, going, gone!] An indirect way of saying that someone is guilty 
of a blatant falsehood. The words mimic the way in which a radio 
or television announcer often describes a home run. Bola, a general 
term for “ball,” is widely used with the fi gurative meaning of “ru-
mor” or “false story” (Real Academia Española 1956, under bola).
The metaphor generates the image of a bola of major proportions, 
“out of the ballpark.” Panama: fi eld.
10. Le pasó una bola de humo [He pitched a fastball (smoke ball) right 
past him]. He took him by surprise. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 62.
11. Le tiró a / Se fue con la bola mala [He swung at/went for a bad 
pitch]. He made a bad mistake; he was a failure. Cuba: Feijóo 1984, 
121; Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 62, 346.
12. No tiene nada en la bola [He has nothing on the ball]. He is not 
intelligent; he has no infl uence. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 20. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 61; 1986, 13.
13. Para el que tiene vista no hay bola rápida [For someone who has 
a good eye (for perceiving the pitch), there’s no fastball]. If one has 
the proper abilities for what he wants to do, he cannot be defeated. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 12.
14. Se llevó la bola y el bate [He took away with him the ball and 
the bat]. Refers to someone who fails at a certain activity but will 
not allow others to continue. The imagery is from neighborhood 
games where the equipment is often the property of one of the 
players. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 
1999, 231.
15. Tiene mucho en la bola [He has a lot on the ball]. He is very tal-
ented, very intelligent. Literally, the expression refers to a pitcher 
who can make the ball behave so it deceives the batter and prevents 
him from getting a hit. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 13.
16. Tocó la bola y se embasó [He bunted the ball and got on base]. He 
took his opponent by surprise and defeated him. Cuba: Sánchez-
Boudy 1978, 62.
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BOMBO/BOMBITO (n.), a fly ball that is easy to catch, a “pop fly” or 
“pop-up”
 Fue un bombo/bombito al pítcher [It was a pop fl y to the pitcher]. 
Said of something, e.g., an exam, that was extremely easy. Puerto 
Rico: Claudio de la Torre 1989, 32; Deliz Hernández 1998, 325; 
García Santos 1997, 2664. Claudio de la Torre also gives “bombo al 
cátcher” with the same meaning.
BRAZO (n.), throwing or pitching arm
1. Cuidado con el que no tiene brazo que a lo mejor batea [Beware of 
the one who does not have a good (throwing) arm; he is probably a 
strong batter]. If someone has a weakness in one area, he may have 
strengths in another. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 124. 
2. Hace rato que estoy calentando el brazo [I’ve been warming up my 
arm for some time now]. I’ve been preparing to take action. Cuba: 
Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
BULL PEN (n.), bull pen (area where relief pitchers warm up before 
going into the game)
 Hay movimiento en el bull pen [There’s movement/action in the bull 
pen]. Something (unknown but potentially important) is happening. 
Action in the bull pen typically means that the current pitcher will 
be replaced by a relief pitcher. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 241.
CÁ(T)CHER, QUÉCHER (n.), catcher 
1. Ése es cácher [He’s a catcher]. He eats and drinks at the expense of 
others but never pays the bill himself. A catcher receives the balls 
thrown by the pitcher, hence the metaphorical meaning. Nicaragua: 
Matus Lazo 1998, 23. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 60 (un tronco de 
quécher [a great catcher]). See also pícher.
2. Es cátcher, pítcher, y fi elder [He’s a catcher, pitcher, and fi elder]. He 
can do everything; he’s a one-man team. Mexico: Gómez Maganda 
1963, 1:208.
CANTAR (v.), to call (said of the umpire); literally, “to sing”
 Estoy cantándolas como las veo [I’m calling them as I see them]. I’m 
giving my true opinion of the situation. The pronoun las refers to 
bolas or pitches. Puerto Rico: García Santos 1997, 2033. The same 
phrase is used in English.
CARGABATES (n.), bat carrier, batboy
1. En esa novena yo voy de cargabates [On that team, I’m just a
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batboy]. In that group/company, I occupy a very lowly position. 
Cuba: Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
2. Es un cargabates [He’s a batboy]. He’s second rate, not worth any-
thing. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 85.
CERO (n.), zero
1. Cero y van dos [Zero (balls) and two (strikes)]. A warning that some-
one has made two mistakes, told two lies, had two narrow escapes, 
etc., and is one strike away from being out. Panama: fi eld.
2. A mí nadie me da nueve ceros [No one gives me nine zeros]. No one 
is going to defeat me. Nine zeros would indicate that throughout the 
nine innings of the game, the individual has remained scoreless; in 
other words, he has suffered a humiliating defeat. Cuba: Sánchez-
Boudy 1978, 114.
COGIDA (n.), catch
 Es como la cogida de Sagüita [It’s like Sagüita’s catch]. It’s an ex-
traordinary accomplishment. Alberto “Sagüita” Hernández was a 
player with the Havana ball club in the 1940s. According to Sán-
chez-Boudy, he was known for making an important catch that 
gave his team the championship. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 400. 
In this country, a 1954 World Series catch made by Willie Mays of 
the New York (now San Francisco) Giants is similarly famous. 
CURVA (n.), curve (ball)
 Esas curvas no la[s] resiste nadie [No one can resist (swinging at) 
those curves]. A statement about the effectiveness of curveballs 
thrown by a pitcher is transformed here into a piropo, a street com-
pliment, aimed at a young woman with an attractive fi gure. Cuba: 
Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
EMBASARSE (v.), to get on base
1. Dile a tus puros [padres] que yo me embaso rápido [Tell your parents 
I’ll get on base quickly]. Tell your parents I’m prepared to marry you 
right away. As given by the collector, this serves as a piropo, or street 
compliment, to an attractive female passerby. Feijóo 1973, 47. 
2. Está embasado [He’s on base]. He’s in a stable job or relationship. 
Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 25.
ERROR (n.), an error, a misplay
1. Detrás del error viene el hit [After the error comes the hit]. A mis-
take is often followed by success. Puerto Rico: “500 dichos” 1997, 
under baseball. 
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2. Cero error, cero carrera [No errors, no runs]. Nothing important has 
been happening. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 122. See also jit.
ESTRAI(K), ESTRIKE (n.), strike (a ball pitched within the strike zone 
and not hit by the batter)
1. Le pasó un estraik [He threw a strike past him]. He deceived him/
did something unexpected. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 309. Ven-
ezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 60. 
2. Le tiraba sólo estraiks [He threw only strikes to him]. He controlled 
him, would not let him advance. Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 29.
3. Se lo dije en estraik sin bola [I told him with a strike and no balls]. 
I told him straight out, straightforwardly. Panama: fi eld.
FAO (n.), foul ball, a ball hit outside the base lines
1. El que da mucho “fao” batea jonrón [The one who hits a lot of fouls 
can hit a home run]. The person who persists in trying will eventu-
ally succeed. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 124.
2. El que da mucho fao, se poncha o batea “jonrón” [The one who hits 
a lot of fouls either strikes out or hits a home run]. A variation on 
the previous entry. A batter who hits a lot of fouls has shown that 
he can hit the ball hard, and one day he’ll hit it straight for a homer. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 12.
3. Ése me resultó un fao [That fellow turned out to be a foul ball]. He 
turned out to be a disappointment (e.g., on a blind date). May be 
applied also to events. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 60; Núñez and 
Pérez 1994, 226.
FILDEAR (v.), to catch, to field
 Se lo fi ldeó la pelona [Death caught/fi elded him]. He died. La pelo-
na, literally, “the bald one,” is a common slang term for death, often 
depicted graphically as a skeleton. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 163. 
FILDEO (n.), the act of fielding
 Hay buenos en el fi ldeo y malos en el bateo [There are some who are 
good at fi elding and bad at hitting]. An individual who is good at one 
activity may not be good at another; we all have our strengths and 
weaknesses. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 79. 
FLAI (n.), a fly ball, a ball hit into the air
1. Cayó de fl ai [He fell (on us) like a fl y ball]. He appeared unexpect-
edly. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 173.
2. El que no echa una llanta no coge un fl ai [The one who doesn’t move 
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fast doesn’t catch a fl y ball]. You have to be on your toes to succeed. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 76.
3. Me la tiró de fl ai [He hit me a fl y ball]. He tried to deceive me. Cuba: 
Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 99.
4. Me tiró un fl aycito [He hit me a little fl y ball]. He asked me an easy 
question (e.g., on an exam). Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26. Ven-
ezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 230.
5. Se tiró otro fl ai [He hit another fl y ball]. He broke wind again. Nica-
ragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26.
6. Si el fl ai es fácil no lo fi ldees difícil [If the fl y is an easy one, don’t 
make a diffi culty out of catching it]. If a problem is easily solved, 
don’t turn it into a major obstacle. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 
80.
7. Yo no voy en ese fl ai [I’m not going with that fl y ball]. I’m not joining 
in that nonsense. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 30.
GOMA (n.), home plate
1. Está/Viene por la goma [He is/is coming right across the plate]. 
He’s performing admirably. Originally referring to a pitcher’s abil-
ity to throw strikes, its use has been broadened to include virtually 
any activity. In the Dominican Republic, it is applied to someone 
who is very strict, even severe in his actions. Cuba: Oraá 1973, 
94; Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 185. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 
1978, 119. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 
1999, 87. 
2. Partiste la goma [You split the plate in half]. Your performance was 
excellent. Cuba: Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
GORRA (n.), cap.
 Botó la gorra [He threw down his cap]. He lost his composure. Ni-
caragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26. Matus Lazo adds that the adjective 
gorrudo refers to someone who makes a habit of this gesture.
GUANTE (n.), glove
1. Colgó el guante [He hung up his glove]. He retired/left his job. Nica-
ragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26.
2. Le dio el guante y la pelota [He gave him the glove and the ball]. 
He let someone else have a turn. The image suggests the pitcher 
handing over the ball and glove to the relief pitcher who is about 
to take his place, but the phrase can be applied to any situation in 
which power or responsibility passes from one person to another, 
whether temporarily or permanently. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 
408.
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3. Guante sin grasa/Guante que no se engrasa no coge bola [A glove 
that is not greased will not catch the ball]. Any job requires appro-
priate equipment, and the equipment must be properly maintained. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 80. Elsewhere Sánchez-Boudy identi-
fi es castor oil as the substance used to grease the glove and make 
it supple (1993, 67).
4. Si no la coge no es el guante sino el pelotero [If he doesn’t catch 
it, it’s not the fault of the glove but of the ballplayer]. If someone 
doesn’t succeed at doing something, he should not blame the equip-
ment or tools but himself. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 80.
5. Tiró el guante [He threw down his glove]. He lost his temper. A 
player may sometimes be ejected from the game for throwing equip-
ment. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 26.
HOME (n.), see JON
HUELGA (a surname)
1. Niña, estás como Huelga, encendida! [Baby, you’re like Huelga, re-
ally hot!] A piropo, or street compliment, directed at an attractive 
female passerby. Cuba: Feijóo 1973, 46. José A. Huelga was a bril-
liant young pitcher in postrevolutionary Cuban baseball. He died in 
an automobile accident in 1974 at the age of twenty-six (González 
Echevarría 1999, 374).
2. Si te coge Huelga, te acaba [If Huelga catches you (leading off fi rst 
base), he’ll fi nish you off]. A warning not to take chances. Cuba: 
Batista Moreno 1973, 103. See the previous entry.
JIT (n.), hit
1. Cero jit, cero carrera [No hits, no runs]. Nothing happened. Domini-
can Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 35. See also error.
2. Dió un jit / La metió de jit [He got a hit]. He was a great success at 
the conference, meeting, etc. Nicaragua: Mántica 1973, 64. Venezu-
ela: Rosenblat 1960, 59.
3. Dio un jit de dos/tres bases [He got a two-base/three-base hit]. He 
became the father of twins/triplets. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 161.
JON, JOM (n.), home, home plate
1. ¡A morir a jon, Reñazco! [Home (plate) or die, Reñazco!] Try as hard 
as possible; hang in there until the end. Reñazco is presumably 
a Nicaraguan ballplayer, but the collector does not identify him.
Nicaragua: Peña Hernández 1968, 305.
2. El que se tira siempre en jon a la larga se cuela [He who always 
slides into home will eventually score]. Persistence will win out in 
the end. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 124.
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3. No pisa el jon [He doesn’t step on the home plate]. He consistent-
ly has bad luck; he never succeeds. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 
279.
4. Pasó a jom [He advanced to home plate]. He died. Venezuela: Núñez 
and Pérez 1994, 288.
5. Pícher que repite punta [d]e jon le dan jonrón [A pitcher who repeat-
edly pitches over a corner of the plate will get hit for a home run]. A 
pitch on the corner may fool the batter once or even twice, but if re-
peated too often, it may be hit hard. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 82.
JONRÓN (n.), home run
1. Bateó de/pegó un jonrón [He hit a home run]. He was a great suc-
cess at the party, meeting, etc. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 206. 
Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 59; Núñez and Pérez 1994, 288. 
2. Bateó de jonrón con las bases llenas [He hit a home run with the 
bases loaded]. He was a total success. A home run with three run-
ners on base—a grand slam—is the ultimate scoring success in 
baseball. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 28. Venezuela: Núñez and 
Pérez 1994, 288.
3. Tres líneas de ron no batea jonrón. [A glass of rum won’t hit a home 
run]. One who drinks a lot of alcohol won’t be able to perform well. 
Tres líneas (three lines) is a measure used by bartenders. The say-
ing involves a play on the words ron ‘rum’ and ron ‘run’ (as in home 
run). Spanish pronunciation does not distinguish between fi nal m
and n. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 37.
JUEGO (n.), game
1. Este juego lo picheo yo a la blandita [I’m pitching this game like 
softball]. I’m proceeding carefully and gently in this matter. Cuba: 
Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
2. Ha realizado un juego perfecto (cero jits, cero carreras, cero errores) 
[She has achieved a perfect game: no hits, no runs, no errors]. Said 
of a virtuous woman who has passed marriageable age without ac-
complishing anything good. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 165.
3. Hicieron un doble juego/jugada [They made a double play, i.e., two 
outs on a single hit]. Said of any situation in which two objectives 
are achieved simultaneously. In a typical double play, the player 
who is on fi rst base is put out when he is forced to run to second, 
and the batter is put out at fi rst. Mexico: Gómez Maganda 1963, 
2:164.
JUGADOR (n.), player
 Está como el mal jugador: ni pitcha, ni cacha, ni deja batear [He’s 
like the bad ballplayer: He doesn’t pitch, nor catch, nor let anyone 
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bat]. Said of someone who does nothing himself and keeps oth-
ers from accomplishing anything, either. The pattern is the widely 
known Spanish proverb, “Como el perro del hortelano, ni come 
(las berzas) ni (las) deja comer” [Like the vegetable farmer’s dog, 
he doesn’t eat (cabbages) and won’t let anyone else eat (them)]. In 
current usage, it is usually shortened by omitting the words in pa-
rentheses. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 163 (second part only); fi eld (also 
with ni deja cachar [nor let anyone catch]). 
JUGAR (v.), to play
 Dime con quién juegas y te diré si pierdes [Tell me with whom you 
play, and I’ll tell you whether you’ll lose]. A parody of one of the 
commonest proverbs in Spanish, “Dime con quién andas y te diré 
quién eres” [Tell with whom you go around, and I’ll tell you who you 
are]. Although the wording is generalized (  jugar can apply to any 
game), the collector groups it with other parodies that almost all 
refer specifi cally to baseball. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 53.
LANZADOR (n.), pitcher
 Ven con nosotros; José está de lanzador [Come with us; José is 
pitching]. Come along, José is buying the drinks. Nicaragua: Matus 
Lazo 1998, 28. Lanzador (thrower) from the verb lanzar (to throw)
is the Spanish term often used instead of the Anglicism pítcher or 
pícher. Cf. the use of cátcher noted earlier.
LIGA (n.), league
1. Ese juega en grandes ligas [That fellow plays in the big leagues]. He 
is very intelligent. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 24.
2. Está quemando la liga [He’s burning up the league]. Said of some-
one who is triumphing in any sort of endeavor. Dominican Repub-
lic: Cruz Brache 1978, 119. 
3. No batea en liga fu [He doesn’t bat in a bad league]. He’s a good 
person. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 397.
4. Quiere batear en la liga grande [He wants to bat in the big league]. 
He wants to be a star in whatever he does. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1986, 106.
5. Ese es de grandes ligas [He’s a big leaguer]. He’s outstanding. Puer-
to Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 52.
MAJAGUA (n.), baseball bat (made of majagua wood)
 Me dejó con la majagua al hombro [He left me with the bat on 
my shoulder (waiting for the pitch)]. He left me waiting and never 
showed up. Cuba: Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
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NOKOLBOL (n.), knuckleball, a type of pitch
1. El libro es bueno pero aprende a darle a la «nokolbol» [A book is 
good but learn to hit the knuckleball]. A book can provide helpful 
information, but practical experience is necessary also. The knuck-
leball is a diffi cult pitch to hit. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 81.
2. El que tira «Nokel bol» [sic] siempre se embasa [He who hits the 
knuckleball always gets on base]. He who goes slowly will succeed. 
The knuckleball is a slow pitch. Sánchez-Boudy considers this to be 
the equivalent of “El que va despacio va lejos” [He who goes slowly, 
goes far]. Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 81.
NOVENA (n.), team (of nine players)
1. Batean/juegan en la misma novena [They bat/play on the same 
team]. They are much alike, have the same defects, share the same 
opinions. Cuba: Pérez López 1968, [27]; Oraá 1973, 95; Sánchez-
Boudy 1978, 247.
2. Ése batea/juega en las dos novenas [That fellow bats/plays on both 
teams]. Said of someone who is bisexual. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1978, 53; Paz 1996, 96.
3. Ése juega en dos novenas al mismo tiempo [He plays on two teams 
at the same time]. He doesn’t take sides; he doesn’t compromise 
himself. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 248.
4. Está jugando contra una novena que tiene diecisiete fi les y la cerca 
corrida [He’s playing against a team that has seventeen fi elders and 
the fence moved farther out]. He’s playing against impossible odds; 
he can do nothing. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 248.
5. No juego en esa novena [I don’t play on that team]. I don’t agree with 
those individuals. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 248.
6. Están poniendo una novena con deiciocho fi elders [They’re putting 
up a team with eighteen fi elders.] They’re making it impossible to 
win, to achieve anything. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 172.
PALOMÓN (n.), a pop-up, an easily caught fly ball
 Ése tipo es un palomón al cuadro [That fellow is an infi eld fl y]. He 
is easily deceived or defeated. If applied to a situation, something is 
easily achieved. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 115.
PELOTA (n.), ball; baseball; ball game
1. Ahí sí es verdad que dan a la pelota [There they really hit the ball]. 
They really know how to do things right. Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 25.
2. Botó la pelota [He hit the ball (hard)]. A) He made a mistake (cf., in 
English, “he booted the ball”) or he told a big lie. B) He did some-
thing extraordinary or unexpected. The two contrasting meanings 
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coexist; context is the determining factor. Cuba: Pérez López 1968, 
[7]; Batista Moreno 1973, 103; Oraá 1973, 94; Sánchez-Boudy 
1978, 269. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 383.
3. Botó la pelota y estilló el bate [He hit the ball hard and shattered the 
bat]. He performed extremely well. Puerto Rico: “500 dichos” 1997, 
under baseball.
4. El que sabe tirar pelotas no necesita que nadie le caliente el brazo
[He who really knows how to throw the ball doesn’t need anyone to 
warm up his arm]. The expert in any fi eld performs well without as-
sistance from anyone. Before entering the game, a pitcher normally 
warms up by throwing balls to a teammate. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1993, 75.
5. Esa pelota ni la viste [You didn’t even see that ball]. You didn’t 
anticipate what was going to happen. Cuba: Batista Moreno 1973, 
103.
6. Ése juega con pelota de poli [That fellow plays with a hardball]. The 
situation is serious; he doesn’t fool around. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1978, 269.
7. La pelota es redonda y viene en caja cuadrada [The ball is round 
and comes in a square box]. Anyone may experience a setback. 
Pelota is a general term for “ball,” and the proverb may or may 
not have been derived from baseball. Sánchez-Boudy, however, in-
cludes it among baseball-related sayings. Cuba: Feijoó 1984, 82; 
Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 80. Puerto Rico: Fernández 1991, 2204.
8.  Le puso la pelota para que la bateara [He pitched the ball to him so 
that he could hit it]. He treated him gently. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1984, 74.
9. Más vale pelota en mano que árbitro cantando [Better a ball in the 
hand than an umpire calling (literally, “singing”)]. A parody of the 
widely known Spanish proverb, “Más vale pájaro en mano que cien 
volando [Better a bird in the hand than one hundred fl ying]. Com-
pare to the English version, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the 
bush.” Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 79.
10. No ataja la pelota [He can’t stop/cut off the ball]. He can’t do his 
work properly, carry out his assigned task. Mexico: Jiménez 1970, 
163.
11. Pelota que no has de coger, déjala correr [If you aren’t going to catch 
the ball, let it roll]. A parody of the well-known proverb, “Agua que 
no has de beber, déjala correr [If you aren’t going to drink the water, 
let it fl ow], often used to mean “If you aren’t going to use something, 
let someone else enjoy it” or “If you’re not serious about the girl, let 
her alone.” Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 52.
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PICHAR, PICHEAR (v.), to pitch
1. Pichea fl ojito [Pitch a slow/soft one]. Take it easy on me. Cuba: 
Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 120.
2. ¿Quién va a pichar esta noche? [Who’s pitching tonight?] Who is 
paying (e.g., for drinks or food) tonight? Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 
60.
3. Pichea y cachea al mismo tiempo [He pitches and catches at the 
same time]. He is bisexual. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 50.
PÍCHER (n.), pitcher
1. Al pícher que tira rectas siempre le batean la pelota [The pitcher 
who always throws straight will have his pitches hit regularly]. If 
one always does things the same way, opponents will soon catch 
on. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 12.
2. Con pícher que batea duro ándate con disimulo [With a pitcher 
who hits hard, proceed cautiously]. Be careful when you are fac-
ing a highly qualifi ed opponent. As a general rule, a pitcher is not 
a strong hitter, but there are exceptions. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1993, 12.
3. Cuando el pícher se vira, en vez de correr es mejor volver a base
[When the pitcher whirls (toward fi rst base), instead of running, 
it’s better to return to the base]. Don’t take unnecessary or unwise 
risks. The runner on fi rst base typically takes as much lead toward 
second as he dares, and the pitcher may turn quickly and throw 
the ball to put him out. The runner must dive for the base to reach 
it before the ball does. If the runner continues to second, he runs 
the risk of being tagged out or caught in a rundown between two 
opposing players. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 66. 
4. El que es pícher no necesita que por él tiren pelotas [He who is a 
pitcher doesn’t need anyone to throw the ball for him]. A person 
who is qualifi ed for his work doesn’t need anyone to do it for him. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 75.
5. Pícher que mucho se vira sorprende [A pitcher who often whirls (to 
throw to fi rst) will (eventually) take the runner by surprise]. Perse-
verance wins. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 23.
6. Si el pícher no se descuida, ni el venado se le escapa [If the pitcher 
is not careless, even a deer won’t get away from him]. If you keep 
an eye on your enemies, they won’t take you by surprise. Cuba: 
Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 12.
7. Son pítcher y cátcher [They are (like) pitcher and catcher]. Said of 
two people who aid or support one another. Puerto Rico: Núñez de 
Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 237. 
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PISAR (n.), to touch base
 Pisa y corre [He touches base and runs]. Said of someone who is in 
a great hurry. Panama: fi eld.
PLANCHITA (n.), a bunt (a short, downward hit that touches the 
ground not far from the batter)
 El que toca planchita también batea [The one who bunts also hits 
the ball hard]. One can never fully know another person’s capabili-
ties; therefore, one should always be alert. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1993, 22.
PONCHAR(SE) (v.), to strike out, be struck out
1. Ahí te ponchaste tú [That’s where you struck out]. That’s where you 
failed/made your mistake. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 
6. Venezuela: Rosenblat 1960, 60. Rosenblat considers the term 
ponchar(se) to have reached Venezuela via Cuba.
2. Combinando lanzamientos se poncha el bateador [By combining 
pitches, you strike out the batter]. The person who uses various 
strategies to get ahead will always win out. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
2000, 83.
3. Cuidado con el que se poncha pero le tira duro a la bola [Be careful 
of the one who strikes out but swings hard at the ball]. Be careful 
of the one who makes mistakes but is also capable of great success. 
Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 68.
4. Está ponchado en el trabajo [He has struck out at work]. He has 
been fi red or laid off. Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 30.
5. Está ponchando en casa de la novia [He is striking out in his girl-
friend’s house]. He’s making a poor impression with his girlfriend’s 
family. Puerto Rico: García Santos 1997, 2030. 
6. El que se va con la mala se poncha [The one who goes after a bad 
pitch will strike out]. The one who goes after something false will 
end up a failure. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 81. 
POSICIÓN (n.), position
 Está en posición anotadora [He is in scoring position]. He is on the 
verge of a triumph (e.g., in his career). A runner on second or third 
base is said to be in scoring position because a hit can bring him 
home. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1986, 122.
PRIMERA (n.), first base; first baseman
1. Ése no llega ni a primera [That fellow won’t even get to fi rst base]. 
He will have no success in what he is attempting to do. Puerto Rico: 
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Núñez de Ortega and Delgado de Laborde 1999, 127; “500 dichos” 
1997, under baseball. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1978, 286.
2. La primera que no se estira no coge bola [The fi rst baseman who 
doesn’t stretch (exert himself) doesn’t catch the ball]. You get out of 
anything (e.g., a task or job) what you put into it. The person who 
doesn’t do his best doesn’t succeed. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 67.
3. Lo cogieron entre primera y segunda [They caught him between 
fi rst and second]. They took him by surprise. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1978, 286. See “Lo cogieron fuera de base” under BASE.
4. Lo importante es llegar a primera base [The important thing is to 
reach fi rst base]. Initial success is necessary for further accom-
plishments. Puerto Rico: García Santos 1997, 758.
5. Tira a primera base a ver cómo te sale [Throw to fi rst and see what 
happens]. Try a certain strategy and see whether you succeed or 
not. Instead of pitching to the batter, the pitcher may throw to fi rst 
base to try to put out a runner who has taken a big lead. Cuba: 
Batista Moreno 1973, 103.
RILÍ (n.), release (from a contract)
 Ella le dio su rilí [She gave him his release]. She (his wife, girlfriend) 
left him. Also used to refer to someone who has been fi red from his 
job. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 58. 
SEGUNDA (n.), second base
1. El que roba la segunda lo agarran fácil en tercera [He who steals 
second is easily caught on third]. The person who takes a risk and 
succeeds will be watched more closely from then on. Cuba: Sánchez-
Boudy 1993, 12.
2. Político que roba segunda te tumba [The politician who steals 
second will deceive you]. The politician who is underhanded will 
defraud the public. Stealing second (running from fi rst to second 
when the ball has not been hit) is perfectly legal in baseball but en-
tails a certain amount of deception as well as the ability to run fast 
and a willingness to take risks. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 25. 
3. Si no corres como un venado, no robes la segunda [If you can’t run 
like a deer, don’t steal second]. Don’t try to do something for which 
you do not have the necessary qualifi cations. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 
1993, 12.
TRES Y DOS (adv.), three and two (i.e., three balls and two strikes)
1. El que está en tres y dos puede tocar planchita [He who is at three 
and two may bunt]. The person who is in a diffi cult situation may 
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do something unexpected. A batter who has reached a count of 
three balls and two strikes will walk with one more ball or be out 
with one more strike. A bunt (a very short hit that lands close to 
home plate) is an unexpected, but not unheard of, strategy in such 
a situation. Cuba: Sánchez-Boudy 1993, 66. 
2. Está en tres y dos [He is at three and two]. He’s in a diffi cult situ-
ation, at a crucial point. Cuba: Pérez López 1968, 37; Sánchez-
Boudy 1978, 324. Dominican Republic: Cruz Brache 1978, 116. 
Nicaragua: Matus Lazo 1998, 33. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and 
Delgado de Laborde 1999, 166. Venezuela: Núñez and Pérez 1994, 
467.
WILSON (adj.), Wilson, a brand of baseballs considered superior to 
others
1. Ése es Wilson [or] Wilson Wilson [He’s a Wilson]. He’s the best. 
Puerto Rico: Claudio de la Torre 1989, 235; Núñez de Ortega and 
Delgado de Laborde 1999, 164.
2. Ése es Wilson Wilson Willie May[s]. (See previous entry.) He is ab-
solutely the best. A superlative created by combining the Wilson 
brand of baseball with a reference to Hall of Famer Willie Mays of 
the Giants, considered by many to be one of the fi nest players in 
the history of baseball. Puerto Rico: Núñez de Ortega and Delgado 
de Laborde 1999, 164.
Notes
1. See the exhibition Web site www.baseballasamerica.org, in particu-
lar the section entitled Sharing a Common Culture. A book designed 
to accompany the exhibition, bearing the same title and subtitled 
Seeing Ourselves Through Our National Game, was published by Na-
tional Geographic in 2002. A number of other Web sites describe or 
comment on the exhibition, such as the one mounted by the Field 
Museum of Natural History in Chicago, the venue of the exhibit 
from February to July 2003.
2. The term americano is often applied by speakers of Spanish to res-
idents of the Americas as a whole, the more specifi c term for a 
citizen of the United States being norteamericano, “North Ameri-
can.” Baseball can therefore be described as un deporte americano 
in Spanish, but to convey its popularity in the Spanish-speaking 
Americas, speakers of English need to resort to a term such as 
“Pan-American.”
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3. A summary of the history of Venezuelan baseball can be found on the 
Web site iml.jou.ufl .edu/projects/Fall02/Landino/ThePast.html.
George Chevalier, the author of a series of reminiscences of ear-
ly days in the Canal Zone, includes in his “When the Canal Zone 
Played Baseball” some brief references to the history of the game in 
that region (www.pancanalsociety.org/Articles/GC/Chevalier131
.html).
4. The Web site www.internationalbaseball.org/southamerica.htm in-
cludes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and 
Venezuela as regions where the game is played, at least on an ama-
teur and in most cases very-limited basis.
5. www.zonalatina.com/Zldata230.htm. The Web site includes a list 
of Latino players and their salaries, which surely appear astronom-
ical to most Latin American readers. According to another Web site, 
among slightly more than 14,000 major league players over the 
years, 340 have been born in the Dominican Republic, 206 in Puer-
to Rico, 148 in Cuba, 140 in Venezuela, 90 in Mexico, 43 in Pan-
ama, 8 in Nicaragua, and 7 in Colombia (www.baseball-reference
.com/bio). At the beginning of the season in 2000, there were 170 
major league players from Latin America:71 from the Domini-
can Republic, 33 from Puerto Rico, 31 from Venezuela, 14 from 
Mexico, 9 from Cuba, 8 from Panama, 3 from Colombia, and 1 
from Nicaragua (www.latinosportslegends.com/LatinsinMLB_2000
.htm).
6. A number of parodies attributed specifi cally to the humorist Mem-
brillo, published in Zig-Zag Libre in April 1982, appear in Sánchez-
Boudy 1993, 52–53. They are also included, without attribution, 
with numerous other examples of “baseball proverbs” in a separate 
section of the same author’s recent Diccionario de refranes popu-
lares cubanos (Sánchez-Boudy 2000, 79–85). I have incorporated 
some sample parodies into the annotated list.
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“You Can’t Kill Shit”
Occupational Proverb and Metaphorical
System among Young Medical Professionals
Stephen D. Winick
IntroductionDuring the 1990s, I observed several folklore forms at work 
among young medical professionals in New York City and Phila-
delphia. Among them were the proverb “You can’t kill shit,” and 
its variants “Shit never dies” and “Scum never dies.” These prov-
erbs proved fascinating not only in themselves but as a theoreti-
cal window into the workings of occupational proverbs, both as a 
subset of the proverb genre and a subset of occupational folk cul-
ture. On the one hand, the existence of such proverbs suggested 
that mainstream proverb theory needed some refi nement. On the 
other, the specifi c meanings of these proverbs, and their situation 
within a system of metaphorical folk speech, indicated that the 
prevailing understanding of medical folklore also required some 
revision.1
“You Can’t Kill Shit,” Occupational Proverbs, and Proverb Theory
At the time I fi rst encountered “You can’t kill shit,” occupation-
al proverbs were sadly neglected within the fi eld of proverb stud-
ies; only recently (e.g., Dundes, Streiff, and Dundes 1999) have 
proverbs restricted to an occupational community been widely 
studied.2 Indeed, until quite recently, the prevailing defi nition 
of proverbs, and its attendant methodology, precluded the exis-
tence of specifi cally occupational examples. Archer Taylor (1985, 
15), writing in 1931, concluded that “the trades and mercantile
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conclusion lies in his assumptions about what constitutes a prov-
erb in the fi rst place. Proverb scholars of Taylor’s era insisted that 
a saying be generally disseminated among the population before 
they called it a proverb. Most proverb scholars were students of 
literature and looked there fi rst for the evidence of an expression’s 
proverbiality; compilers of the generally accepted proverb diction-
aries used literary references as their foremost means of confi rm-
ing proverbiality. But occupational proverbs are often too esoteric 
to migrate into the general population. They are unlikely to be 
found in literature (at least the literature proverb scholars usu-
ally read) and therefore were rarely represented in the dictionar-
ies Taylor perused as he wrote his classic text. This explains his 
impression that very few occupational proverbs existed.
How much has modern proverb scholarship changed since 
Taylor? On the one hand, as I have indicated, scholars have be-
gun to recognize occupational proverbs as an important category. 
On the other hand, many modern proverb scholars still insist on a 
certain degree of “age and currency” for any text to be considered 
a proverb and in practice, therefore, still restrict their analyses to 
proverbs that they can fi nd in many different places and times. 
Reading through general literature, advertising, newspapers and 
other sources, they compile dictionaries of proverbs that have oc-
curred frequently in writing (e.g., Whiting 1989), or they use sur-
vey data that solicits proverb texts from a broad sample of the 
population (e.g., Mieder, Kingsbury, and Harder 1992). They then 
use these dictionaries as guidelines to decide which expressions 
are proverbs and which are not. These methods of defi ning the 
proverb will always fail to apprehend a good proportion of prover-
bial speech, namely whatever is not found in “general” readings or 
known to the “general” public.
Why do scholars insist on age and currency as characteristics 
of the proverb? Wolfgang Mieder (1993, 42) writes that “any prov-
erb must ‘prove’ a certain traditionality and frequency to be con-
sidered verbal folklore,” suggesting that this view of proverbiality 
relies on a defi nition of folklore as traditional material repeated 
from the past. But as a discipline, folklore has moved away from 
variant-distribution models and toward a paradigm of analyzing 
emergent verbal performances. Since the 1970s, the discipline 
has for the most part rejected defi nitions of folklore based on age 
Comes Around
W
h
a
t 
G
o
e
s
 A
ro
u
n
d
88
or currency, and the notion of tradition has expanded to include 
much more than repetition from the past.3 Therefore, few folklor-
ists today would claim that the only way for a segment of discourse 
to be considered folklore is for it to be repeated many times.
The restriction of proverbs to generally known sayings also 
begs another question: Which population must know and use the 
proverb? It was long ago established that any complex society 
is divided into innumerable overlapping social groups, each of 
which uses folklorically patterned communication. These groups 
were dubbed “folk groups” by Dundes (1980, 8) and include fami-
lies, occupational groups, hobbyists, church or religious groups, 
ethnic or national groups, and many other potential congrega-
tions.
Do small folk groups have proverbs? Indeed, it is surprising to 
me how many friends have spontaneously shared proverbs known 
only to their families, hobby groups, or professions. Among single-
lens refl ex photographers, for example, it is customary to note that 
“If you saw it, you missed it.”4 Among medical doctors, a common 
admonition runs, “When you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not 
zebras.”5 There are even proverbs restricted to students writing 
doctoral dissertations, including “The only good dissertation is a 
done dissertation.”6 The medical proverbs I introduced at the be-
ginning of this article fall into precisely this category.
Because of the small numbers in these folk groups, and 
because the effi cacy of these statements is restricted to these 
groups, it is unlikely that any of these esoteric proverbs will be 
widely cited in the literature searched by proverb scholars. But 
they share the forms and functions of proverbs and thus are, by 
almost any defi nition, proverbs among the relatively small com-
munities which use them. Taylor’s statement about the absence 
of proverbs originating in certain occupational groups therefore 
stands as an example of the inadequacy of a variant-distribution 
model, or a model based on age and currency that uses a list of 
many citations as its primary form of evidence. This is simply too 
limiting to encompass the multiplicity of proverbs that are spo-
ken in the innumerable folk groups of the world. I have elsewhere 
suggested another possible model for defi ning proverbs, removing 
the age and currency requirements retained by such scholars as 
Mieder (Winick 2003); however, models other than mine that bet-
ter account for occupational and other groups’ proverbs are also 
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studies to take. Considering proverbs like “You can’t kill shit,” 
then, can prove important in advancing proverb scholarship into 
new areas of theory and practice. 
“You Can’t Kill Shit” in a System of Medical Filth Metaphors
I fi rst encountered the proverb “You can’t kill shit” in the con-
text of other medical metaphors. Describing an experience he had 
had in the hospital, a friend whom I will call Dr. X mentioned the 
acronym SHPOS (pronounced shpoz, to rhyme with the plural of 
“spa”), which he said stood for “subhuman piece of shit.” (Dr. X 
and others also used SHPOS as a plural; following them, I will 
use the same acronym in this article for the singular and plural 
forms.) Describing his experience with a patient that he referred 
to as “a real SHPOS,” he summed up his attitude toward the en-
counter with the statement that “You can’t kill shit.”
As a folklorist with a keen interest in proverbs, I was intrigued 
by the appearance of what was clearly a proverb restricted to a 
small occupational group, whose meaning was not immediately 
obvious. This drew me into researching the use of proverbs and 
other metaphorical speech among doctors.7
It is generally accepted that folklore pervades the world of mod-
ern professional medicine. Among others, David Hufford (1989), 
Anne Burson-Tolpin (1990), and Kathleen Odean (1995) have 
noted mnemonics, proverbs, photocopy lore, jargon and pseu-
dojargon, euphemisms, practical jokes, dramas, songs, legends, 
and slang collected from medical practitioners. Among these, the 
genre that has probably received the most attention is doctors’ 
derogatory slang terms for their patients—for example, SHPOS. 
Folklorists, linguists, and sociologists have all examined these 
expressions of hostility, and scholars have informally collected 
terms of abuse (e.g., George and Dundes 1978; Scheiner 1978; 
Monteiro 1980; Taller 1981; Gordon 1983; Liederman and Grisso 
1985; Burson-Tolpin 1990; Odean 1995).
Among these terms, the single word gomer has been stud-
ied more than any other. In concentrating on this word, scholars 
have neglected an important aspect of medical slang, one which 
connects slang terms to medical proverbs. This neglected area is 
the crucial place of fi lth in the metaphorical system of doctors. 
Terms such as “dirt”, “shit” and “scum” appear repeatedly in the 
Comes Around
W
h
a
t 
G
o
e
s
 A
ro
u
n
d
90
metaphorical speech of young doctors, showing their proverbs to 
be deeply connected to a wide-ranging system of metaphor and 
belief about fi lth and pollution.
Indeed, gomer seems to be a brief and anomalous exception 
to an otherwise common rule: The most insulting medical slang 
terms employ fi lth metaphors. In a personal communication with 
Anne Burson-Tolpin (1990), Renée Fox, an expert in the sociology 
of medical students and young doctors, expressed the opinion 
that gomer was merely the latest in a series of derisive terms. 
It had replaced crock as “the ultimate expression of hostility to-
ward the patient” (p. 50 n. 9). Crock, according to almost all the 
relevant ethnographers as well as nonfi ction authors like Melvin 
Konner (1987, 382) and all of my informants, is short for “crock 
of shit,” although that full phrase is never voiced in the hospital. 
After gomer replaced crock, Burson-Tolpin believes that it was in 
turn replaced by dirtball, which, along with its variant, dirtbag, I 
myself encountered among medical students and doctors during 
both formal interviews and informal socializing. Since that time, 
SHPOS appears to have gained the dubious honor of “most hos-
tile epithet.”8 This reveals a clear pattern: Among the four terms 
that have probably held sway between the 1960s and the late 
1990s—gomer, crock, dirtball, and SHPOS, gomer is anomalous 
because it does not compare the patient to dirt or fi lth.9 Thus, by 
concentrating on gomer, scholars have missed the importance of 
fi lth in medical folklore.10
Mary Douglas, Barbara Babcock, and Victor Turner have con-
tributed to our understanding of fi lth as a symbol, and their work 
has important implications for this article. Douglas points out 
that our general societal ideas about dirt predate the discovery 
of pathogenic organisms. In modern hospitals, however, the con-
sciousness of the pathogenic theory of disease is higher than it is 
anywhere else, and the pathogen is included within the pollution 
system of the culture. Indeed, the pathogenic organism is force-
fully stamped out and therefore by all rights should not even be 
present in the hospital. Rooms, instruments, and personnel must 
be sterile to avoid spreading infection. Doctors’ ideas of dirt are 
often bound up with infectious diseases. Thus, doctors speak of 
the dirty case, one in which a serious infection has occurred, and 
the dirty room, a hospital room that has housed seriously infected 
patients and must be thoroughly sterilized (Monteiro 1980, 56). 
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the symbolic system of fi lth addressed in this article. It helps ex-
plain why dirt and fi lth are such powerful symbols among the 
community of medical professionals.
However, it is clearly not only the fear of the infectious that 
dominates this symbolic system. If it were, the most infectious pa-
tients would be the ones to whom fi lth metaphors were assigned. 
In fact, this is not the case. To get to the root of hospital rules of 
fi lth, we, like Douglas, must go beyond the pathogenic model of 
disease.
According to Douglas (1966), dirt, fi lth, and pollution (includ-
ing exudations of the human body such as excrement) are to be 
understood symbolically as the contravention of a system of order. 
Thus, those items that do not fall within the categories prescribed 
by society, items that exist but violate the rules of order in a cul-
ture, are frequently tabooed, labeled abominations, and avoided. 
Douglas’s theories, as outlined in her book Purity and Danger,
apply to what she calls “primitive societies,” in which ideas about 
dirt are highly structured. Although the modern hospital is not 
a primitive society in Douglas’s sense, some of her insights also 
relate to hospitals.
The connection between dirt and the “shit” of “You can’t kill 
shit” may itself not be obvious, for dirt and feces are not the same 
thing. Douglas explains this as a symbolic connection. Dirt, she 
says, is “a kind of omnibus compendium which includes all the 
rejected elements of ordered systems. . . . In short, our pollution 
behavior is the reaction which condemns any object or idea likely 
to confuse or contradict cherished classifi cations” (1966, 35–36).
Dirt, seen in this light, is metonymically linked to feces and 
any bodily exudation by its quality of anomaly or ambiguity. Feces, 
blood, mucus, and other bodily products, at once part of the body 
and removed from it, “of and not of the self” (Babcock-Abrahams 
1975, 174), are profoundly ambiguous, anomalous phenomena 
that are practically always subject to taboo, or, as in our culture, 
considered “disgusting.”
Given that dirt and fi lth are such negative concepts, is it likely 
that people would be compared to fi lth simply because they evad-
ed easy categorization? Indeed, according to Turner (1967, 97), 
this is a widespread, cross-cultural phenomenon. People in the 
transitional, liminal phase of rites of passage, whose “condition 
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is one of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all customary 
categories,” are “nearly always and everywhere . . . regarded as 
polluting.” Because of this, he points out, they are often forced 
to go literally fi lthy and symbolically compared to dirt, decay, 
and such bodily exudations as menstrual blood (p. 96). In other 
words, these people are treated much like the crock and SHPOS 
in the modern hospital.
As a demonstration of the way in which Douglas and Turner’s 
ideas may apply to our medical proverbs and phrases, let us look 
fi rst at the term crock, short for the metaphorical or proverbial 
phrase “crock of shit.”11 Most scholars who have analyzed this 
term have found it has the following consistent meanings: “a pa-
tient who complains continually of multiple symptoms, many of 
which are either imaginary or of psychic origin” (Monteiro 1980, 
56); “has no organic disease, but has constant physical com-
plaints” (Gordon 1983, 175); or, more succinctly, “patient with 
nothing physically wrong” (Konner 1987, 382). Dr. X defi ned 
crock similarly: “If somebody comes in, complaining of abdominal 
pains, and comes to the emergency room every other night, and 
they get the full work-up, and it’s always negative . . . they may 
have something, or it may totally be psychiatric; who knows? But 
eventually someone says, oh, he’s just a crock. . . .” (tape-record-
ed interview by the author, 1995).
What we see here is that the crock or “crock of shit” is a pa-
tient who has symptoms, or who claims to have symptoms, but 
who cannot be diagnosed by his physician. Diagnosis is itself the 
most important way in which doctors categorize their patients. 
As Burson-Tolpin (1990, 100) notes, “Diagnosis can be viewed as 
a process of imposing order on disorder.” There is nothing natu-
ral or acultural about diagnosis; indeed, Burson-Tolpin stresses 
“the order-imposing aspects of the diagnostic process and its so-
cially constructed nature” (p.102). Like the taxonomies of Doug-
las’s primitive societies, diagnoses are socially constructed ways 
of categorizing the chaos of experience. Using diagnoses, medi-
cal professionals neatly categorize their patients and thus reduce 
the chaos in the hospital environment. Those who do not fi t into 
this scheme, i.e., those for whom doctors cannot fi nd any organic 
cause of symptoms, are assigned to the category of crock.
As a clue to how crock fi ts into this environment, it is interest-
ing to note that the diagnosis, converted to a noun, often becomes 
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are frequently referred to as “stabs,” those who overdose are re-
ferred to as “O.D.s,” etc. Thus, in conversational speech, the term 
crock fi lls the same syntagmatic slot as the diagnosis. Indeed, two 
of my informants used the term “diagnosis” to describe the term 
crock.12 Even if not a diagnosis, crock is certainly a category that, 
like an individual diagnosis, preserves the integrity of the diag-
nostic system as a whole; patients who seem to have symptoms 
but no diagnosis, thus those who threaten the system, are called 
crocks.
Like “dirt” in Mary Douglas’s analysis, then, crock (of shit) is 
“a residual category” that contains those outcast and ambigu-
ous elements “rejected from our normal scheme of classifi cation” 
(1966, 36). Indeed, one fascinating facet of the term crock is that 
its lexical meaning mirrors its social function. As a residual cat-
egory, it is a container for the fi lth that might otherwise pervade 
and destroy the system. Like a literal “crock of shit,” a crock keeps 
the pollution inside, containing it and rendering it harmless to 
the outside environment.
It can be argued that the metaphorical phrase “crock of shit” 
is simply borrowed from nonmedical folklore, where its meaning 
is “a lie.” Indeed, it is likely that that is the ultimate source of the 
expression. However, two things indicate that the medical com-
munity has adapted this term and applied it in a new way. First, 
while the nonmedical usage of “crock of shit” refers to an utter-
ance, as in “That’s a crock of shit,” the medical use refers to the 
person who makes the complaint, not the complaint itself. Also 
crock does not necessarily express an intent to deceive or a lie. As 
Dr. X points out in the interview quoted earlier, “They may have 
something . . . who knows?” It is the inability of the doctor to fi nd 
the problem, the uncertainty of “who knows?,” that is the root of 
the term crock.13
Some doctors use pot as a synonym for crock. It is tempting to 
explain this merely as the extension of crock to “Crock-Pot,” but 
this overlooks the fact that pot is sometimes used as a synonym 
for toilet. (This could easily have originated with the chamber pot 
and been transferred to the toilet. Indeed, a “crock of shit” most 
plausibly refers literally to a chamber pot.) This metaphor is ex-
tended when crocks are said to have “high serum porcelain” (Tall-
er 1983, 39). The word “porcelain” in American folklore is often 
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a code word for toilet, as in “worshipping the porcelain God” and 
“driving the porcelain bus,” both of which refer to throwing up 
in the toilet. Thus the crock (of shit) has become the basis of an 
extended metaphorical system referring ultimately to containers 
that prevent the spread of bodily fi lth.
Having demonstrated that crock is a case of a fi lth metaphor 
being applied to a patient who “breaks the rules” of classifi cation, 
let me pause to examine more fi lth metaphors, using the work 
of David Paul Gordon, who provides us with succinct defi nitions 
of several of the terms, consistently using his defi nition of gomer
as a point of reference. This defi nition (quoted almost verbatim 
from George and Dundes’s earlier article (1978)) is “an alcoholic 
or derelict with extremely poor personal hygiene and a record of 
multiple admissions to the hospital. Symptoms are predictable, 
and illness is often feigned. When sick, shows lack of interest in 
recovery; is often disoriented or hostile” (Gordon 1983, 175).
Most of the terms in Gordon’s sample comparable to his use 
of gomer are fi lth or pollution metaphors. A blivet is “ten pounds 
of shit in a fi ve-pound bag (=a gomer),” a dirtball is “much worse 
than a gomer,” and a SHPOS is a “subhuman piece of shit; a 
gomer.” Also intriguing is the term grume, which is here defi ned 
as “patient dirtier and in worse condition than usual gomer. (See 
dirtball)” (Gordon 1983, 175–76). The grume was fi rst noted by 
George and Dundes and is descended from the Latin term grumus,
meaning “little heap.” In medical terms, this usually refers to a 
blood clot, a bodily exudation and therefore a profound ambigu-
ity in Douglas’s sense. Furthermore, blood clots occur most often 
when blood gets where it does not belong, i.e., when, in Douglas’s 
analysis, blood itself becomes a pollutant (1966, 35–36). Accord-
ing to George and Dundes (1978, 572), the only other common 
usage of grumus is as part of the expression “grumus merdae,”
or “pile of shit.” Thus, in either of its common uses, it refers to a 
by-product of the body removed from the body, a powerful form 
of pollution.
Why is the type of patient in question so frequently referred 
to by a fi lth metaphor? A defi nition of SHPOS given by Dr. X is 
“slimy, skanky, drug-abusing, nasty personalities who come into 
the hospital and then don’t let you do anything” (interview, 1995). 
In this hostile but almost poetically vivid description, several 
dimensions to SHPOS are apparent. First of all, they are called 
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dirty, smelly, and practice poor hygiene. Thus, the fi rst level at 
which these patients are ascribed fi lth is a literal one; they are re-
ally fi lthy and so are metaphorically compared to a piece of fi lth. 
SHPOS also demonstrate the conceptual link between patho-
genic infection and dirt that I mentioned earlier. These patients 
are almost always infected with something, and the most com-
mon treatment for them is antibiotics. Thus, just like the dirty 
case and the dirty room, the SHPOS is either the known or the 
suspected carrier of infection.
After the SHPOS’s literal fi lthiness, Dr. X also mentions their 
unwillingness to undergo treatment or to follow the doctor’s or-
ders. It is in this sense that they “don’t let you do anything.” Typi-
cally, they refuse to allow blood samples to be taken or antibiotics 
to be administered. Contrasting SHPOS with other patients, Dr. 
X states, “Other people have genuine problems, and they come 
in, and you fi x ’em, and they try and keep ’em fi xed, and they try 
and stay out of the hospital, whereas . . . SHPOS don’t care. You 
know, if they end up back in the hospital, what the heck? It’s a 
nice warm bed and free meals.” On the other hand, if a visit to the 
clinic is suggested by the doctor, Dr. C tells me that “the SHPOS 
never come back because they go back out on the street and shoot 
up again. . . . it becomes a joke even giving them an appointment” 
(tape-recorded interview by the author, 1995).
The unwillingness of the SHPOS to fulfi ll what doctors see as 
their part in the doctor-patient role relationship is also a defi ning 
characteristic, at least for some doctors. Dr. X states, “Even the 
drug abusers who come in with pneumonia . . . and say, ‘Been 
coughing up this green stuff; help me out,’ and you say, ‘Okay, 
you’re going to need IV antibiotics, and I’m going to have to draw 
cultures,’ and they say, ‘Okay, doc, go ahead. . . .’ That’s not 
SHPOS.”
Another characteristic for which SHPOS are reviled is that, 
while other patients are the victims of circumstances beyond 
their control, the SHPOS’s illness is entirely self-infl icted. The 
typical diagnosis for a SHPOS, according to several of my infor-
mants, is “drug overdoses complicated by infections.” While nor-
mal patients suffer from accidents or violence or illness through 
no fault of their own, SHPOS are usually responsible for their 
own conditions. One clear indication of this is that, no matter 
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how dirty or grimy, no matter even if their condition is technically
self-infl icted, children, who are usually considered too young to 
be responsible, are never called SHPOS. “There’s really no such 
thing,” Dr. W told me, “as pediatric SHPOS” (tape-recorded inter-
view by the author, 1995). 
It is important to note that the “shit” of the proverb “You can’t 
kill shit” and the metaphorical phrase/acronym, “subhuman 
piece of shit/SHPOS,” refer to the same patients. The proverb 
also emphasizes the self-abusive nature of this type of patient and 
his or her unwillingness to comply with the doctor’s recommen-
dations. Asked to give me a sample context in which this proverb 
may be used, Dr. C reports, 
These real hard-core drug abusers come in . . . when you’re trying 
to treat ‘em, a lot of times you’re nervous when you’re just starting 
out as an intern: ‘Since he’s not letting me draw any blood cultures, 
what if I hang the wrong antibiotic? What if I do this, what if I do 
that?’ and the response from the more senior residents who have 
dealt with this before is always, ‘Don’t worry; there’s nothing you 
can do to these people that they haven’t done worse to themselves 
already.’ And that’s basically the meaning of [‘You can’t kill shit’]. 
They’ve abused themselves so badly they’re indestructible! (inter-
view, 1995)
The unwillingness of the patient to allow cultures, the description 
as “hard-core drug abusers,” and the suggestion that they have 
done “worse to themselves already” are all characteristic of all of 
my informants’ descriptions of SHPOS, and part of most explana-
tions of “You can’t kill shit” and “Shit never dies.”
For some doctors, frequent visits to the hospital are also a 
defi ning characteristic of SHPOS. Scheiner (1978), in fact, notes 
two acronyms, POS for “piece of shit” and SHPOS for “subhuman 
piece of shit.” The former refers to “patients medically ill because 
of their failure to care for themselves” and the latter to “a chronic 
POS. A patient who, after intensive medical care and rehabilita-
tion, fails to follow medical instructions, and is readmitted to the 
hospital in his previous critical condition” (p. 69).
While I never encountered POS on its own in my research since 
1993, most informants agreed that the SHPOS was a repeat visi-
tor to the hospital. As Dr. J noted, “Your goal when you treat them 
is that you want to get them out and not have them come back” 
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thwart this attempt. Thus, while there are more literal levels at 
which these patients are worthy of fi lth metaphors, it seems that 
two of the most important are responsibility for their own illness-
es and an unwillingness to get better.14
The SHPOS and his ilk can be considered the worst violators 
of the hospital’s classifi cation system. Dr. X, when confronted 
in 1994 with an older doctor’s dislike of terms like dirtball and 
SHPOS, commented that for the older physician, anyone who 
comes into the hospital for treatment automatically earns the title 
of “patient.” For many of the younger staff members, however, 
dirtballs and SHPOS never achieve that honor; they are only re-
ferred to as patients when senior staff members are present. 
For about half of my informants, SHPOS and dirtball were 
100 percent synonymous. The others expressed a sense of grada-
tion, with dirtbags or dirtballs being slightly less repugnant than 
SHPOS. But the basic features of the two groups were always 
the same. Dirtballs and SHPOS, then, are self-destructive people 
with no concern for getting better. They defy the very category of 
patient, which to these doctors means a sick person who wants 
to get better. These are the most antistructural people in the hos-
pital because it is unclear whether they should be considered pa-
tients at all. At this deep level, then, the dirtbag and SHPOS (and, 
I expect, the grume and blivet as well) disrupt the categorization 
attempts of the hospital in the severest way possible.
Contrasting dirty case and crock with the more caustic dirt-
ball and SHPOS, we fi nd a number of interesting differences. First 
let us note that crock and dirty case, while both metaphors of pol-
lution, are mitigated by their wording. Crock, by eliminating the 
overtly fi lthy part of the metaphor, suggests fi lth without saying 
it outright. Dirty case, while mentioning dirt directly, connects it 
with the case rather than the patient, a subtle difference but one 
that any medical practitioner will appreciate; a “diffi cult case” is 
by no means the same as a “diffi cult patient,” as my informants 
readily confi rmed. Furthermore, while crock and dirty case are 
straightforward terms relating to a fairly simple type of patient, 
SHPOS and dirtball are defi ned by much more complex clusters 
of physical and behavioral characteristics.
It has become clear that the metaphors of fi lth in the case of 
the more severe terms are overdetermined, meaningful on more 
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than one level; they are appropriate because of the patients’ literal 
fi lthiness, because of their penchant for infection, and because 
they seriously violate the rules of order that govern patient be-
havior. Any one of these characteristics would be enough to earn 
them a fi lth metaphor, as crock and dirty case demonstrate. All 
three characteristics make a fi lth metaphor almost inevitable.
Filth Metaphors in Medicine: Function and Meaning
The observation that fi lth metaphors apply mainly to anti-
structural patients who violate the system of order in the hos-
pital environment suggests certain refi nements to the accepted 
wisdom about such language. One reason often given for the ex-
istence of such derogatory metaphors is the young intern’s and 
resident’s position near the bottom of the hospital hierarchy. This 
unenviable position, it is argued, causes this group to seek in-
group cohesion as well as direct hostility down to the patients, 
the only people lower than themselves in the hierarchy. Because 
the hostility is frequently expressed in scatological terms, Odean 
(1995, 149) calls this the “shit rolls downhill” model. This theory 
is certainly valid and does explain to some extent why patient-di-
rected pejoratives, including proverbs such as “Shit never dies,” 
exist. However, it overlooks the fact that not all patients are the 
objects of hostility. In fact, many of the young doctors I know try 
their best to empathize with patients and reserve their hostility 
for a chosen few. This explanation thus fails to account for a sig-
nifi cant feature of hospital life: the selectivity with which epithets 
and pejorative proverbs are deployed.
Like the “shit rolls downhill” model, the generally accepted 
“stress-relief model” of medical folklore also doesn’t account for 
this selectivity. It observes that the hospital is a very high-pres-
sure environment and produces a lot of stress, particularly among 
the younger doctors. It offers this stress as the primary reason for 
the existence of hostile patient-directed pejoratives. In one of the 
fi rst analyses of doctors’ slang for patients, for example, Victoria 
George and Alan Dundes (1978) argue that the derogatory term 
gomer is used by doctors and nurses to refer to patients whose 
“personal hygiene and habits . . . are so repugnant and distasteful 
as to prove offensive even to the most hardened and dispassion-
ate staff member.” In explaining this phenomenon, the authors 
foreground anxiety and stress as the factors that cause doctors 
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in any doctor-patient relationship resulting from the anxiety 
which accompanies illness is greatly exacerbated by the wretched 
and foul conditions of the gomer.” This frustration, they believe, 
causes the doctors to retaliate by using derogatory slang. “The 
greater the stress,” they argue, “the greater the need for folklore 
to relieve the pressures created by that stress” (p. 580). In George 
and Dundes’s estimation, these factors all contribute to giving 
gomer “pre-eminence as a term” of abuse (p. 572).
I agree with George and Dundes that the stress of being re-
sponsible for the lives of others—and the extra pressure created 
by “professional patients” like the gomers they describe—is cer-
tainly one overarching reason for the existence of medical profes-
sionals’ derogatory speech about patients. This is supported by 
my fi eldwork; my older informants, who cited their own common-
sense version of the stress-relief model when discussing their 
younger colleagues’ behavior, all pointed out certain facts: Stress 
tends to be greatest when doctors fi rst begin to take responsibility 
on themselves, that is, during internship and residency, a liminal 
period when doctors are qualifi ed to practice medicine but not 
yet considered fully functioning specialists.15 During these years, 
doctors typically make the fi rst life-and-death decisions of their 
careers. They work long, grueling hours, often skipping meals and 
missing sleep. They are, quite simply, under constant pressure 
and stress. It is during these years that doctors are most often 
observed using pejorative epithets and proverbs. Furthermore, 
the younger doctors with whom I spoke also used the stress-relief 
model as an explanation and justifi cation for their own behavior.
However, like the “shit rolls downhill” model, the stress-relief 
theory does not account for all the evidence. As David Paul Gor-
don (1983) was the fi rst to point out, George and Dundes’s logic
—that the stress experienced by doctors making life-and-death 
decisions is the cause of medical slang—would lead us to the con-
clusion that the patients who are the most severely ill, and thus 
cause the doctors the most stress, get tagged with these derisive 
nicknames. In fact, that proves not to be the case. Furthermore, 
as Odean (1995, 144) has noted, and my informants confi rmed 
in interviews, the use of these expressions is often fundamen-
tally against the young doctor’s principles but encouraged by peer 
pressure. This suggests that the use of these terms is the cause
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of anxiety and stress. Indeed, both Odean’s informants and my 
own reported urban legends about doctors being sued for writing 
SHPOS or dirtball on a patient’s medical chart (see Odean 1995, 
144). Urban legends most frequently express a group’s anxieties, 
and this legend suggests that these slang terms are the source of 
worries as well as an outlet for them. Gordon thus rejects stress 
as an explanation and points to empathy. He states that patients 
with whom it is diffi cult to empathize are the ones who receive 
pejorative nicknames: “For patients likely to produce empathy, 
slang terms will be rare; for those with whom it is diffi cult to em-
pathize, slang is more likely” (1983, 177).
Gordon’s argument against George and Dundes’s explana-
tion appears convincing, and his empathy model appears to hold 
true in many cases. Indeed, the empathy model provides another 
reason why SHPOS and dirtballs have earned themselves meta-
phors of fi lth. However, although these strongest pejoratives are 
reserved for the most unpleasant patients, not all fi lth metaphors 
are restricted to patients with whom doctors cannot empathize. 
My informants often expressed empathy for their crocks, whom 
they believed to be experiencing real pain and symptoms, even 
if only psychosomatic ones. Indeed, some were convinced that 
crocks were sometimes suffering from genuinely unknown syn-
dromes, but they still used the term crock without any apparent 
resentment. Thus, empathy alone, I think, is not the answer.
The solution, I believe, is that a certain kind of stress causes 
fi lth metaphors to be applied to patients; George and Dundes are 
quite correct that stress is the major force behind these terms, but 
they fail to specify what type of stress. The stress of caring for a crit-
ically ill patient who urgently needs help does not cause doctors to 
use fi lth metaphors. Doctors’ medical training has prepared them 
to deal with this stress; that is the whole point of being a doctor.
It is the stress that results from a loss of control that ulti-
mately translates into fi lth metaphors. The dirty case and dirty 
room represent a failure to keep the hospital antiseptic and thus 
to control infection. The crock, dirtball, and SHPOS, similarly, 
represent violations of the system of categorization through which 
doctors control their environment. This can result in feelings of 
powerlessness and futility. The crock makes doctors powerless by 
taking away their ability to diagnose, their ability to assign people 
to meaningful categories and thus order the universe neatly; their 
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dirtbag, dirtball, grume, or SHPOS makes doctors powerless by 
directly or indirectly thwarting their efforts and by being a non-
patient, a person who has no desire to be helped by the doctor in 
the fi rst place. All of these types of patients cause stress by being 
outside the doctors’ control and thus thwarting the doctors’ at-
tempts to be doctors.
Only now does it become clear how fi lth metaphors help to 
relieve some stresses, even as they create others. Doctors do not 
generally feel good about calling patients SHPOS or commenting 
that “Scum never dies.” As already stated, their fears of getting 
caught and their own moral squeamishness cause them unease 
that surfaces in contemporary legends and rumors in which doc-
tors are punished for using these terms. Nevertheless, the stress 
of disorder in the basic system of categorization that defi nes hos-
pital life, and from the resulting powerlessness of doctors to do 
their job, is much greater. Through proverbs, proverbial phrases, 
and epithets, doctors can create new categories to hold their un-
categorizable patients—patients who “may have something . . . 
who knows?” (crock). They can also express their outrage at those 
who are not even patients and “don’t let you do anything” (dirtbag, 
SHPOS, “You can’t kill shit”), and who, like the infection in a dirty 
room, do not belong in the hospital at all. Because it reorders the 
hospital environment, this form of stress relief is greater than the 
residual anxiety caused by the terms themselves and the fear of 
being caught using them.
This structural argument takes away some of the sting of the 
fi lth metaphors themselves, for these emerge, at least in part, as 
a common cross-cultural way of handling anomaly. Still, one is-
sue raised by this metaphorical system is essentially ethical: Is 
it unethical or otherwise inappropriate for doctors, charged with 
the care of patients, to think and speak of them in these terms? 
Among many older physicians, the answer is often yes; stories 
abound of older physicians chastising younger ones for using 
these terms. The urban legends already alluded to suggest that 
younger doctors, too, worry about the ethics of stating that “Scum 
never dies” in reference to their patients. Although they feel some 
shame and certainly worry about getting caught, however, they do 
not generally think of themselves as unethical even though they 
clearly know their statements are derogatory. 
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It is on the subject of ethics that David Gordon’s article makes 
the strongest argument. Gordon asserts that “hospital slang for 
patients principally expresses frustration and irritation at having 
to provide care when it is not felt to be needed or useful” (1983, 
179). Based on my own experience with doctors, I agree with Gor-
don. In the case of crocks, the time and resources spent testing the 
patient are not justifi ed by any results, and although the patient 
cannot be considered culpable, the doctor’s frustration is under-
standable. In the case of those considered dirtbags, dirtballs, or 
SHPOS, the doctors believe the patients to be the unethical ones, 
consuming precious hospital resources until they are well enough 
to leave, then returning again and again, never attempting to get 
better. Dr. W, recounting a story in which a SHPOS was compet-
ing for his attention with a severely injured but very cooperative 
woman whose frightened child was outside waiting for her, shook 
his head in anger and said, “They just suck up medicine, take up 
space, and tire you out with annoying whining while you have real 
patients to treat” (interview, 1995).
In this sense, as in the societies described by Mary Douglas 
and Victor Turner, the ambiguous or anomalous item is credited 
not only with pollution but with danger. By sapping the hospi-
tal’s resources and the doctors’ strength, the dirtball and SHPOS 
threaten to wreak havoc. From the doctors’ point of view, then, 
the use of these insults takes on a quality of righteous indigna-
tion against dangerous invaders, rather than unfair deprecation 
of sick people.
Gordon even implies that, far from being unethical, the de-
rogatory slang employed by doctors reinforces their strong sense 
of ethics. For the doctors, “Frustration over giving care to patients 
who do not need it implies concern for other patients . . . and a 
wish to care for the most needy” (1983, 179). Again, I agree with 
this conclusion. My own informants’ stories of the competition 
between SHPOS and “real patients,” like the one already quoted, 
make it clear that their concern is not only for themselves but 
also for their genuinely sick patients.
An alternate meaning for one of the proverb’s variants is inter-
esting in this regard. Ms. L, the only registered nurse among my 
informants, revealed that “Scum never dies” or “Shit never dies” 
can be used in two different contexts. On the one hand is the 
situation already described, namely the inexperienced doctor who 
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the resident may say. On the other hand, the proverb can also be 
used to express regret or exasperation when a genuine patient, a 
good patient, dies, but a SHPOS recovers. In these cases, “Scum 
never dies” or “Shit never dies” is used almost with regret and car-
ryies a connotation of injustice: “Why do good patients die when 
shit never dies”? In this sense, the proverb points us directly to 
the issue of compassion for one’s other patients.
The proverb “You can’t kill shit” has thus led us into a fasci-
nating and complexly organized system of metaphors. Phrases 
like “crock of shit,” “piece of shit,” “pile of shit,” and just plain 
shit, grume, dirtball, scum, and dirtbag, and their related obser-
vations that “You can’t kill shit” and “Scum never dies,” are not 
randomly applied to patients, nor are they assigned according to 
who creates the most stress. Although they are hostile, and per-
haps hurtful, they are not unethical. Instead, they can be seen as 
both the underbelly of a highly developed system of categorization 
that seeks to impose order on the frequently chaotic world of the 
hospital, and as the product of a code of ethical behavior by which 
physicians attempt to heal themselves as well as others.
Notes
1.  Among other lessons, Wolfgang Mieder taught me to build upon the 
solid work of previous generations of scholars. I offer this paper in 
that spirit and dedicate it to him.
2.  It has long been common to speak of Medical Proverbs and Legal 
Proverbs. However, these are not disseminated mostly within oc-
cupational communities. They are, rather, proverbs dealing with 
medical or legal knowledge disseminated among the general popu-
lation.
3.  For a famous defi nition of folklore utilizing this new paradigm, see 
Ben Amos 1972. For a discussion of new meanings for tradition, see 
Ben Amos 1985. For analysis of these ideas and their impact on the 
defi nition of proverbs, see Winick 1998, 44–55; 2003.
4.  This proverb refers to the fact that while the fi lm is being exposed 
to light, the camera’s shutter interrupts the photographer’s view 
of his subject. Therefore, anything that the photographer actually 
sees through the lens, he fails to capture on fi lm, and vice versa. 
The metaphorical or extended meaning is that in the profession, 
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nothing can be taken for granted until the fi lm is developed and 
examined. This proverb was pointed out to me by Jeff Benton.
5.  I fi rst heard this proverb from my brother, Jonathan Winick, who is 
a neurologist; it has also been noted by Dundes, Streiff, and Dundes 
(1999). It means that when confronted with a set of symptoms, a 
doctor should consider the more likely or common causes fi rst.
6.  Clearly, this is a variation on the older proverb, “The only good In-
dian is a dead Indian” (see Mieder 1997). It was pointed out to me 
by folklorist Xan Griswold.
7.  My primary source data includes formal interviews and informal 
conversations with both young and older doctors—i.e., fourth-year 
medical students, interns, residents, established professionals, and 
retirees. Formal interviews were conducted with students and young-
er professionals (those who use these proverbs and metaphors), and 
more informal checking was undertaken with older physicians, who 
were asked either to remember such expressions from their younger 
days or give their reactions to them. The most formal parts of my 
fi eldwork consisted of a series of interviews conducted with seven 
main informants: three fourth-year medical students, three young 
M.D.s, and one registered nurse. Five were resident in Philadelphia, 
the others in New York. None wish to be identifi ed by name.
8.  These terms were not necessarily new when they rose to promi-
nence. SHPOS was noted at least as early as 1978, the same year 
that George and Dundes announced gomer’s preeminence.
9.  Although most scholars reject the folk etymology that gomer is an 
acronym for “get out of my emergency room” or “grand old man of 
the emergency room,” a satisfactory alternative has yet to be found; 
certainly there is no reason to think fi lth enters into gomer’s ety-
mology, however.
10.  It would also be possible, of course, to treat SHPOS and crock as 
instances of specifi cally anal folklore, another realm pioneered by 
Alan Dundes in such works as Life Is Like a Chicken Coop Ladder.
Such an approach has been taken by Odean (1995). Her approach 
and mine do not preclude each other; it is certainly possible for the 
meanings of these terms to be multiple, at once part of a system 
of anal folklore and another system of fi lth folklore. Since SHPOS 
and dirtball mean the same thing, and since “Shit never dies” and 
“Scum never dies” mean the same thing—in other words, since both 
nonanal and anal fi lth metaphors can be used in identical situa-
tions—I consider these examples of fi lth folklore rather than anal 
folklore.
11.  While “crock of shit” itself must be classifi ed as a metaphorical 
phrase or idiom, “to be a crock of shit” qualifi es by most defi nitions
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cult it is to distinguish between such categories as traditional meta-
phor, idiom, proverbial phrase, cliché, etc.
12.  One informant, Dr. M, was equally explicit in saying that crock was 
“not a real diagnosis, just a general description.”
13.  Interestingly, although some commentators have considered crock 
a term of hostility, my informants did not think of it that way. To 
them, a sweet old lady whose disease could not be diagnosed would, 
if she persisted in her complaints, be called a crock.
14.  Gordon (1983, 177) noted that “patients who demand more atten-
tion than warranted by physical condition” were often the recipi-
ents of pejorative epithets. Perhaps this should be expanded to “pa-
tients who take up time and resources unnecessarily”; although the 
infections themselves may warrant serious attention, because they 
are self-infl icted, it can be argued that patients are unnecessarily 
making themeselves sick.
15.  It is the residency that prepares a doctor for specialization. The 
internship generally precedes it. Both together are liminal for the 
doctor who intends to specialize.
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“Cheaters Never Prosper” and 
Other Lies Adults Tell Kids
Proverbs and the Culture Wars over Character
Jay Mechling
W e rarely think of proverbs as “fi ghting words,” but the neo-conservative camp in the “culture wars” that began brewing 
in the 1980s has appropriated proverbs and their folklore cous-
ins—moral maxims—as ammunition in the very public rhetoric 
aimed at bringing morality and “common sense” back into Ameri-
can life. Folklorists know all too well the sorry history of the politi-
cal uses of folklore in totalitarian regimes, but who would suppose 
that in the early twenty-fi rst century, proverbs would be taken up 
as a weapon to promote an ideological cause in the United States? 
Writers of advertising copy, certainly, have used proverbs for de-
cades in their attempts to associate certain commodities with the 
common sense of the folk (e.g., Mieder 1993), so perhaps it is 
not so strange that the persuasive powers of proverbs should be 
tapped in ideological campaigns. 
In a departure from the usual scholarly approach, I intend 
to focus on the ideological use of proverbs in the current culture 
wars. The usual scholarly gambit is to show how people use prov-
erbs strategically in their communication with others who are 
presumed to understand their meanings. People usually trot out 
proverbs in response to a social situation, such as a criticism of 
someone’s behavior (e.g., “A fool and his money are soon parted”). 
As Abrahams (1968) points out, the great value of folklore, espe-
cially genres like proverbs and jokes, is that they are impersonal, 
which means that they can assume a strategy of indirection when 
a direct communication would seem so personal as to threaten 
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the social solidarity of the group. Even using proverbs in forms 
other than the usual oral communication—in advertising or lit-
erature or cartoons, for example—follows these principles. The 
hucksters and authors and cartoonists (Gary Larson, especially) 
choose a traditional proverb or some variant proverbial form to 
invoke folk ideas, knowledge, and wisdom in making meaning.
I depart from this usual approach because I am not examin-
ing the contextual uses of individual proverbs but the very idea 
that adults want to teach children proverbs as an element in their 
character education. This remarkable development demonstrates 
a misunderstanding of both proverbs and children’s cultures, as I 
shall show. This inquiry actually will bring me full circle to make 
a point about proverbs in context. 
First, I need to provide some background on the culture wars 
that seem so salient in our public life and on a particular issue 
in those wars, the putative “character crisis” in American culture 
and, especially, in the socialization of our children. Next, I exam-
ine the particular idea and strategy of teaching folklore (including 
proverbs) to children to increase their cultural literacy and uplift 
their characters. That strategy contains some highly problematic 
ideas about culture and individual behavior. Finally, I show what 
this all means when you take the child’s point of view, as do chil-
dren’s folklorists who actually study children’s folk cultures in 
their natural, everyday settings. 
The Culture Wars and the Crisis in Character
The phrase “culture wars” crept into public discourse in the 
United States sometime in the 1980s during the Reagan era. Neo-
conservatives, especially those who grounded their defense of tra-
ditional values in religious faith, embraced the term because they 
felt that they were involved in a holy war against the forces that 
were deserting and denigrating traditional values. These people 
saw feminism, multiculturalism, gay rights, and related ideas and 
social movements as sources of threats to traditional American 
values and institutions. The other side, usually labeled “liberals,” 
also had a sense that they were in a culture war against right-
wing forces of the 1980s. These culture wars have continued into 
the fi rst years of the twenty-fi rst century and show no sign of 
abating.
In a series of thoughtful books, sociologist James Davison 
Hunter (1991, 1994, 2000) has mapped the contours of these 
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wars. Hunter rightfully points to shifting ideas about knowledge 
and truth as key elements in the differences between the “ortho-
dox” camp, as he calls the neoconservatives, and the “progres-
sive” camp, as he calls the cultural left. For the orthodox, moral 
authority relies on a transcendent source of truth (usually God), 
whereas for progressives (even among the religious progressives) 
moral authority is emergent, conditional, tentative, and relative. 
This distinction perhaps summarizes too neatly Hunter’s much 
longer and nuanced analysis of the worldviews of the two sides, 
but this issue of the sources and nature of moral authority lies at 
the heart of the matter, especially when I consider the campaign 
to teach children proverbs. 
Hunter looks at the actual skirmishes in the culture wars 
that take place in politics, in the schools, in courtrooms, and in 
the mass media. Those defending “traditional values” see public 
schooling as an especially important arena for fi ghting the culture 
wars, seeing in feminism, multiculturalism, pluralism, gay rights, 
and assorted experiments in “progressive education” a conspiracy 
to capture the hearts and minds of America’s children and con-
vince them that morals are relative and the measure of all things 
is individual satisfaction. When psychology replaces religion as 
the cultural foundation for everyday behavior, reason these crit-
ics, then the therapeutic sensibility elevates a “real self” or “au-
thentic self” apart from social roles and norms and mistakes in-
dividual liberation from social responsibilities and obligations for 
political freedom. In the minds of the orthodox camp, the public 
culture visible in the mass media aimed at children only serves to 
reinforce progressive schooling’s message that there are no abso-
lutes in matters of right and wrong. 
The result of this progressive control over the socialization of 
children, argue the orthodox, is that people in the United States 
face a profound character crisis. Those who claim that children 
face a character crisis point to a string of school shootings, the 
most dramatic of which was the slaughter at Columbine High 
School in 1999. But even beyond the most extraordinary out-
breaks of violence, the orthodox see everyday evidence of the loss 
of values and morality in the ways young people dress, talk, pierce 
and tattoo themselves, and engage in premarital sex. 
The orthodox antidote to this infection is the “character-
education” movement in the schools and the parallel curricu-
lum of youth organizations outside of school. Thomas Linkona, a
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developmental psychologist and professor of education, for exam-
ple, created the Center for the Fourth and Fifth Rs (respect and 
responsibility) at the State University of New York at Cortland, 
and the Josephson Institute of Ethics, based in Marina del Ray, 
California, has organized a Character Counts! coalition of organi-
zations and educators with training programs based on the “six 
pillars” of character—namely, trustworthiness, respect, responsi-
bility, fairness. caring, and citizenship (www.josephsoninstitute
.org). Even the Boy Scouts of America, while not an offi cial mem-
ber of the Character Counts! coalition, has used the movement’s 
name in some of its materials and on its Web site.
Some fi gures in the character-education movement advocate 
the use of folklore and mythology in building curricula to teach 
children traditional morals and values. A notable example is Arthur 
J. Schwartz, who earned an Ed.D. from Harvard and who is a vice 
president at the John Templeton Foundation, a nonprofi t organi-
zation with a mission “to pursue the insights at the boundary be-
tween theology and science through a rigorous, open-minded and 
empirically focused methodology” (www.templeton.org). Schwartz 
directs the foundation’s character-development programs, and in 
an essay he contributed to a volume on the “new era” in character 
education, he makes an explicit case for using folklore in teach-
ing children right from wrong. Schwartz sees in the grassroots 
efforts by parents in numerous school districts evidence that the 
question for debate no longer is “Whose values?” but “How should 
educators transmit these core values to our children?” (2002, 1). 
One way, argues Schwartz, is to teach our children “maxims to 
live by.” “For the past several years,” he writes,
I have asked literally hundreds of people of all ages to share with 
me a maxim or “wise saying” that has been passed on to them. For 
example, my best friend told me that as he grew up his father said 
to him repeatedly, “A job worth doing is a job worth doing well.” To 
this day, my friend still hears the voice of his dad as he approaches 
an important project. (Schwartz 2002, 5)
Schwartz defi nes a maxim as “a concise formulation of a fun-
damental principle or rule of conduct” (2002, 6), and it is clear 
from his examples that what he has in mind is a class of proverbs. 
These maxims are “civilization’s ‘memory bank’,” he says, and he 
notes (correctly) that children tend to hear and learn a maxim in 
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some specifi c context, often within a communication act aimed by 
an adult at the child. His example is a mother citing “Two wrongs 
do not make a right” when a child defends hitting a sibling with 
“he hit me fi rst” (2002, 6–7). Schwartz approvingly cites Anand 
Prahlad’s African-American Proverbs in Context (1996) to show both 
how proverbs work in context and the universality of proverbs as 
means for the everyday moral education of children (2002, 8–9). 
Recognizing that maxims live in oral performance, Schwartz 
proposes traditional memorization strategies—oral recitation and 
writing in a copybook—for transmitting them to children (2002, 
9). “Drill and practice are essential components of a successful 
performance,” he notes, and such rote practice is the necessary 
foundation before the teacher can help the children connect a 
particular maxim to “their own experiences, feelings, and motiva-
tions” (2002, 9). Schwartz is eager to make it clear that the peda-
gogy he recommends is not “indoctrination” but an interactive 
strategy that can be employed once the kids can recite the max-
ims. He then goes on to show how high schools with honor codes 
experience less student cheating than schools without them (a 
point to which I shall return later).
Now, folklorists have recommended using folklore in the class-
room for a long time, so Schwartz’s recommendations may seem 
welcome news. In fact, the most thoughtful and authoritative prov-
erb scholar in the United States—Wolfgang Mieder—himself par-
ticipated in a project aimed at teaching proverbs to fourth graders 
(Mieder and Holmes 2000), and I’ll also discuss that project. My 
concern is that all these efforts somehow miss the actual, living 
folk cultures of children, especially children out of the surveil-
lance of parents and teachers. Before I get to that critique, how-
ever, we should look briefl y at proverbs and why they are such an 
attractive folk genre for the character-education movement.
“Common” Sense in Proverbs
For educators like Schwartz, the attraction of proverbs and 
maxims lies in the seeming universality of folklore. People think 
of folklore as common sense, a form of understanding that is 
“common” in its everyday nature but also “common” because it is 
shared widely in the society. If proverbs really express common 
sense, they offer promise as a body of knowledge (folk knowledge) 
and everyday, folk morality agreed to by “everyone.”
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Recall that the orthodox camp in the culture wars is react-
ing against cultural diversity and its ideology, “multiculturalism.” 
The orthodox dispute the claims by progressives that reality is 
plural and value systems, including moral systems, are relative. 
Because the progressives do not believe we have access to an ab-
solute reality, they are forced to see beliefs and values as cultur-
ally specifi c, and some progressives would add that even within 
specifi c cultural systems, behavior may be very contextual.
However, progressive philosophers like Rorty (1989) and West 
(1989) and social scientists who work in the postpositivist tradi-
tion are the fi rst to explain that the “everything goes” sort of rela-
tivism attributed to them by the orthodox camp is not the relativ-
ism progressives espouse. Progressives acknowledge that there 
may be widespread social agreement on some matters of value 
and morality, but anthropology holds little promise for those 
seeking a human consensus to replace the religious source the 
orthodox camp relies upon for distinguishing right from wrong. 
Human common sense agrees on few absolutes, if you ask the 
anthropologists, so progressives are stuck trying to sort out how 
to “do the right thing” when what seems absolutely true to two 
groups leads each to behavior that appalls or disgusts the other. 
Schweder (2003), for example, attempts to sort out the dispute 
over female genital circumcision in the United States, where one 
group (including progressive feminist women) fi nds immoral a 
custom practiced by another group (in this case, African women 
from some cultures). 
In the chaos of this plural messyness, some of the orthodox 
have realized that an appeal to religious values may not work 
as the best available strategy for reinvigorating American soci-
ety with an agreed-upon set of moral principles for governing ev-
eryday lives. While plenty in the orthodox camp still cling to the 
Judeo-Christian tradition as the source of the common morality 
system in American culture, others claim that there really is a 
basic, core, agreed-upon (hence, common, shared) set of beliefs 
and values in the United States, even if most of them remain un-
spoken.
Articulating shared values and beliefs, therefore, becomes for 
the orthodox (but also for some progressives) an important task 
in restoring morality to everyday lives. One of the most famous 
early statements in the culture wars was Hirsch’s 1987 book,
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Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know. In that 
book, Hirsch simultaneously bemoaned the loss of a common cul-
tural knowledge in the United States and claimed to be able to 
specify what elements in that common cultural knowledge needed 
to be relearned to bring us back to some halcyon days (never 
specifi ed, but one suspects it was the 1950s) when everyone un-
derstood everyone else because we had a common body of knowl-
edge (expressed in English, to be sure). 
Part of the orthodox camp’s complaint is that we used to be 
able to count on the schools to provide children with a common 
body of knowledge. Part of the “Americanization” of immigrant 
children was their compulsory schooling in English and a cur-
riculum aimed at teaching them the common body of knowledge. 
“Progressive” ideas in education, feminism, multiculturalism, 
teachers’ unions, and a host of other developments destroyed 
this important function of public schooling, argue the orthodox, 
resulting in the loss of common knowledge Hirsch and others 
claim to chronicle. If schools can’t or won’t do the job, reason 
Hirsch and his colleagues, then we need to put into the hands 
of parents, willing teachers, youth workers, and even children 
themselves the road map and tools for acquiring cultural literacy. 
Hirsch and his coauthors followed up Cultural Literacy with The
Dictionary of Cultural Literacy (Hirsch, Kett, and Trefi l, 1988), 
with updated editions, and A First Dictionary of Cultural Literacy: 
What Our Children Need to Know (Hirsch, Rowland, and Stan-
ford, 1989).
Progressives often ridicule the efforts by Hirsch and others, 
saying they treat knowledge as if it is preparation for a game of 
Trivial Pursuit, a board game that became widely popular in the 
1980s. It is tempting to implicate this trivia approach to knowl-
edge in the distressing trend toward “teaching for the test” rather 
than teaching critical thinking in schools, but in any case by the 
1990s, it became clear that the orthodox camp had mounted an 
effective counteroffensive against so-called progressive education. 
Hirsch’s notion of cultural literacy fi t well the “back to basics” 
movement in education, and although these battles are still be-
ing fought in the fi rst years of the twenty-fi rst century, the ten-
dency of state governments to link school funding to scores on 
standardized tests means that, at least for a while, the cultural 
literacy approach to knowledge will remain dominant. 
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Here, fi nally, is where we get to folklore and, specifi cally, to 
proverbs as indispensable expressions of common cultural knowl-
edge. In their Introduction to the 1988 fi rst edition of The Diction-
ary of Cultural Literacy, Hirsch and his colleagues explain the ba-
sic premise of the project, namely, that,
although it is true that no two humans know exactly the same 
things, they have a great deal of knowledge in common. To a large 
extent this common knowledge or collective memory allows people 
to communicate, to work together, and to live together. It forms the 
basis for communities, and if it is shared by enough people, it is 
a distinguishing characteristic of a national culture. The form and 
content of this common knowledge constitute one of the elements 
that makes each national culture unique. (p. ix)
This remarkable opening paragraph begins simply enough 
with the idea, familiar to folklorists, that a group with a great deal 
of “common knowledge” and “collective memory” has (though they 
don’t use this phrase) “high context,” making their communica-
tion highly connotative. It is when the authors attempt to argue 
that the nation/state can be seen as a high-context folk group 
that progressives begin to worry. 
I must pause here briefl y to clarify the ways the orthodox and 
progressive camps in the culture wars are talking past each oth-
er about such fundamental concepts as “culture” and “shared.” 
(These incommensurable positions, by the way, seem to contra-
dict claims that the society enjoys a reasonably high level of com-
mon knowledge.) Long ago anthropologist Anthony F. C. Wallace 
(1961) noted that there are two broad approaches to culture, ap-
proaches he called “the replication of uniformity” and the “orga-
nization of diversity.” The fi rst represents an approach Wallace 
and others have discredited because it posits an unrealistic view 
of socialization as a process that reproduces the same set of val-
ues and beliefs in all its members. Even by the time Wallace was 
writing about this, the discovery of considerable variation in be-
liefs and behavior within seemingly homogeneous groups meant 
that anthropologists could no longer talk about culture as some-
thing shared among individual minds as if there were some sort 
of uniform national character that led to a common culture. By 
the 1960s, there was plenty of evidence that Americans (to keep 
to this example) did not share the same set of beliefs, values,
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motives, and customs, even though it was in the interests of those 
in power to believe that everyone saw the world as they did. 
Given the strong evidence of intracultural diversity, Wallace 
and others preferred instead to view culture as a mechanism for 
the “organization of diversity,” recognizing that social systems do 
manage to hang together somehow because systems can work 
without the participants’ sharing internal attitudes and values; 
participants merely need to know what is expected of them in 
social interactions. In fact, Wallace argued, large, complex social 
systems, like that of the United States, probably actually require
that not everyone share the same set of experiences, values, be-
liefs, and motives. Such sharing is quite impossible, but what 
the members of the society can share is an understanding of the 
system (a sort of “cognitive map” of the “mazeway,” as Wallace put 
it) and the competence needed to negotiate the system. It is in 
this special sense that Wallace and others say Americans share a 
common culture.
Note that from Wallace’s perspective it is not necessary that 
people in the society share a body of common knowledge defi ned 
by content, though in a society with large-scale public schooling 
and mass media there may be some relatively common knowl-
edge. This is why the orthodox camp targets schools and the mass 
media as the realms needing reform, needing to return to impor-
tant content as the measure of common knowledge. 
Enter Hirsch and like-minded intellectuals who seek to re-
store the content of our common knowledge, if not through the 
school curriculum (though they are trying), then through the in-
fl uence parents and other custodians have on children. The ex-
plicit aim is to create “cultural literacy” in the citizenry of the 
United States, beginning with the children. Hirsch’s dictionaries 
attempt to put into writing the minimum body of knowledge that 
Americans should have. “It is this shifting body of information,” 
write the editors, admitting that things do shift, “that our culture 
has found useful, and therefore worth preserving. . . . This shared 
information is the foundation of our public discourse” (Hirsch, 
Kett, and Trefi l 1988, ix). In choosing this information, the edi-
tors were guided by three principles:1) that the information lie 
between the overly general and the overly specialized, 2) that the 
knowledge be widely known (as measured by its appearance in na-
tional periodicals), and 3) that the information have some lasting
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signifi cance (Hirsch 1988, ix–x). Hirsch sees the Dictionary as a 
fi rst, tentative, unfi nished attempt to chart this knowledge. 
In a separate introduction, entitled “The Theory behind the 
Dictionary: Cultural Literacy and Education,” written by Hirsch 
alone, it becomes clear that he sees this body of common knowl-
edge as essential for reading and learning. Without shared back-
ground knowledge, argues Hirsch, people cannot understand 
what they read and hear. Like classic liberals, Hirsch sees the 
ability to read and understand public discourse as the founda-
tion of a democratic, prosperous society. He excoriates “multi-
cultural antielitism” as an ironically paternalistic practice bound 
to continue the suffering of disadvantaged students who need to 
acquire cultural literacy to work their way out of their disadvan-
taged state (Hirsch, Kett, and Trefi l 1988, xiv–xv). Here emerges 
the concept of “cultural capital” introduced by Bordieu (1984) and 
others, though Hirsch would not be caught uttering the ideas of 
so radical an intellectual. Still, the concept is the same; people 
need cultural capital to become socially mobile. 
Most remarkable from the folklorist’s point of view is Hirsch’s 
creating sections of “Mythology and Folklore” and “Proverbs” (fi -
nally to the topic of this essay) early in the Dictionary, just follow-
ing “The Bible.” By “Mythology and Folklore,” Hirsch means, it 
seems, stories of lasting signifi cance. “For purposes of communi-
cation and solidarity in a culture,” writes Hirsch in the paragraph 
introducing this section, “myths are just as important as history” 
(1988, 27). He continues, “The myths that are shared by literate 
Americans are worldwide in their origins, and embrace both an-
cient and modern cultures” (p. 27). The mythological characters 
and stories in this section come from Greek, Roman, and Brit-
ish sources, with only “John Henry” and “Washington and the 
Cherry Tree” representing American folklore. For someone wor-
ried about the survival of American culture, Hirsch’s massive ne-
glect of American materials (to say nothing of the odd choices of 
John Henry and the Parson Weems story) seems to contradict his 
announced intentions.
In an insightful chapter on “the problem of tradition” in Ameri-
can culture, particularly the “politics of tradition,” Bronner (1998, 
67–68) notes how efforts like Hirsch’s lead inevitably to battles over 
“whose tradition?”—despite Schwartz’s confi dent claim that this 
question has been settled. The reader of Hirsch’s dictionaries of 
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literacy and Bennett’s (1993, 1995) books of “virtue” notes quite 
quickly the almost exclusively Western sources of the folklore re-
produced for its universal wisdom. The reasoning seems to be (not-
withstanding expressions, like Schwartz’s, for example, of appre-
ciation for African American proverbs) that, since proverbs and the 
“old stories” express a universal wisdom, then we may as well use 
a body of folklore from Anglo-American traditions as our access. 
The American folklorist is tempted to offer a catalogue of what 
characters and stories Hirsch could have included in this sec-
tion of the Dictionary, many of which well might have bolstered 
the larger claims and intentions of the project, but let’s move on 
to the section in the Dictionary on “Proverbs,” since my article 
means to examine and extend Mieder’s and other folklorists’ care-
ful research on the texts, textures, and contexts of people’s uses 
of proverbs to manage their social relations, allay anxiety, and 
persuade others to take some action.
“Proverbs represent the accumulated wisdom, prejudices, and 
superstitions of the human race,” writes Hirsch in the paragraph 
introducing the “Proverbs” section (1988, 46). He notes that the 
folk ideas expressed by proverbs “are often common to many na-
tions” (he quotes the German version of “many hands make light 
work”), that part of the power of proverbs lies in the poetry of their 
expression (e.g., the proverb rhymes in German, “Viele Haende/
Bringt’s gleich zu Ende”), and that the appropriateness of a prov-
erb is wholly contextual, so that “Many hands make light work” 
speaks to some situations, while “Too many cooks spoil the broth” 
speaks to others. Hirsch argues that Americans need to know this 
body of common proverbs because people often say or write trun-
cated versions, and the meaning will be unclear if the reader or 
listener does not know the full proverb. Hirsch also warns against 
necessarily believing proverbs (e.g., “Boys will be boys”); he just 
wants “to give everybody the chance to be an insider in American 
literate culture” (1988, 46). 
Again, the folklorist reading these entries wonders why Hirsch 
and his fellow editors chose some proverbs and excluded others. 
The proverbs in A First Dictionary of Cultural Literacy: What Our 
Children Need to Know (1989), written for children, has an even 
shorter list of proverbs (of “lasting signifi cance,” one presumes). 
There is no point in offering an extended list of proverbs he could 
have included, but let me make two points. First, given the goal of 
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uplifting the morality of America’s children, why did Hirsch omit 
“Cheaters never prosper [or win),” a proverb I have something to 
say about later? 
Second, I note that he misses completely one quality of prov-
erbs that Geertz (1975, 26) says characterizes everyday knowl-
edge—namely, its “earthiness,” its sometimes-obscene quality, 
which helps pack its power. My mother was raised by her Scots-
Irish grandmother in western Pennsylvania, and I remember from 
my childhood numerous proverbs my mother learned from Gran-
ny and used when appropriate. “Shit or get off the pot” was an 
all-purpose proverb meant to criticize indecision and urge action. 
There are many of these. One lovely example came from one of 
my university students in a folklore class. She recalled her fa-
ther warning her just before dates that “A hard prick has no con-
science,” a proverb that made a powerful impression on her. Her 
adolescent boyfriend’s father or friends might have offered him 
some advice from the other angle: “If she’s old enough to bleed 
[i.e., menstruate], then she’s old enough to breed [get pregnant].” 
In other words, avoid intercourse or use a condom. 
You won’t fi nd these common proverbs in The Dictionary of 
Cultural Literacy. Hirsch gives us the Disneyfi ed version of prov-
erbs, just as Disney gives us the Disneyfi ed version of European 
and American fairy tales and folktales. This is important to un-
derstand because whether or not the Dictionary has its intended 
infl uence depends a lot on how children and even adults acquire 
and use proverbs (or mythology and folklore, for that matter). 
Because Hirsch, Bennett, and others put so much impor-
tance on the home and the school as sites where children and 
adolescents acquire the cultural literacy they need to participate 
knowledgeably in public discourse, to be comfortable “insiders” in 
American culture, it is worth asking this question: How do chil-
dren actually acquire cultural competence in folklore and mythol-
ogy? Narrowing this question even more to the genre of proverbs, 
is there any reason to believe that children acquire competence in 
using proverbs by reading dictionary entries on proverbs, writing 
the proverbs in copybooks, memorizing the proverbs, and showing 
adults that they can recite the proverbs from memory (“by heart,” 
as the interesting vernacular phrase has it)? The children’s folk-
lorist’s answer to this question leads, I think, to some bad news 
for Hirsch, Schwartz, and their colleagues.
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“If at First You Don’t Succeed, Give Up . . . “
When, as a children’s folklorist, I look at the existing schol-
arship on proverbs, I am amazed to notice for the fi rst time that 
proverbs really are not a children’s genre of everyday commu-
nication. Folklorists working on proverbs gather their materials 
from adults and printed or electronic sources created by and for 
adults. Some adolescent uses appear now and then (see the earli-
er proverbial advice about hard pricks and menstruating women), 
but judging by scholarship, proverbs seem exclusively adult in 
their uses and appeal. 
Getting at this from the other direction, the scholarship by 
children’s folklorists leads one to draw the same conclusion. Look 
in vain in the usual places—e.g., Opie and Opie (1959), Bronner 
(1988), Sutton-Smith et al. (1999)—for children’s uses of prov-
erbs. The only example I could fi nd in Opie and Opie (1959, 137) 
was “fi nders keepers/losers weepers,” but (like some examples 
drawn from fi eldwork later) such a proverbial sort of rhyme seems 
much more like an aggressive, combative claim—a taunt, really—
than an offered bit of wisdom. 
Moreover, children’s acquisition of competence in expressing 
oral and customary lore often depends on developmental forces 
and schedules. Young children, for example, are incompetent 
storytellers, jokers, and riddlers until they reach certain devel-
opmental stages, at which point they can perform competently, 
which is to say that they can perform like adults. Learning to play 
with language—a requisite skill for telling jokes and riddles com-
petently—is an important developmental achievement. Similarly, 
the metaphorical elements of stories provide practice in moving 
competently between literal and fi gurative uses of language. 
Psychologists and sociolinguists recognize these same ele-
ments in proverbs, observing how developmental stages coincide 
with the child’s ability to understand their metaphorical quality. 
Mieder points to that research in the book he and Deborah Holmes
(2000) wrote describing their experiment in teaching proverbs to 
fourth graders. Mieder and Holmes developed their project in re-
sponse to a Call for Proposals (CFP) from the John Templeton
Foundation for projects that would “increase scholarly and 
pedagogical understanding of an approach to character edu-
cation which involves the learning and employing of practical 
moral principles encapsulated in the form of maxims, proverbs,
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aphorisms, and wise sayings” (Templeton Foundation CFP, quot-
ed in Mieder and Holmes 2000, 7). Awarded a grant, Mieder and 
Holmes executed their thoughtfully designed experiment. Mieder 
provided the scholarly expertise on proverbs, chose the proverbs 
to be incorporated into the curriculum, and about twice monthly 
visited Holmes’s fourth-grade class, where he introduced some 
new proverbs, showed how they were used in oral settings, lit-
erature, and mass media (cartoons, advertising, etc.), and had, 
by his report, genuinely lively and fun conversations with these 
nine-year-olds about proverbs. Holmes and Mieder designed a se-
ries of classroom activities around proverbs, including having the 
students keep journals, write stories, draw illustrations, create 
puppet plays, design illustrative posters, and more. 
Classroom experiments, of course, require some assessments 
of the “added value” of the educational exercises, and the authors 
used a range of qualitative and quantitative measurements (stan-
dardized tests) to see how many of the proverbs were now part of 
the children’s familiar knowledge and what the children thought 
was the result of the project. The authors were quite satisfi ed 
with the experiment and published their book to encourage other 
teachers to incorporate proverbs into their instruction.
Mieder seems well aware of the pitfalls of this approach. In an 
earlier essay (1994), he explores the notion that in any given soci-
ety there may be a “minimum” body of proverbs familiar to a large 
portion of the population. In reviewing the limited research on 
the familiarity of proverbs to American students, he fi nds pretty 
discouraging results, and he calls for broader, interdisciplinary 
cooperation in establishing questionnaires and sampling proce-
dures that will help establish empirically the minimum body of 
widely shared proverbs in a society. Meanwhile, Mieder (1994, 
308–9) notes that the “cultural literacy” project of Hirsch and his 
colleagues seems to be getting at the same notion of a minimum 
shared knowledge members of a society need to have. He com-
ments that the Cultural Literacy (1987) book “added a controver-
sial appendix,” providing an early, tentative list of “What Liter-
ate Americans Know,” a list later expanded into the Dictionary of 
Cultural Literacy (1988). Mieder is troubled by Hirsch’s failure to 
explain how he arrived at his list of “265 essential proverbs” and 
his lack of any evidence about how frequently these proverbs have 
appeared. Mieder faces Hirsch’s problem in his own scholarship, 
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he acknowledges, whenever he creates lists of proverbs for diction-
aries or other uses, as in the educational experiment he launched 
with Holmes. Mieder (1994, 312) holds out hope that “scientifi c 
demographic research” will answer, fi nally, the question both he 
and Hirsch are posing—namely, can we identify the minimum 
body of proverbs that we think Americans should know?
While I think the matter of common knowledge is a plenty in-
teresting question, one worth asking in relation to Wallace’s ideas 
about what it means to share culture, for example, the troubling 
complication I bring to this discussion arises out of the fact that I 
have done extensive fi eldwork with preadolescent and adolescent 
boys in the natural setting of their summer encampments as a 
Boy Scout troop (Mechling 2001). Amazingly, we do not have a 
lot of ethnographic studies of children’s folklore in these natural 
settings, but what scholarship exists suggests strongly that kids 
do not use proverbs and proverblike expressions in their every-
day lives. In my twenty-fi ve years of fi eldwork with the troop I 
studied, I never once heard a boy (ages eleven to seventeen) use a 
proverb. It might have happened out of my hearing, but I doubt 
it. The scoutmaster and other adults, for that matter, used prov-
erbs and proverbial sayings only sparingly, and in any case the 
kids did not seem to add those proverbs to their repertoire of folk 
speech. Bronner (1988 and personal communications) has not 
found children using proverbs, nor do proverbs come up in the 
standard collection of essays on children’s folklore (Sutton-Smith 
et al. 1999). Nor did the ethnographers Fine (1987) and Goodwin 
(1990) discover any proverbs in their fi eldwork with kids. Look 
as I may, I simply cannot fi nd in these standard ethnographies 
of children’s folk cultures any examples of children’s spontane-
ous uses of proverbs. Just about every other genre is represented 
except proverbs.
So why do children eagerly appropriate the genres of stories, 
riddles, jokes, puns, and other wordplay and still not show much 
interest in proverbs? The answer, I think, lies in the authority of 
the proverb. Children’s folklore resists adult power. Children use 
their folklore to manage their own psychological anxieties and 
social relations within the friendship group, including power rela-
tions. But children also use folklore to undermine adult power, 
very often in the form of parody. Mieder notes that “proverbs often 
are too rigorous in their moral or ethical message” and that they 
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have been “quoted too often as ultimate wisdom,” which gives rise 
to parodic versions of proverbs, “twisted wisdom” and “antiprov-
erbs,” as Mieder and Litovkina (1999) call them. Some of these 
joke forms of proverbs—like “Wellerisms”—require wordplay that 
is probably beyond most children’s and even adolescents’ abili-
ties. Other joke forms of the proverb—such as changing just a 
letter or word (Mieder 1996, 600) may be easier for young people 
to understand. 
Thus, I suspect but cannot prove that kids as young as eleven 
or twelve probably can understand and appreciate joke versions 
of proverbs, such as “If at fi rst you don’t succeed, give up. There’s 
no sense being a fool about it” (a parody version of “If at fi rst you 
don’t succeed, try, try again”), and I have seen Boy Scout pa-
trols create long skits with a parody of a proverb as their punch 
lines, such as “People who live in grass houses shouldn’t stow 
thrones” (a parody of the proverb, “People who live in glass houses 
shouldn’t throw stones”). Even early adolescents enjoy this sort 
of punning and wordplay. But recognizing that adults sometimes 
pontifi cate with proverbs does not mean that children actually be-
lieve and acquire the proverbs as part of their strategic repertoire 
for communicating with their peers.
Hirsch is right that kids would not understand the humor of 
the parodies and joke versions if they did not have some previ-
ous experience with the original proverbs. But what is gained for 
“character education” if the kids learn to recognize the proverbs 
and immediately make fun of them, thereby draining them of their 
power as moral advice?
So Hirsch, Schwartz, and other like-minded teachers and par-
ents who want a curriculum explicitly teaching proverbs, maxims, 
and other folklore genres for the character development of chil-
dren have things wrong in two ways. First, divorcing proverbs from 
their everyday, performance contexts robs them of any meaning. 
As Mieder observes, “Proverbs in collections are almost meaning-
less or dead” (1996, 597); they need to be acquired in living per-
formance. The project he and Holmes designed tried to provide 
kids with experiences in living performance, but the problem I see 
is that the children’s performances were always for adults. I have 
no doubt that the children in Holmes’s class thoroughly enjoyed 
the curriculum built around proverbs, but we still lack evidence 
(apart from self-report, notoriously unreliable in such cases) that 
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the children actually acquired a living repertoire of proverbs that 
they used in their everyday lives. I think these children performed 
well and wisely to please the adults, but I am still skeptical about 
what happened away from that classroom context. 
Second, even when kids do acquire proverbs, they tend to use 
them in parody or joke forms and not the ways adults want them 
to. In this regard, proverbs resemble the Pledge of Allegiance and 
other formulas that adults take very seriously. Until they are de-
velopmentally ready to understand the words and meanings of 
the phrases, children merely memorize the pledge and often get 
things wrong. Once they are old enough to actually understand 
the words, they create parody versions they recite to each other 
(usually out of the earshot of adults). Children’s folklorists fi nd 
parody versions of many “sacred” texts, from “The Battle Hymn 
of the Republic” to the “The Star-Spangled Banner.” The moral 
seriousness of proverbs, as Mieder says, puts them in this class 
of texts that adults take seriously and children parody to take at 
least a little power away from the adults.
If those advocating character education through the memori-
zation of moral maxims are willing to take recall and recognition 
as a sign of good character—an educational strategy not unlike 
teaching for the standardized tests in schools—then I suppose 
they have improved some children’s characters in this narrow 
sense. If, rather, we consider good character to mean more than 
the mere recitation of moral maxims, to mean that a child or ado-
lescent makes wise choices when confronted with a complex mor-
al dilemma, then I believe we have to look elsewhere for the ways 
children actually acquire everyday morality for living. 
“Cheaters Never Prosper”
There is one other problem with treating proverbs as the cache 
of cultural knowledge and wisdom—sometimes they lie. Conspic-
uously absent from Hirsch’s dictionaries of cultural literacy, both 
the dictionary for adults and the one for children, is the well-
known “Cheaters never prosper” (also “Cheaters never win”). This 
proverb and a very few others—“Sticks and stone may break my 
bones/But words will never hurt me” and “fi nders keepers/losers 
weepers,” for example—are the exception to my earlier general-
ization that children don’t use proverbs in their own folk groups 
except in their parody and joking forms. Children do use proverbs 
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like “Cheaters never win,” but the contexts do not suggest that the 
children view these proverbs as folk wisdom. Quite the contrary, 
children use these proverbs like charms meant to ward off a bad 
eventuality or taunts to make another child unhappy. One child 
telling another in a midst of a game that “Cheaters never prosper” 
is not uttering a truth but an almost desperate hope in the face of 
reality: cheaters actually prosper quite nicely in the world, judg-
ing from most evidence. Similarly, the child who responds to hurt-
ful words with “Sticks and stones . . .” is really hurt and merely 
trying to undermine the satisfaction the hateful kid is enjoying. 
Children do acquire a moral or ethical system to use in every-
day life, but they don’t learn such a system by memorizing the 
Ten Commandments or twelve points of the Scout Law or a list of 
proverbs. Those who have engaged in fi eldwork actually studying 
the everyday behavior of children in their natural settings fi nd that 
their ethical behavior is very situational. Most children come to un-
derstand that circumstances and contexts affect how one follows 
a general principle to always tell the truth, for example, despite 
the moral of the Parson Weems fanciful story about George Wash-
ington and the cheery tree. Making children memorize proverbs 
like “Cheaters never prosper” or “Cheaters only hurt themselves” 
invites cynicism. Surveys of student cheating regularly fi nd little 
difference in cheating rates between religious and secular schools 
(Mechling 1988), and a series of cheating scandals at the United 
States service academies—the army’s at West Point, the navy’s at 
Annapolis, and the air force’s at Colorado Springs—reveals that 
even the most rigid and traditional of school honor codes are not 
much defense against highly motivated cheaters.
So, as I said at the outset of this inquiry, advocates of charac-
ter training who want to enlist traditional folklore, like proverbs, 
in the project seem ignorant about the nature of children’s folk 
cultures. These cultures are very rich (even if short on proverbs), 
and they got that way not because adults provided them with 
traditional folklore and customs but because they are dynam-
ic, creative systems that appropriate materials from everywhere. 
No symptom in children that adults see as evidence of a crisis 
in character—from the most horrible events like the Columbine 
shootings to the most mundane gestures like a dirty joke told to 
shock parents—will be addressed by character education created 
by adults for children. Even if there is a character crisis among 
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America’s children—a claim I doubt very much—a better ap-
proach would be modeling good character in our own adult lives. 
That we cannot even agree as adults about what constitutes good 
character possibly makes us poor preachers to children. Maybe 
the best course is to heed the wisdom of a traditional American 
proverb: Leave well enough alone.
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The Proverb and Fetishism in 
American Advertisements
Anand Prahlad
In 1977, Mieder and Mieder called our attention to the uses of proverbs in American advertisements. Undoubtedly, many of 
the same observations they make about proverbs are still appli-
cable twenty years later. For example, they note that proverbs are 
“the most popular folklore item used by Madison Avenue” (1977, 
309). A perusal of contemporary magazine advertising reveals this 
is still the case. The Mieders also mention some of the reasons 
for this, including the brevity of the genre, the poetic qualities 
of proverbs that draw attention to them and make them stick in 
the reader’s mind, and their ability to inspire “trustworthiness in 
the advertised product by awakening positive traditional feelings 
in the consumer” (p. 309). They discuss further the “particular 
love for changing proverbs” (p. 310) that heightens the appeal of 
the advertisement. For example, the proverb, “Different strokes 
for different folks,” becomes in a Volkswagen advertisement, “Dif-
ferent Volks for different folks.” Just as exciting as the insights 
provided by Mieder and Mieder’s article are the possibilities that 
their study invites for more theoretical analysis of proverbs in 
advertising.
A focus on folklore in the world of advertising takes one im-
mediately into an interdisciplinary realm, where elements of 
popular culture, economics, politics, gender, and race become 
as important to our understanding of how the traditional items 
function as the folklore itself. Furthermore, an actual survey of 
proverbs in magazine advertisements leads to some general ob-
servations that, in turn, suggest specifi c analytical directions. It 
becomes apparent, for instance, that some theorizing about the 
nature and content of advertisements is necessary to frame a
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discussion of proverbs within this particular context. For in-
stance, what is the relationship between advertisements and the 
economic system out of which they arise? What societal values 
and social issues are refl ected in advertisements, and what com-
mentaries on these issues are offered? As for proverbs, what roles 
do they play in these commentaries, and what further insights 
can be gained into the relationship between elements of tradi-
tional and commercial culture through a study of proverbs in ad-
vertisements?
I would like to advance the idea that American advertising 
operates as a system of signs refl ecting what can be called the 
“religion of capitalism.” I am using the term religion loosely to 
refer to a system of beliefs, rituals, and dogma that guides behav-
ior, offers answers to the most profound philosophical questions 
of life, and provides a structure in time and space that helps to 
order existence on both cosmic and day-to-day levels. Within this 
religion, the god is capital, and the focus is ardently this-worldly. 
There is an extreme emphasis on material wealth, accumulation 
of objects, and an ongoing demonstration of power. 
Tenets of this system, in many cases, are antithetical to those 
of Christianity, the proclaimed religion of American society. For 
example, material wealth takes priority over matters of the soul, 
and objects are worshipped as passionately as the heavenly
Judeo-Christian God. This is evidenced by the amount of time 
devoted to acquiring objects in comparison to the time devoted 
to ensuring a seat in heaven. Rather than extolling humility, this 
system celebrates displays of power and self-aggrandizement. 
Hence, fame and being in the limelight become almost as impor-
tant as being wealthy, and those who have “made it”—meaning, 
basically, have become wealthy, but also including connotations 
of being coldhearted, ruthless, and single-minded—are celebrated 
as heroes (e.g., Donald Trump). 
Ultimately, popular culture feeds off of the public’s seemingly 
insatiable obsession with stars and stardom. In spite of the public 
protest sparked by John Lennon’s comment that the Beatles were 
more popular than Jesus, one must acknowledge it contains an 
element of truth. It is interesting that lately such icons are offered 
roles closer to that of priests with power to induct initiates into the 
inner circles of their domain (e.g., the recent reality television se-
ries, The Apprentice). But just as major religions have historically
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felt compelled to signal their conquest of territories by literally 
or ideologically fl ying their fl ags and banners, so, too, does the 
system of capitalism seem obligated to exhibit its dominance con-
stantly.
Advertising is one among many other forms of exhibition. The 
most fundamental reason for advertisements is to generate sales, 
to get consumers to spend their money; however, their function 
extends beyond the behavioral realm and reaches into the region 
of beliefs and values. Those invested in the buying habits of con-
sumers are not just interested in their behaviors; they are equally 
determined to infl uence their value system because the consumer 
who reasons that he/she needs a new car because the old one is 
no longer functional is nowhere near as desirable as the person 
who is convinced that he/she needs a new car because it will 
somehow magically transform him/her into someone else.
Drawing on the idea of a capitalist religion, I consider adver-
tisements as ad/altars. The terminology suggests a number of 
important points. First, it proposes that advertisements sell not 
just the commodities depicted but also a complete system of val-
ues. Furthermore, the term forwards the notion that as visual 
displays, advertisements provide us with inventories of those ob-
jects that are most valued within the society and have the greatest 
symbolic meaning within the capitalist system. Additionally, the 
term recognizes the religious overtones characterizing the way in 
which consumers relate to commodity culture. In other words, 
there is a kind of reverence not just for specifi c commodities but 
also for the system that places such an emphasis on buying power 
and an endless acquisition of objects. There is also a disquieting 
passion among American consumers that often mirrors what one 
expects to fi nd among religious devotees. Hence, advertisements 
can be read as paying homage to revered objects, persons, and 
ideas, as visual displays of icons and power objects. Finally, the 
term signifi es the complexity of relationships between the spe-
cifi c items within an advertisement and their potential to refl ect 
the dynamics among groups and social forces operating within 
American society.
The Fetish: From Freud to Marx to Advertising
It is at this juncture that the concept of the fetish becomes 
useful, and I can begin to explore the roles of proverbs within the 
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context of advertisements. The term fetish here encompasses the 
core elements of this phenomenon from a number of diverse dis-
courses, including psychoanalysis, cultural studies, gender and 
Marxist theory, and anthropological writings. Elements common 
to all of these are summarized by McClintock, who writes, “Fe-
tishes can be seen as the displacement onto an object (or person) 
of contradictions that the individual cannot resolve at a personal 
level. . . . By displacing power onto the fetish, then manipulat-
ing the fetish, the individual gains symbolic control over what 
might otherwise be terrifying ambiguities” (1995, 184). Thus, “fe-
tishes can be any object under the sun,” including objects from 
the natural or manufactured worlds, items from private or public 
spheres—for instance, a locket, photograph, etc., or nationalistic 
and religious signs like fl ags, crowns, maps, crosses, etc. (p. 185). 
The idea of a fetish as a “power object” is common to most uses 
of the term, whatever the particulars may be. But perhaps more 
important are the reasons that make the fetish necessary or that 
infl uence the choice of this particular object over others. 
Fetishism can be viewed as a response to trauma, particularly 
one that presents incongruities that are diffi cult to rationalize or 
resolve. In Freudian theory, the young man is traumatized by the 
discovery that his mother does not have a penis—by the over-
whelming presence of her biological difference—and thus seizes 
upon an object as a substitute for the female genitalia. The par-
ticulars of Freud’s scenario aside, the essential points are 1) the 
fetish functions as a symbolic signifi er of what is desired but too 
overwhelming to confront or interact with directly (thus, the fe-
tish negotiates between the imagined and the real, enabling the 
fetishizer to have a sense of control over that which terrifi es him); 
and 2) At the core of fetishistic impulse are both trauma and a po-
tentially disabling sense of loss. The fetish object is thus compen-
satory. This is best seen by comparing an alternate mechanism, 
melancholia, which is also a response to trauma. In the case of 
melancholia, the individual suffers a paralyzing ennui, whereas 
fetishists continue to be high-performance individuals with no 
noticeable signs of social dysfunction. For this reason, some 
scholars have lauded the merits of the fetish impulse, consider-
ing it a creative solution to potentially crippling events as well as 
a critical means for understanding the modern age. One author 
suggests that “fetishism is at the heart of modernity” (McCallum 
131
The Proverb and Fetishism in
 A
m
e
ric
a
n
 A
d
ve
rtis
e
m
e
n
ts
1999, xi) and that “fetishism is a form of subject-object relation 
that informs us about basic strategies of defi ning, desiring, and 
knowing subjects and objects in Western culture” (pp. xi–xii).
Even the term “commodity fetish” from Marxist theory relies 
upon the same basic notions. The disjunction or irresolute ele-
ments from the Marxist perspective are the use value of objects 
versus their market values. While the use value is determined 
simply by factors such as the cost of production, the market val-
ue depends on a diverse set of social factors. The use value of a 
music CD may be fi fty cents; however, its market value may be 
twenty-fi ve dollars. Factors such as the celebrity status of the 
singer, the age of the CD, and the reviews it garners infl uence its 
market value as along with specifi c group-determined values. For 
instance, it may be fashionable among particular groups to wear 
certain articles of clothing, and doing so may be critical to one’s 
status within these groups. Hence, the infl ated market value of 
these articles of clothing bears little relation to the use value. Al-
though Marxist theorists deemphasize the psychological level, the 
intersection between this approach and the perspectives already 
discussed is apparent. For example, capitalist societies have ob-
sessions with particular objects—commodity fetishes. These ob-
jects are invested with “magical” power; they negotiate between 
disparate realities and, arguably, function as signifi ers for what is 
desired but also feared.
As confounding as the concept of the fetish may seem, and 
in spite of the diverse nuances ascribed to the term by differing 
fi elds of study, a fetish comes down to a power object, an object 
with which an individual or group is obsessed and one that be-
comes a symbolic Band-Aid for an extreme emotional wound. Al-
though the stereotypical image of fetishes is sexually related, the 
concept extends far beyond the sexual realm. Stereotypically, we 
may imagine someone who cannot achieve sexual function with-
out the presence of a particular object, for instance, a hairbrush. 
The hairbrush then becomes simultaneously a sign of the man’s 
inability to confront the overwhelming and terrifying difference 
of the female body and his method for negotiating this terror to 
have at least some kind of interaction and experience a degree 
of sexual pleasure. In the case of proverbs, a shy and introvert-
ed child may become fi xated on a particular proverb spoken by 
a parent and use the proverb as a method for interacting with 
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peers. At the point when the child can only interact with peers 
if he/she uses the proverb, it can be considered fetishistic. As 
with the man and his hairbrush, the child uses the proverb as 
a tool to negotiate between his fear and his desire to be close to 
peers. The proverb becomes a power object for the child, some-
thing that he/she relishes and holds closely and obsessively to 
traverse dangerous emotional territory. Similarly, at the point 
when someone, hypothetically, can only fl y on an airplane if he/
she has brought a lucky nickel, or can only socialize with others 
if he/she is wearing a crucifi x, then these objects have become 
fetishistic. Fetishes console and empower; they make their bear-
ers fertile and virile, and without them the fetishist is impotent, 
inarticulate, and disempowered by an overwhelming sense of in-
adequacy and even confusion about personal identity relative to 
others.
My contention, then, is that to the extent that ad/altars con-
tain inventories of objects with which Americans are obsessed as 
well as provide insights into the relationships among these items, 
they offer abundant glimpses into common American fetishes. As 
William Pietz notes, objects carry meaning far beyond their prag-
matic uses: “In postmodern society (so it is said), it is no longer 
the material use of products that is the object of our consumption 
so much as their commodifi ed meanings” (1993, 124). In fact, if 
one of our goals in looking at proverbs in advertisements is to 
understand better the diverse elements present in ads, I cannot 
think of a more appropriate theoretical model for looking at these 
proverbs than through the lens of fetishism.
Because proverbs occur in contexts I have identifi ed as fetish-
istic ad/altars, this essay will investigate the relationship between 
proverbs and these other elements. I will endeavor to show that 
the fetishistic display of ad/altars typically reveals anxieties and 
power issues relating to the dominant, white, male relationship 
with women, nature, and minorities, and to explore ways in which 
proverbs play roles in conveying messages about these issues and 
relationships. Through my analysis, I hope to demonstrate that 
proverbs are far more than simply whimsical, charming catch-
phrases that attract attention and invite humorous and familial 
responses from consumers. While they do do these things, prov-
erbs also function on a less apparent level as ad/altars to refl ect 
ongoing struggles with gender, class, and race.
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A number of elements immediately become apparent from a 
survey of magazine advertisements that include proverbs. One is 
the extent to which women’s bodies are fetishized. As consumers, 
we are so accustomed to the sexualized images of women as inte-
gral components of advertising that we practically take them for 
granted. As the proverbial adage says, “Sex sells.” But a close in-
spection of advertisements reveals some of the more specifi c ele-
ments of this commercial truism. It is apparent that young, seem-
ingly available, white women are one of the dominant fetishes 
in American advertisements. This suggests a sense of impotence 
in the absence of such women, and their role in the white, male 
imagination as objects that negotiate between fears and desires. 
What then may some of those fears and desires be? Some pos-
sible fears include an inability to enjoy intimacy and connection 
with women, men, nature, and “othered” groups, nationally and 
internationally; and the desires are to actually have such rela-
tionships. Hence, another fetish revealed in advertisements is the 
image of women, rather than a real woman. There is an overlap 
between advertisements and pornography as an idealized fanta-
sy, embodied in photographic images; both become the means of 
obtaining satisfaction. As such, advertising becomes a gateway to 
dreams, two of the most pervasive, popular fantasies being wealth 
and sexual pleasure (Williams 1991, 221). 
But beyond the idea that sexualized images of women con-
stitute a pervasive fetish in American advertising, it’s clear that 
ads also contain a plethora of specifi c, commonly identifi ed male 
fetishes. Fetishized female body parts include legs, feet, hair, lips, 
breasts, necks, ears, backs, shoulders, navels, bellies, and but-
tocks. In addition to body parts, fetishized articles of clothing and 
materials are common (e.g., jewelry, shoes, silks, furs, undergar-
ments, and gloves). Although I have found no instances of corsets 
in advertisements—an item that has been described as “one of the 
most important fetish fashions” (Steele 1996, 58)—the popular 
aesthetic of the small waist that dominates images of women in 
American mass culture appears to allude to this fetish. 
While my argument is not that every man who views or cre-
ates advertisements, is in the literal sense, a fetishist, I am sug-
gesting that objects commonly known to be obsessions of extreme 
fetishists are key elements in ads. Furthermore, I am proposing 
that, although these objects may not be necessary for consumers 
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to achieve sexual satisfaction, they are absolutely required to give 
them a kind of psychological pleasure. This pleasure derives from 
possessing these objects and the wealth, social status, and other 
signifi ers of upper-class membership (either through fantasy or 
symbolically) that accrues to those purchasing the objects. As 
Steele notes, “Although fetishism narrowly defi ned appears to be 
distinctly a minority practice, a degree of fetishism appears to be 
extremely common among men—normative, in other words, if not 
‘normal’” (1996, 12). Hence, it seems safe to assert that advertis-
ing is largely a male medium. 
Proverbs and Ad/Altars
Having discussed some of the common fetishes in ad/altars, 
as well as the ways they reveal psychological and social issues, I 
turn now to uses of proverbs in advertising. Overall, proverbs re-
inforce the messages communicated by the advertisements, which 
seems obvious, given that the major reason for the advertisement 
is to sell particular commodities and values. In the Mieder and 
Mieder (1977) essay referred to earlier, a number of reasons are 
given for why proverbs are effective tools in advertising (e.g., their 
brevity, familiarity, and association with tradition and wisdom), 
but they are also successful because they rhetorically negotiate 
between the real and the imagined. Abrahams (1968) describes 
this characteristic of proverbs by saying they address a current 
confl ict by presenting a hypothetical resolution. Thus, the ad/al-
tar is a negotiation site. As I have mentioned, one negotiation is 
between the fetishist’s fears and his desires. Another is between 
the fetishist and the consumer, and this happens on a number 
of levels. For example, the advertiser/fetishist is attempting to 
entice the consumer to enter the gateway of dreams, to adopt 
the advertiser’s values and, at least symbolically, to share in the 
wealth and lifestyle of those at the top of the food chain. He is 
trying to convince consumers that what they could have is better 
than what they do have, that who they could be is preferable to 
who they are.
Given the prevailing context for American advertising, one pre-
dominant function of ad/altars is to negotiate between capitalist 
and Christian value systems, and the proverb is a key element in 
this mediation. While advertisers are driven by capitalist values, 
they understand that effective advertising must be careful not to 
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appear dismissive or critical of Christian ideals. The negotiation is 
a tricky one. Advertisers must anticipate the extent to which ex-
tolling capitalist values is permitted by an audience that at least 
publicly subordinates that value system to Christianity. The need 
for coded signifi ers is great, both for those who nod toward tradi-
tional, conservative values and those who proselytize capitalism. 
When we consider what some of the values of capitalism are, the 
tension between these two systems becomes abundantly clear. 
Within the capitalist system, for instance, making money is the 
most important value. Thus, humanitarian values typically asso-
ciated with religion, religious mandates drawn from such sources 
as the Ten Commandments, notions about goodness, fairness, 
and oneness, and more culture-specifi c notions that emerged out 
of American’s puritanical roots are all dismissed in the interest of 
amassing and exhibiting wealth. The proverb is one of the most 
reliable and persistent markers of traditional, conservative values 
and a humanitarian and Christian attitude appearing in American 
advertising. At the same time, it must assist the advertiser’s most 
important mission—the perpetuation of the capitalist system.
While many ad/altars offer abundant material for extended 
analysis of proverbs in advertisements, I would like to consider 
initially a few that demonstrate simply the close connection be-
tween proverbs and fetishes. One such ad consists almost com-
pletely of a woman’s feet. She is apparently sitting down, wearing 
fi shnet stockings, with one shoe on and the other shoe off. Beside 
her feet is a picture of an American Express card, and across one 
foot is the expression, “Two is better than one.” The central theme 
of foot, shoe, and stocking fetishes is quite evident here. Another 
example contains a full-body photo of a woman in high heels, 
wearing low-cut blue jeans and a shirt that leaves her stomach 
area bare. Her hand is on her hip, which is jutting out provoca-
tively to the side. Beside the woman in huge red letters are the 
words, “WAIST NOT,” followed by a paragraph of smaller print and 
a picture of a Triple Lean diet-formula container. The ad clearly 
draws our attention again to the shoe/foot fetish, as well as to fe-
tishes of bellies/navels, large breasts, and small waists that evoke 
practices of corsetry. A Cointreau liquor ad consists of a full body 
shot of a woman holding liquor bottles in both hands, dressed in 
an orange peel that covers only her breasts and pubic area. The 
proverbial text is contained in the line, “Be Cointreauversial to 
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the beat of a different drummer,” and the fetishes are the same as 
the ones in the previous example, with the exception of legs and 
feet. Examples of ad/altars coupling proverbs and fetishes are 
undeniably commonplace, but what are some of the more com-
plex meanings in these advertisements?
One advertisement appears in Penthouse, a men’s skin maga-
zine that probably ranks next to Playboy in its efforts to appeal 
to a highly educated, professional, male readership. Hence, the 
magazine features fi ction, essays, and interviews by (and with) 
acclaimed authors, artists, and others of note. The advertisement 
under discussion consists of a side view of a woman lying on her 
back, her hips and buttocks raised by her hands, with her legs in 
the air. She is lying on a white sheepskin, wearing silver stilettos 
and her pink underpants, which are presumably in the process 
of being removed (they are almost through one foot and near the 
ankle of the other). She wears red lipstick and has red nails; pearl 
earrings, bracelet, and necklace; and a purple silk robe that cov-
ers only her shoulder. Her face is turned toward the camera, and 
her eyes are closed and her mouth open, suggesting that she is 
uttering sounds that may accompany sexual activity. On the left 
top of the page, against the black background that covers the en-
tire page, in large,capital letters and the same pink color as the 
woman’s underwear is the phrase, “PENTHOUSE BENDS OVER 
BACKWARDS.” Below this phrase in white lettering is a blurb 
touting the wonderful things about the magazine, and a box to fi ll 
in basic information if one desires to subscribe.
A number of fetishes coalesce in this ad to convey multiple 
meanings. For example, all the articles of dress, as well as each 
of the woman’s body parts, are common American fetishes. The 
proverbial expression is connected most obviously to the under-
wear fetish by its lettering sharing the identical pink color. The 
positioning on the page encourages the eye to move at an an-
gle downward from the proverb to the underwear, and down the 
woman’s leg to her bottom, making the proverb meaning diffi cult 
to miss. The reader is invited to take his pick of fetishes because 
the ad conveys the message that the magazine offers fetishes for 
all tastes. As a literary counterpart to the panties, the proverb 
conveys to the reader that, true to the values of the capitalist 
system, traditional culture is also commodifi ed, eroticized, and 
as willingly at the disposal of the male voyeur as is the naked 
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woman. These messages about the proverb are reinforced in the 
accompanying text through such language as “hard-hitting inves-
tigative journalism that gets to the truth”; “fi ction that absorbs the 
mind”; “fashion that refl ects a unique sense of style”; “satire that 
bites”; and “women that inspire the imagination to run wild.”
Through these descriptions, the reader is depicted as an in-
tellectual male who has a fashion sense and a proper reverence 
for tradition, and is sexually aggressive and entitled to “cut loose” 
through leisurely exhibitions of dominance over women and na-
ture. Interestingly, the image invoked does not vary too greatly 
from that of a colonial explorer. In a clever twist, the magazine 
identifi es itself as someone submissive, who “bends over back-
wards,” an allusion that verbally conjures up a servant and visu-
ally evokes notions of a derrière. In either case, the proverb helps 
create the sense that the reader is in charge while the magazine 
is, like the woman depicted, at his service. “Being a man,” “taking 
charge,” or “taking” the woman become equated with spending 
money, with subscribing to the magazine. The proverb works in 
tandem with the visual image to entice the reader to enter the 
gates of the dream. 
Many other ad/altars routinely include these same messages, 
and the proverbs in them function in much the same fashion. A 
Liz Claiborne ad depicts a blonde woman sitting on a beach with a 
crystal blue ocean in the background. She wears a short-sleeved 
shirt and a pair of shorts, both on the conservative side, and her 
head is turned as if she is looking out to sea, her neck open and 
exposed. The sand where she sits looks more like a sheepskin 
than real sand. There are white clouds in the sky behind her, with 
one small patch of blue, and a white sandbar. At the very bot-
tom of the page are the words, “Live for the moments: LIZ CLAI-
BORNE.” While the ad/altar plays down sexualized messages, it 
does not avoid them. The message conveyed is that women need 
not fl aunt their sexual appeal; in fact, even in the midst of the 
most sexualized contexts, they should maintain a measure of 
modesty. Hence, the voyeur is invited to be more refi ned, to focus 
on fetishes such as the neck, arms, and bare feet and remember 
that “she,” the white woman, remains an angelic character in the 
master narrative. 
As Dyer writes, this representation is consistent with the use of 
light and whiteness in ancient European and American visual art: 
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The angelically glowing white woman is an extreme representation, 
precisely because it is an idealization. It reached its apogee towards 
the end of the nineteenth century and especially in three situations 
of heightened perceived threat to the hegemony of whiteness. Brit-
ish ideological investment in race categories increased in response 
to spectacular resistance to its Empire. . . . The white woman as 
angel was in these contexts both the symbol of what virtuousness 
and the last word in the claim that what made whites special as 
a race was their non-physical, spiritual, indeed ethereal qualities 
(1997, 127).
Through the image of the pristine seaside, the messages of white, 
and upper-class, privilege are conveyed. The proverb, which is a 
form of command, invites the working class and nonwhite con-
sumer to experience the peace and calmness depicted and re-
minds the consumer for whom the image is already a reality to 
revel in her privilege. More present here than in the preceding 
example is the suggestion that a beachside image can function as 
fetishistically as the image of a white woman. Just as the scene 
becomes a fetishized refl ection of anxieties arising from a nostal-
gic longing for not just a place but also a time removed from the 
pressures and horrors of modern life, the traditionalness of the 
proverb becomes an element in this fantasy.
A third altar also alludes to leisure-time play and carries many 
of the same meanings. In this ad/altar for Jantzen, a tall white 
woman in a bathing suit poses against the background of a lush 
waterfall. She is perhaps thirty-fi ve and wears a pink head wrap, 
a one-piece bathing suit with bright pink fl owers and green leaves 
and pink slippers, and holds a towel or beachwear of the same 
material as her bathing suit. At the bottom of the altar is a black 
box with the words “SHAPE insurance,” the two words separated 
by what seems to be the shape of a woman’s body with a classic, 
hourglass fi gure. The small waist is exaggerated in the logo fi gure, 
recalling some of the extreme instances of corsetry in the annals 
of fetishism. Below the logo are the words, “When the suit fi ts, 
wear it.” This altar offers a third variation on the common theme. 
The woman here is more sexualized than in the second example, 
but less than in the fi rst. The focus is on her very long legs, which 
are positioned the way models in fashion shows stand, with one 
leg in front of the other, slightly bent. Also like fashion models, 
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she has her hand on her hip, one shoulder turned slightly toward 
the camera, emphasizing her shoulders and neck. 
The proverb on this altar can be read in a number of ways. 
The most obvious is that if a woman is lucky enough to fi t one 
of Jantzen’s suits, she should fl aunt it (the suit and her body). 
But this message is complicated by other elements encoded into 
the altar, for metaphorically, the suit includes whiteness, a thin 
fi gure, and class privilege. Hence, the proverb takes on the com-
manding tone of the previous example, giving women the impera-
tive to fl aunt their literal and metaphorical attributes. In other 
words, one should not feel guilty or bashful about having a body 
that inspires voyeurs and fetishists, nor should one hesitate to 
exhibit one’s political, racial, and economic advantage over less-
fortunate groups of people. At the same time, the proverb con-
veys a strong message that women should accept their roles as 
fetishized objects—suit, in this case, being equated to role within
the power system. 
Two additional ad/altars advertising diamonds further illus-
trate these points. In addition to the fetishistic aspects of proverbs 
in the previous examples, the ones in these two ad/altars more 
specifi cally negotiate between capitalist and Christian values. In 
the fi rst example, a tall woman leans provocatively against a giant 
perfume bottle, her hands on her hips, again in the exaggerated 
pose of a fashion model. She is wearing an elegant black dress 
that reveals her legs and her chest, arms, and shoulders; she 
also has on long black gloves and black stilettos that tie around 
her ankles. Around her wrist is a diamond bracelet, and an enor-
mously thick diamond necklace (reminiscent of the necklaces 
worn by women in certain African tribes to stretch their necks) 
adorns her neck; in addition, she is holding what seems to be 
another jeweled necklace in her hand. She stares directly into the 
camera, and beside her head is written, “Woman cannot live by 
diamonds alone.” At the bottom of the page, below the perfume 
bottle is “BILL BLASS, PERFUME FOR WOMEN: at the Ultima II 
counter.” 
The juxtaposition of the original proverb (which suggests the 
importance of attending to one’s spiritual life as well as one’s 
material needs) and the version here (which emphasizes mate-
rial extravagance) captures diametrically opposed perspectives. 
However, through the creative manipulation of the proverb and 
Comes Around
W
h
a
t 
G
o
e
s
 A
ro
u
n
d
140
its proximity to the visual image, the consumer is more apt to be 
lulled by the familiar ring of the expression into the fantasy world 
of the altar than be disturbed by its message. Upon further scru-
tiny, however, one must ask, “What can possibly be equated to 
spiritual riches if diamonds are merely ‘bread’?” The answer sup-
plied by the ad—perfume—elevates the sensory world of scents 
to the level of spiritual rapture. The ostentatious celebration of 
material wealth here is particularly disturbing when we consider 
the source of the diamonds and the colonial context in which the 
Western world came to own most of the diamonds that it has. Dia-
monds are inherently exoticized, not only because of their innate 
natural qualities but because they are colored by the social and 
political contexts out of which they become our property—they are 
literally extracted from the bowels of the earth by dark and sweaty 
hands. One may read the proverb as, “A white woman cannot live 
solely on the appropriated riches of colonized people—diamonds; 
she must also have those things that are derived from the white 
man’s ingenuity and refi ned taste—perfume.”
The second ad/altar advertises diamonds by Friedman’s and 
consists of a close-up photo of a white woman’s face, drawing 
special attention to her eyes and lips. Her skin has a soft, fi ltered 
glow and appears more olive colored than white. She has dark 
eyebrows and eyeliner and an inviting, romantic smile. In the 
foreground are three fi ngers of her hand, lighted to make them 
whiter. On one of the fi ngers is a large diamond ring. Across one 
of her cheeks, just below her eyes, is the phrase, “You have to see 
it to believe it,” and at the bottom of the page in larger print: “The 
Lovecut Diamond: Twice the size, four times the sparkle, half the 
price.”
The question that the proverb invites here is “What is it?” for 
certainly this altar, like the others, is advertising more than just 
the commodity. The woman becomes as much or more the object 
of the gaze and focus of the advertisement than the diamond, 
and she is no less a fetish than the Aunt Jemima on the cereal 
box (see Deck, 2001). One clear subject here is the hidden “jewel” 
of white womanhood that is teasingly alluded to in the proverb 
and the descriptive text that follows. Both the diamond and the 
proverb are cast as fetishes negotiating between this irresistible 
jewel and the fetishist’s relentless desire for it. The ad/altar fur-
thermore comments on the institution of marriage, and as such,
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implicitly involves Christianity. Here the sacredness of the mar-
riage bond—depicted through the placement of the diamond ring—
is juxtaposed with the extravagant display of material wealth. The 
ad seems to be conveying the message that marriage is about the 
material symbols, whether those symbols are read literally as the 
diamond or metaphorically as the jewel of white womanhood. 
Another kind of ad/altar where the commodity by its very na-
ture seems to confl ict with Christian values is liquor advertising. 
Liquor falls, by some standards, automatically into the realm of 
sin and evokes images of sexuality that run counter to conser-
vative Christian values. Liquor ads, which are among the most 
male-oriented types, promote partying and glorify male privilege. 
Two such ads emphasize the idea that men should ritualistically 
celebrate their hedonistic impulses, which generally involves rites 
that reinforce the objectifi cation and commodifi cation of women. 
A José Cuervo tequila ad/altar illustrates these points. The al-
tar contains a large image of the upper half of a smiling, young 
blonde woman’s body against a white background. She is dressed 
in a shirt that exposes her arms, parts of her chest, and her neck. 
At the bottom of the ad is a sea of yellow liquid (tequila), a bottle of 
tequila, and the words in large letters, “Viva Cuervo.” The proverb 
is written in yellow, like the tequila, across the chest and arms of 
the young woman. It reads, “All work and no play is totally miss-
ing the point.”
This revised proverb offers important insights into the capi-
talist system being celebrated. What, one may ask, is meant by 
“work” and “play” within this ideological context? The restricted 
defi nition of work being alluded to involves man’s obligatory ser-
vice as a labor drone in the capitalist hive. It is this labor that 
certifi es one’s claim to manhood. Play refers specifi cally to activi-
ties that may be grouped under the heading “partying.” Thus, the 
ad/altar positions the advertiser as someone who believes that 
enjoying life, rather than making money, is “the point” of it all. 
More specifi cally, partying with a young, sexy blonde woman is 
the point. This message is driven home by the pastiche of fetish 
imagery—the angelic, sexy, eager-to-please, young white woman 
and the bottle of tequila. The proverb gives a nod to the Christian 
work ethic by suggesting that work is, in fact, important and one 
should engage in it most of the time. At the same time, the prov-
erb gives license for one to step outside of that ethic and do so 
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by engaging in behaviors condemned by Christian conservatives: 
drinking and casual sex. 
A second liquor ad/altar positions the bottle in exactly the 
same spot on the page, at the bottom, right corner. Against a red 
background is a black-and-white photograph on the left-hand side 
of the page. In the photograph, a blonde woman in a black thong 
is jumping out of a cake while a group of men smile broadly and 
cheer. One gets the impression that this may be a bachelor party, 
an occasion when this ritual is often enacted. There are eight 
men; one is African American, and the other seven are white. One 
of the smiling men in front is holding a garter presumably thrown 
by the woman. Surrounding the photograph are very large, over-
sized letters that read, “A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND 
WORDS, AND THESE GUYS WILL DENY EVERY SINGLE ONE.” 
The proverb operates on a number of levels. First, it validates 
the idea that the men are engaged in a secretive, male-centered 
ritual. The ritual is one where men are willing to publicly expose 
their sexual fantasies through the fetish object of the stripper. As 
is often the case with such rituals, the possibility exists that the 
ritual mediates homoerotic desires by focusing the male gaze and 
aroused desire on the female fetish object.
The proverb, then, is not only a signifi er of the “beast” in men 
that may only surface in secretive rituals but submerged homo-
erotic desire as well. The beast spoken of here is one that leads 
men to give in to their sexual urges, even if it involves broken 
promises and infi delity. The whisky bottle, the stripper, and the 
proverb are all testimonies to white male entitlement that makes 
savoring the fruits of the empire more important than rhetori-
cal admonitions against such behavior—those found in religious 
texts. The proverb, in particular, mediates between a Christian 
value system that scorns these men’s behavior and the capital-
istic encouragement to act this way. In this context, the proverb 
promotes secretiveness and dishonesty as ways to evade the sys-
tem of Christian norms, rewards, and punishments. The mul-
tiple fetishes conjoin to undermine the supposed sanctity of the 
soon-to-be consummated marital union by recognizing the man’s 
inability to experience the profound intimacy expected of mar-
riage partners. This impotence is confi rmed by the importance of 
gaining “real” pleasure through fetishistic representations. The 
ad/altar furthermore attests to the primacy of the prospective 
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groom’s relationship with his male friends and his fetishes over 
his relationship with his fi ancée: “Real Friends. Real bourbon.” 
The most fundamental vows that will govern his life, then, are si-
lence and loyalty to his male friends and their world of vice rather 
than commitment to his partner. The proverb can thus be com-
pleted, “A picture is worth a thousand words. Good thing she’ll 
never see any of them.” 
Aesthetics of whiteness seem to be the explicit focus of some 
altars, so much so that the visual image could easily be part of 
a museum exhibit on white female beauty. One such altar con-
sists simply of a black-and-white, close-up photo of a young wom-
an looking directly at the camera. Her hair is long and blowing 
around her face. Above the photo are the words, “What hair care 
goes above and beyond?” The altar is advertising Aveda shampoo, 
and the printed text emphasizes its natural ingredients—hence, 
the more “natural” (black-and-white) photo. However, the altar is 
also, like any art, an advertisement of aesthetics.
Another altar is almost entirely fi lled by a photograph of a 
woman’s neck, shoulders, upper chest, and most of the side of 
her face. The only disruption in the display of her body is a black 
dress on which are two large, decorative (diamond) broaches. 
She is wearing elegant earrings and dark glossy lipstick. Right 
above her shoulder and beside her exposed neck is written, “The 
more things change, the more they stay MONET.” But what are 
“things?” What are the changes mentioned, and what does Monet 
signify? May “things” refer to the continued domination of a Euro-
centric aesthetic? May the altar be reaffi rming the empire’s crite-
ria for beauty, purity, and that which is presumably the ultimate 
object of desire? And may one of the things that have remained 
Monet be the submissive posture of women and their continued 
subordination within the structure of this empire?
The allusion to European aesthetics is also central to an altar 
devoted to Caswell-Massey’s Beauty Nectar. In contrast to the vi-
sual images in most altars, this one consists of a painting, “Beau-
tiful Awakening,” by American artist Skip Liepke. The painting is 
rendered in the style of European nudes of the Renaissance pe-
riod. A redheaded young woman is sitting on a bed, or in a chair, 
her lower torso draped in a colorful towel or blanket. She looks 
to be just arising but captured in a moment of contemplation. 
She is leaning forward, an elbow on her leg, a hand under her 
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chin, and her eyes are closed. The viewer’s eyes are drawn to her 
unclothed back, shoulders, and arm. If the viewer does not make 
the association between the painting and European civilization, 
the text advertising the product makes it clear. Written in poetic 
form, the text reads, “The indulgence for all over skin beauty/
Overfl owing with moisturizers./Enriched. . . ./With three alpha-
hydroxy fruit acids./ Healing Vitamin E./Encased in apothecary
glass/For once-upon-a-time luxury, style, beauty.” Across the top 
of the altar, beginning in the woman’s hair, is the proverb: “To be 
beautiful or not to be, is no longer the question . . .” The remolded 
Shakespearean lines make an obvious link to European aesthet-
ics and further suggest that the question of beauty, of aesthetics 
has been answered once and for all: Are you beautiful?—“you” 
being the woman in the painting and those she symbolizes.
When we consider this ad/altar in the larger context of Ameri-
can society, the question takes on greater signifi cance, for one 
must ask why the question exists in the fi rst place. Who ques-
tions the Eurocentric standard of beauty? Can the message here, 
this reaffi rmation of what has historically been the dominant aes-
thetic for beauty, be motivated by a period of social movements, 
e.g., multiculturalism, which are seen by some as assaults on the 
single, dominating standard of beauty in American society? The 
phrase, “For once-upon-a-time luxury, style, beauty,” certainly 
suggests a reactionary reclamation of a fairy-tale-like world, peo-
pled by white princes and princesses.
A number of other altars also address this tension, provid-
ing reassurance that the white standard of beauty is secure. An 
Olay altar depicts a white woman’s face, shoulder, and part of her 
neck. She is giving herself a facial, and the ad is for facial cleans-
ers. In the lower right-hand corner of the altar is the Olay logo (a 
circle with a woman’s face inside), the word “Olay” in large letters, 
and the proverblike phrase, “Love the skin you’re in.” Although 
not a traditional proverb, the phrase is formulaically similar to 
“Love the one you’re with” and is designed to function proverbi-
ally here. 
As much as anything else, the ad encourages white women 
to love their whiteness. As with the Caswell-Massey altar, I pro-
pose that this one is in dialogue with social movements and ten-
sions arising from challenges to the dominant standard of beauty 
in late-twentieth-century America. This tension results not only 
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from declarations of pride and arguments for diverse standards of 
beauty emerging from people of color but from movements such 
as multiculturalism—and to some extent, feminism—that erode 
hegemonic values by insisting on diversity and relativity in the 
standards by which people are measured. The rising incidence of 
biracial children and more widespread acceptance of interracial 
relationships are additional social factors that threaten to under-
mine ideologies of white supremacy. We may imagine the mes-
sages in these advertisements as responses to assaults on white, 
male fetishes, as commands and pleas to white women to remain 
loyal to the system from which these values spring.
A Bulova altar separates the page into two halves. The top 
half has a blue background, two pictures of watches, a list of 
upper-echelon stores that carry the watches, the word “Bulova” 
in huge letters, and below it, “Keeping America’s time for gen-
erations.” The bottom half is divided into two sides—one with a 
photograph of an older woman, the other with a photograph of a 
younger woman. Both are dressed conservatively with little effort 
to sexualize them. Beside the older woman is written, “Foaming 
Cleanser/Handwritten Letters/String Quartets/Bulova.” Beside 
the younger woman is “Kiwi Mudmask/E-mail/String Bikinis/ 
Bulova.” And at the top of the photograph, across both, is “Like 
Mother, like Daughter.” 
While on one level, the altar is advertising the watches, it also 
comments on the idea of racial purity. The daughter may be more 
adventurous than her mother (string bikinis) and may live in a 
world that is more technological, but just as the watch signifi es 
the perpetuity of Eurocentric, upper-class values and aesthet-
ics, so does the proverb. The daughter is, like her mother, white, 
blonde, conservative, and “beautiful”—read “uncontaminated by 
othered infl uences.” One can read the altar against the back-
ground of social changes that fi nd young, white women depicted 
often in the media as sexually provocative and culturally hybrid. 
The proverb then ends with a sigh of relief, uttered by a middle-
aged, upper-class, white male who is thankful that his family re-
mains racially/culturally pure. In contrast to most of the altars 
we have considered, the images here imply that the commodity is 
equally important—if not more so—than the women. The watch 
as fetish leads us to the world of business, and this, coupled with 
the absence of sexualized images, ironically reinforces the role of 
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women as accessories. The altered proverb reverberates with the 
nuances of the original, in which we imagine a son who “follows in 
his father’s footsteps” by superfi cially engaging elements of popu-
lar “alternative” culture but ultimately maintaining his grounding 
in upper-class values.
The understated fears of cultural contamination in the last 
few examples are addressed more directly in several other adver-
tisements. Some time ago, Grand Marnier ran a series of full-page 
ads that consisted of boxed collages of images, all related to some 
folklore motif. One page has these images in separate boxes: Eve 
offering the apple to Adam; Cinderella’s slipper; and the birds 
and the bees. The middle row of boxes has fi rst, a butterfl y with 
the proverb, “What love unites, let no one divide”; second, a white 
woman’s face with dark lipstick, lips open, about to kiss the ear of 
a darker-skinned man; and third, a visual depiction of the prov-
erb “two ships passing in the night.” 
The two proverbs here can be read as commenting on the 
possible interracial tryst depicted in the middle picture, posing 
two confl icting outcomes and points of view. One suggests an ac-
ceptance of interracial unions and accords them the same sacred-
ness that any union held together by true love deserves. The other 
proverbial allusion suggests the impossibility for such unions to 
work out. Although negative, the second proverb allusion identi-
fi es the source of diffi culty not as racism, but rather the diffi culty 
for two persons from differing backgrounds to fi nd the common 
ground necessary to make such a union last. Positioning the ra-
cially explicit part of the ad in the center invites the consumer 
to refl ect on the diffi culties of love from an interracial perspec-
tive. For instance, how does this perspective cast a different light 
on such deeply embedded American motifs as Adam and Eve, 
Cinderella, and the birds and the bees? What if the prince were 
black? The idea of tragedy in love comes across most strongly in 
the picture of someone failing to place a wedding band on anoth-
er’s fi nger; in this case, the fi nger joint is so greatly enlarged that 
there is no possible way for the ring to go on. Contrary to the pre-
ceding example, Grand Marnier’s ad/altar celebrates the tension 
created by social changes and therefore promotes an image that 
its product is for those who enjoy change and even danger.
A Hard Candy altar has a close-up of a white woman’s face, 
gazing up as if she is daydreaming. Her lips have dark red lipstick, 
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and the blurred surrounding background beside her face is red-
dened as well. Her face is freckled, and she wears sparkling blue 
eye shadow. On her bottom lip is a miniature spoon, and beside 
her lip is a cup and saucer; the saucer is fi lled with coffee. Above 
the cup is a miniature coffeepot held by normal-sized fi ngers, out 
of which the coffee pours into the cup. The proverbial message 
at the bottom of the page is “Wake up and smell the lipstick,” 
and a variety of coffee-inspired names for this lipstick are listed: 
“Cappuccino—badge brown,” “Cafe o Lip—Neutral Caramel,” and 
“Latte Lip—Golden Vanilla.” 
The ad focuses our attention on color, employing words and 
phrases that have often been used in the context of race and even 
mixed ancestry; in fact, using food-related language to signify 
black people is long established, e.g., chocolate, brown sugar, cof-
fee, cocoa, caramel, etc. Moreover, the ad depicts a very young, 
“hip” woman lying down, in a less than fully conscious state. As 
with the previous proverb, a hint of danger is suggested. “Wake up 
and smell the coffee” is a cautionary alarm to someone who is on 
the verge of misfortune. Here, the alarm is being sounded so that 
the woman can appreciate what is about to happen, rather than 
so she can avoid it. If we read such phrases as “Caution: Caffeine 
Lipstick may be addictive, apply and re-apply as needed,” along 
with the list of colors mentioned earlier, as signifi ers of interracial 
mixing, then the altar becomes an endorsement of such social 
changes. The visual image supports this reading. The woman’s 
mouth is open, invitingly, as if she is willingly receiving the liquid 
that will be poured into it, not to mention her heavily freckled 
face. The ad serves as an invitation for the woman to consume the 
symbolic “other,” to mark herself with it. Although the altar offers 
a very different image of woman than many others, it still relies 
on fetishism to convey its message. In this case, however, the fe-
tishized woman is marked with infl uences from othered groups.
A VISA advertisement also departs from the image of white-
ness in most altars. At the top of the ad in a purple rectangle is a 
list of expressions: “It’s dog eat dog,” “It’s survival of fi ttest,” “It’s 
them or you,” “You know, a shoe sale.” At the bottom of the page 
in a yellow rectangle are the phrases, “From kickboxing classes to 
strappy sandals,” and “It’s everywhere you want to be,” along with 
the VISA logo. In the middle is a large rectangle containing the 
visual texts. A young, casually but professionally dressed, Asian 
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American woman is seated on the bench of a shoe store. She 
has on a black miniskirt and white blouse and has long, fl owing, 
straight black hair. Prominent in the photo are her legs and feet—
she has high heels on both feet, but the shoes come from different 
pairs. A number of shoes and opened boxes are on the fl oor, and 
she is leaning over looking at one foot. On the walls behind and 
around her are shelves of boots and shoes. The two elements that 
are most striking in this altar are that the woman is Asian—this 
is the only ad that I have come across where the woman is not 
white—and there is an extreme portrayal of shoe fetishism.
The proverbs address the issue of “making it” and “coming out 
ahead” in a competitive world (perhaps the business world is the 
intended reference). But centering these messages on an Asian 
American woman changes the implications considerably, for it 
seems to recognize the extra diffi culties encountered by a non-
white woman in making it professionally. The woman’s character 
is further developed by the phrase alluding to kickboxing, sug-
gesting that she has taken martial-arts classes and is capable of 
the kind of aggressiveness necessary to succeed in the business 
world. VISA initially comes across as supportive of minorities and 
their efforts to compete and integrate into the mainstream.
At the same time, however, the message also contains many 
of the elements found in other ads. For example, the woman is a 
fetish along with the other fetishes, contained within the sphere 
of corporate reality. This is visually symbolized by designing the 
page as the enlarged replica of a VISA card—purple stripe at the 
top, gold stripe at the bottom, and a lighter color in the middle. 
By visually surrounding the Asian American woman with boots 
and shoes, the ad/altar inseparably confl ates the two dominant 
fetishes presented—shoes and Asian women. However, because it 
is generally accepted that most, if not all, shoe fetishists are mas-
ochists (Steele 1996, 102), the messages conveyed by the altar are 
complicated. At the same time that the altar seems to sympathize 
with the Asian American woman’s struggle to succeed, it takes 
a voyeuristic delight in the prospect of watching her fi ght. The 
proverbs, in combination with the reference to kickboxing—which 
conjures images of martial arts and intensifi es the fetish by en-
hancing the woman’s Asian-ness—and “strappy sandals,” contrib-
ute to the sense that the observer is goading the woman on, the 
way one encourages a player in competitive sports. And, while on 
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the one hand, the woman is confi ned and captured, some of the 
pleasure gained from her confi nement includes her infl icting pain 
on the voyeur, on those who have ultimate power over her. This is 
consistent with the historical fetishization of Asian women, which 
includes an alleged sexual submissiveness and subservience that 
are heightened because of the dangers they may be hiding (e.g., 
the Dragon Lady caricature or rumors of female Viet Cong sol-
diers and Vietnamese prostitutes who supposedly put cut glass or 
other sharp objects in their vaginas to castrate American GIs).
A fi nal example underlines some of the anxieties I have been 
suggesting as negotiated by the ad/altars and the proverbs con-
tained within them. In an ad for Silvertab Levi’s, two black men 
stand next to each other, facing—and almost challenging—the 
camera. It is night, and other than a car light shining behind 
them and some blurred, muted lights off to the right-hand side 
of the page, the background is completely dark. One man wears 
jeans and a jacket that approximates military camoufl age gear, 
along with heavy black shoes or boots. He gazes menacingly at 
the camera, one hand beside his face, the other crossed under 
his elbow. The second man wears jeans and jacket as well, with 
brown boots and dark glasses. Written in large letters across the 
two is the phrase, “Be careful what you wish for.” 
One interpretation of the message is that it alludes to the fan-
tasies of white women who desire interactions with black men. It 
captures the white impulse that yearns for the exoticized fl avor 
of blackness even as it is simultaneously terrifi ed of the actual 
presence of the black, male body. Certainly the ad capitalizes on 
stereotypical ideas about black men to endow the jeans by associ-
ation with hypersexual, rough, mysterious, and dangerous quali-
ties. The picture evokes the worlds of rap music, gangsterism, and 
black militancy, and these are all signifi ers of extreme black-male 
sexuality. Thus, the proverb, if directed to a white audience, can 
be read as a cautionary admonition against frivolously wishing for 
encounters with black masculinity. “Black men are dangerous, 
and you may get more than you bargained for,” the altar seems 
to suggests. If directed to a black audience, and especially a male 
one, the message may be to be careful how you wish for a more 
“thuggish” kind of masculinity. As with the previous few adver-
tisements, this one captures the paradoxical impulses of those in 
power. Although it seems to warn against miscegenation, it relies 
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on images of racial mixing that may be conjured in the minds of 
the consumer and encourages a fetishistic fascination with those 
images.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have suggested that proverbs are often coupled 
with fetishes in American advertisements, and that along with the 
fetishized, visual objects displayed in these ads, proverbs help to 
negotiate between fears and desires. These fears and desires are 
often connected to issues of race, gender, and class and refl ect 
social currents within the society. I have argued, furthermore, 
that advertisements can be viewed as the equivalent of altars in a 
religion of capitalism and that the consumer relationship with the 
fetishized objects in ads often mirrors that of religious devotees. 
Hence, the proverbs occur in an arena of highly charged social 
and political discourse. As such, one of their functions is to medi-
ate between opposing ideologies. Of course, in this context, the 
proverb’s ultimate goal is to persuade the consumer to choose 
the capitalist value and purchase the commodity. By no means 
has my discussion covered the full range of ad/altars or kinds of 
commodities that exist in American advertising; nor do I claim 
that my analysis applies to every kind of advertisement contain-
ing proverbs. However, as my discussion has shown, proverbial 
structures are not only prevalent in the fetishistic displays of con-
temporary advertisers but play signifi cant roles. Because of this, 
they offer insights into cultural discussions focused on important 
social issues and attest to the continued relevance of proverbs 
and their study in contemporary American society.
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“The Early Bird Is
Worth Two in the Bush”
Captain Jack Aubrey’s Fractured Proverbs
Jan Harold Brunvand
T he English author known as Patrick O’Brian (1914–2000) was prolifi c and accomplished in many literary genres. (His 
real name was Richard Patrick Russ, and he invented his “Irish” 
background.) “O’Brian” wrote short stories, novels, poetry, biog-
raphies (including a notable one of Pablo Picasso), and reviews; 
he edited anthologies, and he made numerous English transla-
tions of French works. But Patrick O’Brian’s masterpiece, a series 
of twenty maritime novels set during the Napoleonic War,1 pub-
lished from 1969 to 1999, is what earned him the enthusiastic 
praise of critics along with legions of devoted readers around the 
world (e.g., Prial 1998, Lapham 2000). The novels’ complex and 
historically accurate action occurs from 1800 to 1815 with some 
allusions to earlier events.2 The setting is on ships of the British 
Royal Navy in oceans and ports around the globe (with occasional 
returns to England), and the two main characters who link the se-
ries are the nautical odd couple Captain Jack Aubrey and ship’s 
surgeon Stephen Maturin.
Captain Aubrey is a huge, hearty, and ruggedly handsome 
man who has spent most of his life at sea; a brilliant naviga-
tor, commander, and naval tactician; and an offi cer who lives his 
dangerous life with gusto and optimism, despite suffering many 
setbacks to his career and injuries to his person. Dr. Maturin, in 
contrast, is a plain, even rather ugly, unkempt, but vastly learned, 
man; a naturalist (or “natural philosopher”) boundlessly curious 
about the world around him, an enthusiastic collector of botanical
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and animal specimens, as well as a physician; and a covert British 
intelligence agent who does not hesitate to eliminate in cold blood 
enemies of the empire who stand in his way. Stephen Maturin, of 
mixed Irish and Catalan background, speaks several languages, 
including fl uent Latin and Greek, but is often grumpy or even 
pessimistic and remains woefully ignorant of the customs and 
jargon of the sea. He learns—and often unlearns—much navy lore 
in the course of his many voyages with Aubrey, but he remains 
awkward—even dangerous to himself and others—when around 
any kind of waterborne vessel. The sailors on Jack’s ships take 
elaborate care of The Doctor as he moves about the moorings, 
deck, and rigging.
Different as the two men are in looks, talents, and personali-
ties, Aubrey and Maturin are close friends and share the same 
general background of classical and scientifi c education of the 
time. They are united in their hatred of Napoleon and their love of 
music, which they often enjoy during evenings at sea in The Cap-
tain’s cabin, Jack playing violin, Stephen ‘cello (O’Brian always 
wrote the word with an apostrophe). Indeed, the two characters 
meet on the fi rst page of the fi rst novel, Master and Commander,
at a concert in the governor’s house at Port Mahon on the island 
of Minorca in the Mediterranean Sea, listening to four Italian mu-
sicians performing “Locatelli’s C major quartet.”3
Patrick O’Brian’s stylistic control in the Aubrey-Maturin se-
ries of period speech patterns, class dialects (including profanity 
and obscenity), regional and ethnic expressions, foreign-language 
quotations and allusions, technical naval terms and slang, and 
even the dense bureaucratic prose of the British Admiralty Offi ce 
is remarkable. Especially interesting to the folklorist is his use 
of proverbs and proverbial speech. Merely a collection of these 
proverbial items could constitute a substantial article, or a small 
book, in itself,4 but something more than a simple dictionary 
(which I will compile eventually) should be even more interest-
ing.
O’Brian was well aware of the proverb as a traditional form 
of expression; he (as the books’ narrator) refers to the genre by 
name, as well as by other terms like “saying” (or “wise saying”), 
“adage” (or “old adage”), “expression,” “saw,” “fi gure,” “tag,” and 
“epigram.” In one passage, he lists the usual range of shipboard 
conversation as “fl ights of naval wit, fl abby puns, traditional 
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jokes, proverbs, [and] saws” (FW, 95). In another book, he quotes 
a captain, speaking to his wife, who begins to use the expression, 
“There is a tide in the affairs of men . . .” but, after being inter-
rupted, then attempts to complete and explain the saying: “. . . 
what the proverb means is that you must make hay while the 
sun shines but not force things. The minute your luck begins to 
turn sullen you must strike your topgallantmasts down on deck 
directly, and take a reef in your topsails, and prepare to batten 
down your hatches and lie to under a storm staysail if it gets 
worse” (RM, 12).
In studying O’Brian’s use of proverbs, one is tempted to follow 
the lead of the conversation during one dinner-table scene and 
look for English national character as revealed in their proverbs. 
The observation one navy offi cer makes over dinner is this:
There is very little good in the French: it is said that you can learn a 
great deal about a nation from its proverbial expressions, and when 
the French wish to describe anything mighty foul they say, “sale 
comme un peigne” [i.e., “dirty as a comb”], which gives you a pretty 
idea of their personal cleanliness. When they have other things to 
occupy their mind, they say they have other cats to whip, a most 
inhuman thing to do. And when they are going to put a ship about, 
the order is “à-Dieu-va,” or “we must chance it and trust in God,” 
which gives you some notion of their seamanship (LM, 30).
Dr. Maturin himself encouraged studying English national 
character in proverbs in another passage when he meditated 
upon “the stream of small merriment, long-established jokes, pro-
verbial sayings and more or less droll allusions that made up so 
large a part of his shipmates’ daily intercourse.” Maturin believed 
such light conversation to be “a particularly English characteris-
tic [which] he often found wearisome,” although he did concede 
that this sort of traditional speech “had a value as a protection 
against morosity and that it encouraged fortitude” (DI, 5). But 
we are warned away from seeking clues to national character in 
O’Brian’s English proverbs by the well-known comment of B. J. 
Whiting:
The “national” proverbs do not offer problems which we can safely 
attack with our present knowledge. We cannot hope to discover the 
characteristics of the Englishman, the Frenchman, or the German 
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by making a collection of proverbs, for here the danger of permitting 
a preconceived idea to determine our methods of collecting is too 
diffi cult to overcome. (Whiting 1994, 106)
Wolfgang Mieder issued a similar warning, explaining to an in-
terviewer that “paroemiologists following that road [i.e., search-
ing for national character in proverbs] have hit a dead end,” and 
declaring by way of example, “I could put together a bunch of 
proverbs that show Americans are materialistic, and I could put 
together another collection showing that Americans really value 
friendship and love” (Wolkomir 1992, 118).
There is an obvious and attractive alternative topic for study 
in these fi ne novels, namely, Captain Jack Aubrey’s constant 
comical misuse of everyday expressions, allusions, quotations, 
and especially traditional proverbs. This endearing personality 
trait—so opposite to the captain’s superb command of his pro-
fessional skills—is a major factor in humanizing and rendering 
believable the heroic (if somewhat overweight) fi gure of this berib-
boned and often gloriously uniformed British naval offi cer. Who 
cannot love a character who says things like “’Tis an ill wind that 
spoils the broth, you know” (DI, 35), or “Any stick will do to hang 
a wicked dog” (FW, 157), or “Never count the bear’s skin before it 
is hatched” (SM, 232), or “There’s a good deal to be said for mak-
ing hay while the iron is hot” (TH, 331)?
O’Brian seems to have developed the idea gradually, while the 
novels were under way, of having The Captain misuse common 
expressions.5 Except for the misquotation “Alas poor Borwick” 
(i.e., Yorick)6 in the fi rst volume (M&C, 146), Jack utters no frac-
tured proverb until well into the second volume, when we read 
this: “‘You must make your bed and lie on it.’ He paused, with a 
feeling that this was not quite the epigram that he had wished” 
(PC, 243); this is followed in that same volume by The Captain’s 
slightly off-kilter observation that Stephen Maturin has, in his 
opinion, “a singular genius for hiding [his] talent under a bushel” 
(PC, 410). (The Biblical injunction mentions hiding a candle, al-
though some quote it as a light or a lamp.) By the third volume in 
the series, and constantly thereafter, Captain Aubrey says things 
like “A bird in the hand is worth any amount of beating about the 
bush” (HMS, 157), and “They have chosen their cake and must lie 
in it” (HMS, 191). At this last remark, Stephen asks, “You mean, 
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they cannot have their bed and eat it?” This then becomes the 
fi rst in a series of incidents where The Doctor playfully corrects or 
questions The Captain’s attempted witticisms.
Jack Aubrey seems to have particular problems with proverbs 
that mention birds. Besides the one just quoted, he also says, 
“There you have two birds in one bush” (HMS, 307). He refers to 
“birds tarred with the same feathers” (HMS, 317) and speaks of 
“beating two birds with one bush . . . or even three” (TMC, 67), 
as well as killing “three birds at one blow” (SM, 165), and he is 
quoted by Stephen Maturin as saying, “A bird in the hand waits 
for no man” (DI, 61). Yet again struggling with the “killing bird” 
proverb, Jack is later quoted, “‘This would be killing both birds 
. . .’ He paused, frowned, muttered ‘over one stile’, and went on, 
‘Well, never mind . . .’” (FSW, 236).
Many of Captain Aubrey’s confused quotations and sayings 
reveal simple errors of mishearing or disremembering an original 
word, as in the “Alas poor Borwick” comment, and there is of-
ten a certain logic in these errors. For example, when he speaks 
of a “palm in Gilead” (HMS 50), or Napoleon “killing the golden 
calf” (FW, 214), or Solomon having a thousand porcupines (TGS, 
9), or ironically refers to Stephen as “a true Job’s muffl er” (TGS, 
156), or compares himself, when briefl y wealthy, as having “Cro-
cus [for] my second name” (COM, 6), or when he twice says that 
he feels “as proud as Pompous Pilate” (COM, 207; YA, 117), or 
mentions “Damon and Pythagoras” (PC, 406), he is merely reach-
ing for and slightly missing the terms or names: balm, golden 
goose, Solomon’s concubines, Job’s Comforter, Croesus, Pontius 
Pilate, and Pythias. Similarly, when The Captain describes The 
Doctor as being “obstinate as a bee in a bull’s foot” (HMS, 74), it 
is evident that he has misheard the old saying about not knowing 
a B (i.e., the letter) from a bull’s foot, which doesn’t make much 
more sense that way, either (see RM, 24). In another well-inten-
tioned but muddled Shakespearean reference, The Captain once 
cries, “Lead on, Macbeth,” upon which a sailor who happens to 
be named Macbeth springs forward and asks in a thick Scottish 
dialect, “Wheer tu sirr?” When Jack corrects himself—“Lead on 
Macduff”—the cry immediately goes through the ship, “Macduff 
to the quarterdeck at the double,” and Jack must rephrase his or-
der literally: “Belay there. . . . Scrub it. No, no. My meaning is, the 
offi cers may go over the side as soon as they please” (FSW, 50).7
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The mental processes by which The Captain arrives at some 
of his other fractured proverbs are often quite obvious. When he 
quotes, “If only pigs had wings, we should have no need for tin-
kers’ hands, as they say” (DI, 126), he is combining two things 
that “they say,” fi rst about impossibilities (“If pigs had wings”), 
and second about necessity (“If ‘ifs’ and ‘ands’ were pots and pans, 
there were little need for tinkers”). When Aubrey compliments “a 
fellow . . . who ran like a hare, without beating about the mulberry 
bush, or making any bones about it” (SM, 77), he is just mixing 
three traditional metaphors. He does it again when he says, “He 
is the kind of lamb that lies down with the lion in wolf’s clothing” 
(LM, 134). Jack’s remark, “Many a stitch saves time” (SM, 230), 
although a fractured saying, applies pretty well to his hoisting ex-
tra sails for more speed. Even his remark, “There are two ends 
to every pudding” (IM, 126), is at least as good a phrase as the 
usual “two sides to every question.” Likewise, “There’s many a slip 
twixt the cup and the sip” (COM, 268) is not quite right but means 
about the same as the original. Once, in anger, Aubrey tells an offi -
cer, “You shall sow what you have reaped” (TT, 182), reversing the 
usual terms. Sometimes the correct proverbial expression is quite 
obscure, as when Jack remarks that an offi cer is “all wool and 
no cry” (PC, 304) and again that some supposed omens are “all 
cry and no wolf” (SM, 275); here he is half remembering the fable 
about the boy crying wolf and confusing it with the Wellerism, “‘All 
cry and little wool,’ as the Devil said while shearing the hog.”
As a sort of counterpoint to errors like this streaming from 
The Captain’s mouth are such mangled expressions occasional-
ly spoken by other characters, particularly the common sailors. 
When Stephen brings a potto, a kind of lemur, on board, one of 
the marine offi cers says, “My servant Joe Andrews tells me that 
many of the old African hands say there is nothing like a potto 
for luck: and, after all, there is a potto’s fi eld in the Bible, is there 
not?” (COM, 242). When The Captain takes a letter by dictation 
from a Sicilian-born woman writing to her imprisoned husband, 
a British naval offi cer, he puzzles over her request to include the 
statement that she has been true to him and “would not ply the 
oar”; Aubrey thinks it over, then he writes carefully, “‘play the 
whore’ . . . smiling secretly as he did so” (TH, 65). 
The Doctor, although he has mastered the nautical term “sail-
ing both by and large” by the end of the fi rst book (M&C, 411), 
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continues to puzzle over some expressions throughout the series. 
He refers to someone who “passed [an examination] with sailing 
colours,” which is corrected by The Captain to “fl ying colours,” to 
which Stephen replies, “Let us not be pedantical, for all love” (IM, 
303). Other examples can easily be found, for, as we read in one 
scene,
Jack looked at Stephen with affection: Dr. Maturin could dash away 
in Latin and Greek, and as for modern languages, to Jack’s certain 
knowledge he spoke half a dozen; yet he was quite incapable of 
mastering low English cant or slang or fl ash expressions, let alone 
the technical terms necessarily used aboard ships. Even now, he 
suspected, Stephen had diffi culty with starboard and larboard (RM, 
21–22).
Perhaps the best example of Stephen’s problems with English 
proverbial expressions is his uncertainty when someone tells him 
that “the shipwrights will go through her [i.e., the ship] with a fi ne 
tooth comb” (LM, 205). The Doctor asks, 
This tooth-comb, now, this fi ne tooth-comb that the worthy ship-
wrights will be using—we often hear of it; it appears in daily speech. 
And yet who has ever combed his teeth, in this or any other day?
When it is explained to him that “the fi ne qualifi es the tooth rath-
er than the comb . . .” (i.e., “fi ne-tooth comb”), The Doctor re-
sponds,
“Of course, of course”. . . clapping his hand to his forehead. “This is 
not my most brilliant hour, I fi nd.”
What is, perhaps, Stephen Maturin’s most brilliant witticism 
comes when he offers the joke that the so-called dog watches, 
which are shorter than the other watches aboard ship, were so 
labeled because they are “cur-tailed” (PC, 428). It takes a moment 
before the others understand it, but eventually a midshipman ex-
plains the joke: “He said, cur-tailed: the dog-watch is cur-tailed.” 
This little pun, which O’Brian evidently found in an 1867 book 
about sailor’s language (King 2000, 208) becomes a running gag 
in the series, being repeated with much hilarity at least four times 
in later novels (IM, 123; RM, 127–28; NC, 147; COM, 166). 
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Returning to The Captain’s own wit, what is termed by the 
narrator as “perhaps the best thing Jack had ever said,” is a com-
plicated double pun, hardly worth explaining, based on naval 
slang and English place names: “I must warn you that Plush of-
ten leads to Folly” (YA, 230) .8 Much better—and a proverb parody 
to boot—results from The Captain’s trick of forcing The Doctor to 
choose between two weevils found crawling through some ship’s 
biscuits; when Stephen, puzzled by the request to choose, selects 
the larger of the weevils, Jack gleefully exclaims, “There I have 
you . . . you are bit—you are completely dished. Don’t you know 
that in the Navy you must always choose the lesser of two wee-
vils?” (FW, 54–55). This joke is thrice repeated in later books (SM, 
218; TT, 148; COM, 117).
One should not assume that Captain Jack Aubrey is always 
wrong about his proverbs or only utters proverb parodies; at 
times, he hits the nail squarely on the head with an apt prover-
bial expression. For example, commenting on an instance of one 
man’s cruelty toward another, he says, “When one sea-offi cer is 
to be roasted, there is always another at hand to turn the spit,” 
explaining to Stephen that this is “an old service proverb” (PC, 
105). Similarly, The Captain provides The Doctor with a plau-
sible naval explanation for the common expression (often meta-
phorically applied), “the Devil to pay and no tar [or no pitch] hot” 
(TMC, 280; the expression also occurs in IM, 138; TH, 311; and 
HD, 11 and 105 ). Once, having a problem with an offi cer un-
der his command, Jack observes, quite appropriately, that the 
man is “cutting his coat according to his cloth” (DI 175). When 
Stephen objects mildly to Jack’s taking some albatross eggs for 
their breakfast, we read this: “‘You cannot make an omelette 
without breaking eggs,’ said Jack quickly, before the chance 
should be lost for ever.” To this, Stephen replies, “I might say 
something about pearls before swine—the pearls being these 
priceless eggs, if you follow me—were I to attempt a repartee in 
the same order of magnitude” (DI, 293; see also SM, 32). Even, 
on one occasion, when The Captain ashore has had a few too 
many drinks at a party, his wits are clear enough to retaliate 
to a rival for a lady’s attentions by quoting, aptly, a line from 
Dryden: “None but the brave deserve the fair,” even singing the 
line as a sort of refrain “in his deep, surprisingly tuneful voice” 
(SM, 56).
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In fact, Captain Jack Aubrey on a few occasions is surprising-
ly good at adapting proverbial expressions in new and interesting 
ways. I believe it is an original idea when he converts a familiar 
proverb into a kind of riddle, saying that one of his prisoners is 
“rather like the creature that was neither fl esh nor fowl nor good 
red herring but partook of each: the Sphinx” (WDS, 36). Another 
effective transformation occurs one dark and stormy night when 
The Captain observes, “Not a fi t night out for man or beast, as 
the Centaur observed, ha, ha, ha!” (YA, 219). It also seems right, 
though certainly unconventional, when Jack refers to Stephen as 
a man whom “Lucifer could not hold a book, bell, or candle to for 
pride” (NC, 169–70).
But most often, Captain Aubrey’s attempts at wit, quotation, 
metaphor, or proverbial wisdom are somewhat fractured, and fre-
quently these lapses are noted by listeners, as when he remarks 
while speaking to an admiral that many of his loyal offi cers and 
men had “followed me since my fi rst command . . . in one fell 
sloop.” The admiral asks, “What sloop, Aubrey?” to which Jack 
lamely replies, “. . . I do not mean any specifi c vessel: it was an al-
lusion to the Bible” (FW, 17). It should be noted, also, that earlier 
in the same conversation, when the admiral refers to the French 
ship La Fléche as being “quick as an arrow,” Jack does not catch 
the bilingual pun but must be reminded that “fl éche is the French 
for an arrow, Aubrey.” “Oh, indeed? I was not aware. Very good, 
sir. Capital, upon my word. Quick as an arrow—I shall repeat 
that.” “I dare say you will,” the admiral responds dryly, “and pass 
it off as your own, too” (FW, 16).
Sometimes the intended corrections of Jack’s remarks are as 
confused as the original error; when he is warned by yet another 
admiral to be careful in his dealings with certain people, Jack prom-
ises, “I shall speak to them like a sucking dove,” and the admiral 
corrects him, “Pig, Aubrey: sucking pig. Doves don’t suck” (RM, 
25). In this instance, Jack is correctly quoting Bottom the Weaver 
in A Midsummer Night’s Dream (1.2.85) who, however, is himself 
misquoting the phrase “like a soughing [i.e., a cooing or moaning] 
dove”; pigs and sucking have nothing to do with any of this.
O’Brian fi lled his novels with this sort of clever ambiguity; just 
to cite one further example, in a conversation with his wife Sophie, 
Jack admonishes her, “Sweetheart . . . you might as well save 
your breath to cool your porridge.” Sophie asks, “What porridge?” 
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and Jack explains, “Why, porridge—burgoo. It is what people say, 
when they mean to give you a hint that it is no use carping on the 
same string” (DI, 67). The proverbial phrase “to save one’s breath 
to cool one’s porridge,” although sometimes spoken as “cool your 
broth” or “cool your soup,” was originally “cool your pottage” (a 
sort of stew) and occurs in writings by Plutarch, Rabelais, Cer-
vantes, and others. But O’Brian most likely had in mind a remark 
made by Elizabeth Bennet to Mr. Darcy in Chapter 4 of Pride and 
Prejudice, one of his favorite books. Elizabeth remarks, “There 
is a fi ne old saying, which every body here is of course familiar 
with—‘Keep your breath to cool your porridge,’—and I shall keep 
mine to swell my song.” As for burgoo, that was, indeed, an oat-
meal gruel or porridge served to sailors, although it has no real 
connection to the proverbial phrase. As for “carping on the same 
string,” Jack means harping, of course, and that form of the say-
ing was used by Shakespeare, Cervantes, and a host of ordinary 
people expressing their dislike of hearing the same old complaint 
over and over again. Part of the humor in this scene obviously 
derives from Sophie being even less aware than her husband of 
such conventional expressions and their meanings.
Many of The Captain’s fractured proverbs are either mixed-
up versions of two or more sayings or else apt remarks that he is 
not quite able to fi nish. Here are some examples of the proverb 
blends: “‘The fall very nearly came before the pride,’ he said to 
himself . . .” (FW, 94); “Let us cross that peacock when we come 
to it” (FW, 219); “. . . a heavy frigate with a bite worse than her 
bark” (SM, 294); “I am afraid there is no room for two nightingales 
in one bush” (TH, 173); “The best-laid mice gang oft astray” (TH, 
174); “Do you know what a lame duck does? . . . It attempts to pull 
wool over your eyes” (TH, 200); “I am not one to fl ing a hundred 
thousand dollars in a gift-horse’s teeth” (FSW, 234); “At least it is 
better than rushing at a bull in a china-shop without a plan” (LM, 
150); “I cling to it day and night, like a bull in a china-shop. But 
promises are made of pie-crust, you know” (YA, 237); “A needle in 
a haystack would not bear the comparison, on such a thick night; 
but a stitch in time saves nine, as you know very well” (LM, 169); 
“No humming and whoreing, no barking about the wrong bush” 
(TGS, 96); “Better a dead dog than a lead lion” (NC, 47); “The wish 
could so easily be farther than the thought” (NC, 147); “My tongue 
took the bit between its teeth, so I was laid by the lee again . . .”
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(NC, 195–96); “I am afraid I have been like a bear in a whore’s 
bed” (WDS, 122; Jack is probably thinking of the saying “like a 
bear with a sore head”); “We must not sell the bear’s skin before 
we have locked the stable door” (WDS, 231); “What an early worm 
you are to be sure” (YA, 24; he is thinking of the early bird that 
gets the worm); “We are the very pink [peak?] of perfection” (YA, 
211); and “I shall rest my laurels on that” (YA, 240).
One of Jack’s most glorious mixed-up proverbs occurs in his 
thoughts as he considers his longtime servant, Preserved Killick: 
“Killick was in many ways a wretched servant, fractious, mean, 
overbearing to guests of inferior rank, hopelessly coarse; but in 
others he was a pearl without a thorn. For a moment Jack passed 
some other expressions in review, and having reached bricks 
without price he went to sleep” (NC, 151).
When The Doctor joins in trying to fi nd the right expression, 
it is evident that mostly he is mocking The Captain’s attempts at 
wit without letting on. Consider this exchange:
“. . . you may say it is buying a dog and barking at the stable door 
yourself—“
“The stable door after it is locked,” said Stephen, holding up his 
hand.
“Just so: the stable door after it is locked, yourself. But there are 
more things than heaven and earth, you know. . . .” (FSW, 137)
Later in the same novel, Jack tries the expression again, and it 
comes out like this: “That would be locking the horse after the 
stable door is gone . . .” (FSW, 293).
Here are some of The Captain’s unfi nished proverbial expres-
sions: “‘. . . A good woman is a’—there is something in the Bible 
I don’t quite recall, but it hits the nail on the head, as you might 
put it” (SM, 112); “‘What is sauce for the duck . . .’ began Jack
. . .” (FSW, 84); “I may be able to cook two geese with one—“ (RM, 
66); “‘That is surely selling the bear . . . that is surely counting 
your bears . . .’ he hesitated . . .” (LM, 175); and “I fi nd that I had 
counted my geese without laying their eggs—that I had killed my 
geese—that is to say . . .” (TGS, 277).
Again, when The Doctor realizes that Jack is fi shing around 
for just the right conventional term, he “helps” with some tongue-
in-cheek suggestions, like this example (with The Captain speak-
ing fi rst):
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“. . . I could see him as plain as . . .” 
“The ace of spades?”
“No. Not quite that. As plain as a . . . God damn it. As plain as 
the palm of my hand? A turnpike?”
“As Salisbury sphere? A red herring?”
“Perhaps so . . .” (FSW, 106).
They never do agree on the rest of the saying, which may have 
been “plain as day . . . as your hand . . . as the nose on your face 
. . .” etc.
As noted, the most charming instances of fractured proverbial 
uses in the novels, and those that best reveal character, occur 
when Stephen Maturin comments upon Jack Aubrey’s vagrant 
way with witticisms, sometimes correcting him, sometimes agree-
ing (or pretending to). Stephen is often referred to as The Cap-
tain’s “particular friend,” and as such he feels free to speak his 
mind, just as Jack does; neither one usually takes any offense 
from whatever is said (although they do twice come close to duel-
ing over a perceived slight). At any rate, these exchanges between 
two old friends, several of which have been quoted already, are 
wonderfully written. Here are some further examples, with The 
Captain always beginning the conversation:
”Perhaps you could tell him to judge the pudding by its fruit.”
“You mean prove the tree by its eating.”
“No, no, Stephen, you are quite out: eating a tree would prove 
nothing” (IM, 292).
* * * * *
“It is no good carrying your pig to market and fi nding . . .” He 
paused, frowning.
“It will not drink?”
“No, that ain’t that neither.”
“That there are no pokes to be had?”
“Oh well, be damned to literary airs and graces . . . .” (TGS, 
114)
* * * * *
“Only this morning I was thinking how right they were to say it 
was better to be a dead horse than a live lion.” He gazed out of the 
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scuttle, obviously going over the words in his mind. “No, I mean 
better to fl og a dead horse than a live lion.”
“I quite agree.”
“Yet even that’s not quite right, neither. I know there is a dead 
horse in it somewhere; but I am afraid I’m brought by the lee this 
time, though I rather pride myself on proverbs, bringing them in 
aptly, you know, and to the point.”
“Never distress yourself, brother; there is no mistake, I am sure. 
It is a valuable saying, and one that admonishes us never to un-
derestimate our enemy, for whereas fl ogging a dead horse is child’s 
play, doing the same to a lion is potentially dangerous, even though 
one may take a long spoon.” (FSW, 307; Stephen alludes to “He who 
sups with the Devil must have a long spoon.”)
* * * * *
“. . . let us hope that the fi rst plan . . . comes to root. That is to say 
. . .” He paused, frowning.
“Rules the roost?”
“No . . . no.”
“Takes fruit?”
“Oh be damned to it. The trouble with you, Stephen, if you do not 
mind my saying so, is that although you are the best linguist I was 
ever shipmates with, like the Pope of Rome that spoke a hundred 
languages—Pentacost come again . . .” 
“Would it be Magliabechi you have in mind?”
“I dare say: a foreigner, in any case. And I am sure you speak 
quite as many, and like a native, or better; but English is not one of 
them. You do not get fi gures quite right, and now you have put the 
word clean out of my head.” (NC, 130)9
* * * * *
And a fi nal example of one of these exchanges that involves a lit-
erary allusion:
He paused for quite a while and then in the tone of one quoting an 
an aphorism he went on, “The heart has its reasons that the . . . 
that the . . .”
“Kidney?” suggested Stephen.
“That the kidneys know not.” Jack frowned. “No, Hell and death, 
that’s not it. But anyhow the heart has its reasons, you under-
stand.”
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“It is a singularly complex organ, I am told.” (YA, 59; see also YA, 
94)10
The richness, variety, and humor created by all the proverb 
use and misuse in the Aubrey-Maturin novels lends itself very 
well to parody, and it is no surprise to fi nd lists both of the origi-
nal misquotations and also parodies of them circulating nowa-
days, either in print or on the Internet. The quotation that forms 
part of my title is taken from The Aubrey Coat-of-Arms, an image 
available as a JPEG fi le from one of the Patrick O’Brian Web sites, 
where the motto is actually given in Latin as “Avis matutina dua-
bus in dumo par est.” One can download the image and convert it 
to use as a poster, letterhead, name tag, T-shirt, whatever.11
A book-length parody titled The Port-Wine Sea (Wenger 1999) 
includes a number of renderings of fractured proverbs similar to 
The Captain’s (here named Jack Audibly), including these: “Don’t 
eat the horse before the cart” (p. 23), “Uneasy lies the head that 
wears a frown” (p. 23), “deaf as a post-captain” (p. 35), “The road 
to heaven is paved with good inventions” (p. 70), and “When in 
Rome eat the sauce of the gander” (p. 115). It may be debated 
whether these euphemisms are as good or better than the epi-
grams coined by O’Brian himself, but they are certainly pretty 
close to the march and not to be despoiled, nor looked scantly at, 
since a rolling stone butters no parsnips, as they say.
In the fi gure of Captain Jack Aubrey, Patrick O’Brian (who 
himself inhabited something of an invented persona) created a 
memorable character who is superb in his professional role at 
sea, somewhat less successful on land (especially when it comes 
to investments and politics), and altogether convincing as a believ-
able personality. An important part of his credibility as a literary 
character comes from the language he speaks—rich in the techni-
calities and jargon of early nineteenth-century sailing, but made 
more human by his earnest efforts to fi nd appropriate proverbial 
and other traditional expressions for his feelings, even when (or 
especially when) he gets the sayings not quite right. These de-
lights provide just one more reason to read what one reviewer 
called “the best historical novels ever written.”12
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Appendix: More Fractured Speech
(Spoken by Jack Aubrey, unless otherwise noted)
“. . . and I must remind you that Fortune is bald behind” 
[spoken by R. T. Farquhar, a colonial administrator] “What is this 
that Farquhar tells us about fortune? Is she supposed to have the 
mange?” [asked by Jack] “I conceive he was referring to the old 
tag—his meaning was, that she must be seized by the forelock, 
since once she is passed there is no clapping on to her hair, at 
all. In the fi gure she ships none abaft the ears, if you follow me.” 
[reply by Stephen] (TMC, 235)
“There is something to be said for making hay while no clouds 
obscure the sun; and that it is your rolling stone that gets the 
worm” (DI, 62; spoken by Stephen to Jack).
“. . . as you know, one man may lead a horse to the water, 
but ten cannot make him think” (FW, 176; spoken by Stephen to 
Jack).
“You are not to suppose that they are all tarred with the same 
feathers” (RM, 61).
“I was just wondering whether the infernal ptarmigan [i.e., 
termagant] was there when Sam called at Ashgrove Cottage . . .”
[Jack explains to Stephen] “Ptarmigans are those contentious for-
ward cross overbearing women you come across only too often” 
(RM, 87,88).
“He [Jack] was turning parsnips, butter and soft-words over 
in his mind in the hope that something brilliant might come of it 
. . .” (RM, 122; the narrator describing Jack).
“. . . although Fanny Harte may be neither Scylla nor Charyb-
dis, they are very, very fond of one another, and when all is said 
and done, that is what really signifi es” (LM, 63).
“. . . dirty dogs ate hungry puddings—that is to say, hungry 
dogs ate dirty puddings . . .” (LM, 229).
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“Upon my word, Jack, that woman is as headstrong as an al-
legory on the banks of Nile” (TGS, 73; spoken by Stephen).
“Two precautions are better than one” (TGS, 288).
“Do you know, I very nearly said a good thing just now, about 
your cock and hen turtles. It was on the lines of sauce—sauce 
for the goose being sauce for the gander, you understand. But it 
would not quite take shape” (NC, 19).
“‘He counted his chickens without reckoning with his host,’ 
said Stephen” (NC, 91). “He counted his chickens without his 
host, by God” (WDS, 249).
“. . . so there is a Roland for your. . . . The name Oliver fl oated 
up out of a score of others. . . .” (NC, 180; Preserved Killick sug-
gests that the saying may refer to “Roland . . . gunsmith off of the 
Haymarket; and . . . Oliver’s Warranted Leadenhall Sausages.”)
“. . . roar like a bull in a basin” (NC, 222).
“‘Here’s a pretty kettle of fi sh,’ cried Jack. ‘An elegant God 
damned kettle, upon my word’” (TT, 32).
“May I take it this is so, or is the fi sh wather to—that is to say 
. . .” (TT, 46, referring to “The wish is father to the thought.”).
“‘Let them gather their peasecods while they may,’ said Jack, 
‘Old Monday he’s a-dying’” (TT, 54).
“. . . a childhood memory to do with Satan and idle hands 
fl oated there, but he could not quite fi x it . . .” (TT, 108; the nar-
rator describing Jack).
“. . . as Captain Aubrey often says, ‘You cannot both have a 
stitch in time and eat it’” (COM, 135; spoken by Stephen).
“‘Scylla and Charybdis ain’t in it, with a strong southwester 
and a falling tide,’ said Jack. ‘Nor the Gorgonzola’” (YA, 108).
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“I shall sleep . . . like a crew of hedgepigs in an ivy-tuft . . .” 
(YA, 165).
“‘I never said a word,’ cried Jack. ‘I was as mute as a swan’” 
(HD, 141).
“‘. . . a near impossibility, like. . . .’ He searched for the word. 
‘Making a mountain out of a molehill?’ [Stephen asks] ‘Even worse, 
Stephen, even worse’” (BAM, 49). 
Notes
1.  The Aubrey-Maturin novels, their dates of fi rst publication, and the 
abbreviations used for reference are as follows:
 M&C Master and Commander (1969)
 PC Post Captain (1972)
 HMS HMS Surprise (1973)
 TMC The Mauritius Command (1977)
 DI  Desolation Island (1978)
 FW The Fortune of War (1979)
 SM The Surgeon’s Mate (1980)
 IM The Ionian Mission (1981)
 TH Treason’s Harbor (1983)
 FSW The Far Side of the World (1984)
 RM The Reverse of the Medal (1986)
 LM The Letter of Marque (1988)
 TGS The Thirteen Gun Salute (1989)
 NC The Nutmeg of Consolation (1991)
 TT The Truelove (1992; published in England as Clarissa Oakes)
 WDS The Wine Dark Sea (1993)
 COM The Commodore (1994)
 YA The Yellow Admiral (1996)
 HD The Hundred Days (1998)
 BAM Blue at the Mizzen (1999)
  All of my page references are to the W. W. Norton & Company 
U.S. editions, which began in 1990 with the reissue of Master and 
Commander and Post Captain, then continued through the series.
2.  The essential reference works for historical, biographical, geograph-
ical, naval, military, musical, scientifi c, philosophical, gustatorial, 
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linguistic, and a host of other technical details in the Aubrey-Ma-
turin novels are these:
Bowen Kerrihard’s Aubrey/Maturin quiz book. 1998. South Bend, Ind.: Quill 
Communications Services.
Brown, Anthony Gary. 1999. Persons, animals, ships and cannon in the Au-
brey-Maturin sea novels of Patrick O’Brian. Jefferson, N.C., and London: 
McFarland & Co.
Cunningham, A. E., ed. 1994. Patrick O’Brian: Critical essays and a bibliog-
raphy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
Grossman, Anne Chotzinoff, and Lisa Grossman Thomas. 1997. Lobscouse
& spotted dog: Which it’s a gastronimic companion to the Aubrey/Maturin 
novels. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
King, Dean. 2000. Patrick O’Brian: A life revealed. New York: Henry Holt.
King, Dean, with John B. Hattendorf. 1996. Harbors and high seas: An atlas 
and geographical guide to the Aubrey-Maturin novels of Patrick O’Brian.
New York: Henry Holt. 
King, Dean, with John B. Hattendorf, and J. Worth Estes. 1995. A sea of 
words: A lexicon and companion for Patrick O’Brian’s seafaring tales. New 
York: Henry Holt.
3.  This detail is typical of O’Brian’s sense of history and humor, for as 
Anthony Gary Brown writes in his indispensable reference (1999), 
“Pietro Antonio Locatelli (1695–1764) was an Italian violinist and 
composer, famous as a great virtuoso and technical innovator. Al-
though many of his works for both solo violin and string quartet 
survive, the ‘great C major quartet’ . . . is not among them, appear-
ing to be a happy invention by O’Brian (as is the trio of HD, 3)” 
(1999, p. 195).
4.  In a fairly attentive second reading of the series, I noted 472 pro-
verbial expressions, an average of 23.6 per book. The low number 
was 11 (in WDS), the high, 44 (in DI). Probably a close third reading 
would bring the total to more than 500 items.
5.  Although the characters Jack Byron and Tobias Barrow in O’Brian’s 
novel The Unknown Shore (1959) are prototypes for Aubrey and 
Maturin, resembling them in many ways, Jack in the earlier book 
never misquotes or utters fractured proverbs.
6.  The Captain may also be confusing Yorick/Borwick with two differ-
ent ships mentioned in the novels named Berwick, one French, the 
other British.
7.  O’Brian’s biographer notes an instance during World War II when “a 
lanky Harvard-educated American [possibly Archibald MacLeish] . . .
in a conversation corrected Patrick’s misquotation of some Shake-
speare lines” (see King 2000, 93).
8.  Plush and Folly are place-names in Dorset, and offi cer William 
Harding inherited a small estate between the two villages, which 
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prompted Jack’s witticism. Plush was also the naval term for the 
grog left over after the regular measure had been served out, which 
by custom belonged to the cook. Thus, as the narrator explains, 
“unless he had a good head for rum, this often led him to commit a 
foolish action.” 
9.  Stephen is alluding to Antonio Magliabechi (1633–1714), a bibli-
ographer and linguist said by his contemporaries to be “a living 
library,” according to the note in Brown’s lexicon (1999, p. 204).
10.  The aphorism Jack tries to quote here is from the Pensées of Blaise 
Pascal (1623–62): “The heart has its reasons which reason cannot 
know.”
11.  The JPEG fi le is available at http://www.hmssurprise.org/Coat
.html
12.  Richard Snow writing in the New York Times, and quoted on the 
covers of the Norton paperback editions of Post Captain and The
Surgeon’s Mate.
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As the Crow Flies
A Straightforward Study of Lineal Worldview in
American Folk Speech
Alan Dundes
(For Wolfgang Mieder, Magister Proverbium,
paremiologist without peer)
“We do not see the lens through which we look.” So wrote anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) in an essay 
entitled “The Science of Custom” that appeared in The Century 
Magazine in 1929. Although this essay was later expanded to be-
come the fi rst chapter of her classic Patterns of Culture, published 
in 1934, for some reason, this succinct articulation of the diffi culty 
of perceiving one’s own culturally relative cognitive categories was 
omitted. From a folklore perspective, it suggests that one of the 
important potential contributions of folklore with respect to iden-
tifying the characteristics of that critical lens may be that native 
categories of perception are clearly delineated in various genres, 
including those subsumed under the rubric of folk speech.
In 1950, another outstanding anthropologist, Dorothy 
Demetracopoulou Lee (1905–75) published her insightful paper 
“Codifi cations of Reality: Lineal and Non-Lineal” in Psychosomatic
Medicine. Her main point was to demonstrate that fellow anthro-
pologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) had misread some of 
his famous Trobriand Island ethnographic data by seeing lines 
where the Trobrianders did not. In other words, Malinowski was 
guilty of imposing Western lineality upon nonlineal phenomena. 
While she did speak of anthropologists referring to “unilinear” 
or “multilinear” courses of development and more generally of 
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Westerners following a “line of thought,” she was not particularly
concerned with documenting Western lineal worldview. The bulk 
of her discussion provided instances of Malinowski’s misinterpret-
ing Trobriand culture. She did conclude, however, that “much of 
our present-day thinking, and much of our evaluation are based 
on the premise of the line and of the line as good” (Lee 1950, 96).
Lee’s brilliant essay did not receive all the credit it deserved 
(see Graves 1957). It is my contention that Dorothy Lee was on 
the right track and American folk speech amply confi rms her as-
sertion that the line is absolutely central, if not sacred, in Ameri-
can worldview. But she did not distinguish between drawing par-
allel lines and concentric circles as a lecturer’s means of making 
a point. In contrast, I argue it is “straight lines” that are crucial, 
not curved ones. Moreover, the straight lines are often displayed 
in the form of a square or box. It is precisely the combination of 
“line,” “straight,” and “square,” I suggest, that shapes the lens 
through which Americans (and other Westerners) look. These 
constituent features that so signifi cantly affect our perception 
are found repeatedly in dozens of examples from familiar folk 
speech.
The word “line” or the plural “lines” occurs alone, in combina-
tion in various compounds, and often as an affi x, e.g., guidelines, 
deadlines, outlines, bloodlines, hemlines, necklines, hairlines, 
headlines, bylines, baselines, goal lines, property lines, airlines, 
ship lines, railroad lines, bus lines, trolley or streetcar lines, cho-
rus lines, battle lines, pipelines, assembly lines, picket lines, time 
lines, datelines, telephone lines, fi shing lines, waterlines, coast-
lines, shorelines, skylines, and lifelines, among many others.
The line functions as a kind of limit. One must “toe the line,” 
not “cross the line,” “lay it on the line,” or have one’s fate be “on 
the line.” One may be asked to “hold the line,” meaning to main-
tain the status quo at any cost to prevent any unfavorable in-
cursion or development. One can think or be “in line” (with the 
prevailing code or trend) and by the same token, if an individual’s 
behavior or suggestion is inappropriate, he may be admonished 
that he is “(way) out of line.” One may seek to keep a rebellious 
child “in line,” that is, insist that he or she conform to existing 
social conventions. The son or daughter of a king is said to be “in 
line” to occupy the throne. Presumably the heir must belong to 
the appropriate “lineage.” To reach the Internet or use e-mail, one 
173
As the C
ro
w
 F
lie
s
must go “online.” Runners begin a race at the “starting line” and 
end at the “fi nish line.”
A line can be an occupation or profession. Upon an initial 
meeting, one person may ask another, “What’s your line?” mean-
ing “What do you do for a living?” If one’s vocation is the same 
as one’s father/mother and grandfather/grandmother, one may 
boast that he or she comes from “a long line” of doctors, lawyers, 
educators, etc. If a line can refl ect the past, it can also represent 
a trajectory pointing toward the future. One can look forward to 
success “down the line.” In business, one speaks of a line of prod-
ucts with the “top of the line” being the best. The “bottom line” 
refers to the grand total or fi nal fi gure on a fi nancial balance sheet 
but more metaphorically, to the fi nal upshot of a contract or deal. 
If one seeks information about a product or a person, he is said to 
be trying to “get a line on” it. 
A line is also an insincere formulaic ploy (often a well-rehearsed 
sales pitch) or tactic intended to sway or seduce an addressee, as 
in trying to persuade a member of the opposite sex to accept an 
invitation for a date. These are often termed “pickup lines.” Such 
usage almost certainly relates to the notion of a “line of argument” 
or “line of reasoning.” Political organizations often have specifi c 
agendas or platforms which may be referred to as “party lines.” 
It may simply be the infl uence of print, but one tends to refer to 
poetry, even purely oral poetry, in terms of lines, and the same 
goes for “learning one’s lines” or “forgetting one’s lines” in a stage 
play. Clothing has “lining,” and a metaphor speaks of “lining one’s 
own pockets” (with illegal funds). Even clouds have a “lining,” as 
in the proverb, “Every cloud has a silver lining,” which in the best 
tradition of American optimism urges citizens to “always look for 
the silver lining.”
A line is still a line even if it’s narrow. One speaks of a “fi ne 
line” or a “thin line” when making a subtle distinction between 
two different things. A line is no less a feature for its being inter-
mittent, as in a “dotted line” upon which to sign one’s name, say, 
to open a “line of credit” at a bank. With telephones, in former 
times, one could have a “party line” or indulge in a “private line.” 
A diffi cult superior may take a “hard line” in dealing with a sub-
ordinate, especially if his performance is adjudged “borderline,” 
and consequently “draw the line” in demanding future improve-
ment. A fi red employee, without adequate salary or benefi ts, may 
Comes Around
W
h
a
t 
G
o
e
s
 A
ro
u
n
d
174
well fall below the “poverty line.” One can also draw a “line in 
the sand” to indicate that an opponent can approach no farther. 
The names of famous borders also include the word line, such as 
the Mason-Dixon Line or the Maginot Line. Banks and insurance 
companies often “redline” impoverished urban areas where credit 
is denied residents. The red line in this instance serves as an 
unoffi cial and often illegal demarcation of areas that loan offi cers 
use to evaluate requests for funds.
It is not just that one is forced to stay “in line” and not “jump 
the line” by disregarding the folk principle of “fi rst come, fi rst 
served” in a “checkout line” at a grocery store, but there is an im-
plicit and sometimes explicit understanding that the line must be 
straight. Lines, of course, can be either straight or curved, but the 
straight line provides the norm. “As the crow fl ies” is a traditional 
response to an inquiry as to how far away a given objective is. 
“As the crow fl ies” means the minimum distance from the pres-
ent point to the objective as measured in a straight line. There is 
also the proverb: “The shortest distance between two points is a 
straight line.” Often, however, it is not possible to go directly from 
point A to point B. Only crows (and other birds) can do so, fl y-
ing over obstacles that impede the progress of land-bound crea-
tures.
Straight means direct, honest, and right, among other things. 
One tries to “get one’s facts straight,” that is, correct. “Be straight 
with me” is a request for honesty. “Setting the record straight” 
is an attempt to eliminate previous errors. “Straight from the 
horse’s mouth” refers to an unimpeachable source of informa-
tion, presumably deriving from the practice of actually examining 
a horse’s teeth (to determine its age and condition) as opposed to 
simply taking the word of a horse trader. To speak “straight from 
the shoulder,” a phrase apparently derived from boxing (referring 
to a direct punch), means being frank and to the point, without 
exaggeration or embellishment. The “straight dope” is slang for 
true information. To be a “straight shooter” or a “straight arrow” 
implies that the individual in question is completely honest and 
trustworthy. Someone who is not so dependable may be urged 
to “straighten up and fl y right.” “Straight talk” is sincere, hon-
est talk. To “see straight” means to discern reality clearly. “To 
go straight” implies that one may have had a shady past but 
has now decided to lead a righteous, law-abiding life. If a person 
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“plays it straight,” he or she is being totally above board, com-
pletely honest. 
If a person is successful in a job, he may be promoted. The 
promotion may be gradual, or it may be dramatic so that he goes 
“straight to the top.” In stage comedy, the “straight man” has to 
keep a “straight face” when he delivers a “straight line” to set up 
the joke’s “punch line” uttered by the principal comedian. Straight 
can also mean unadulterated, as in taking one’s whiskey “straight” 
or “straight up,” that is, without any diluting mixer or ice cubes. 
To do something “straightaway” means doing it right away. A par-
ent may tell a child to “come straight home” after school, meaning 
to come directly home without meandering or taking any wrong 
turn or detour. Ideally, one’s destination lies “straight ahead.” To 
win seven “straight” games (seven in a row) signifi es that one has 
won an unbroken series or sequence. Straight also designates 
conventional norms in sexuality. Hence, a “straight” is a hetero-
sexual as opposed to a homosexual, at least in gay slang.
If straight conveys honesty, frankness, forthrightness, then it 
may be contrasted with “crooked” (cf. the abridged form “crook” 
for a criminal) or “bent,” as in “bent out of shape,” or someone who 
“bends the law” or terms involving circles or the adjective “round.” 
One must not get “out of line” and certainly, as already men-
tioned, not “cross the line.” Incidentally, “cross” implies departing 
from “straight.” An individual may betray another by “crossing 
up” that person. An even worse betrayal is called a “double cross.” 
In any event, one makes a “beeline” for an objective and does so 
by going “straight ahead” toward one’s goal.
This is very different from taking a “roundabout” way. Some-
one who “beats around the bush” is not being direct. Someone who 
gets the “run around” is not being treated in an honest, truthful 
manner. To “mess (kid, horse) around” is to waste time and not 
stay on course. Someone who is driven crazy may be said to be 
“(a)round the bend.” There is an old American folk metaphor, “to 
go ‘round Robin Hood’s barn,” meaning to follow a winding road 
or be long-winded. “Round Robin Hood’s barn makes a tedious 
yarn” (Whiting 1977, 365; Mieder 1992, 38). The word “around” 
may also signify inexactness or at best a vague approximation. 
A friend tells another they should meet “around fi ve o’clock.” 
That is certainly not the same as specifying “fi ve on the dot” (the 
dot presumably being a point on the line?). Even the use of the 
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Latin “circa” with respect to dates refl ects the same indulgence 
with approximation. A certain person may be said to have been 
born circa 1900, circa being, of course, cognate with the English 
word “circle.” A similar nuance of around is found in the common
leave-taking formula, “See you around,” meaning in no particu-
lar place at no particular time. To “round off ” a number, say an 
amount of money owed, is a self-conscious admission that one is 
willing to be inexact just for the sake of keeping things simple.
The negative associations of round and roundness in contrast 
to straight are occasionally reversed in American proverbs. We 
know that proverbs are famous for presenting two completely op-
posite points of view. “He who hesitates is lost” urges immediate 
action to ensure success while “Look before you leap” recommends 
caution. There is even a proverb covering this characteristic of the 
genre: “The devil can quote scripture,” meaning that one can al-
ways fi nd a proverb to justify one’s position. So in contrast to “The 
shortest distance between two points is a straight line,” we have 
“The longest way round is the shortest way found.” But by the 
same token, we also have “Don’t go round the world for a short 
cut.” So the upshot is, “You pays your money, and you takes your 
choice.” Still the general mistrust of round prevails: “Money is 
round and rolls away” (Mieder 1992, 416).
The epitome of roundness is, of course, the circle (Loeffl er-
Delachaux 1947; de Alvarez de Toledo 1951). “Circular reasoning” 
is clearly in opposition to “thinking straight.” In terms of logic, if 
one uses a proposition to lead to a conclusion and then purports 
to prove the proposition by means of the conclusion, one is guilty 
of “circular reasoning,” the idea being that one has completed a 
circle so there is no starting point. One has argued or reasoned 
in a circle (see Walton 1991; Rips 2002). A folk belief also states 
that when one becomes lost, say in a forest, in the course of try-
ing to fi nd one’s path to safety, one will wind up “going around 
in circles.” A bit of military doggerel, which is, however, known 
generally, confi rms the association of being frustrated or lost with 
going in circles: “When in danger, when in doubt; Run in circles, 
scream and shout.” Perhaps analogous to going in circles as a 
metaphor for working to no purpose may be the expression “spin-
ning your wheels” that signifi es “going nowhere fast.” A wheel is, 
conceptually speaking, a kind of circle (Loeffl er-Delachaux 1947, 
69), and a “wheeler-dealer” or someone who “wheels and deals” is 
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typically a person who is deceptive or even ruthlessly dishonest. 
Finally, one of the most striking pieces of evidence revealing the 
folk perception of circles is that a repeated series of actions that 
lead to an increasingly negative situation may be termed a “vi-
cious circle.” The adjective is surely telling!
If the circle (and roundness) connotes an undesirable state 
of confusion, the square does the opposite. The square is obvi-
ously an expanded form of straight lines. “To square” accounts 
is to settle matters equitably. One tries to treat others “fair and 
square,” for example, by giving them a “square deal.” Meals that 
are substantial and satisfactory are called “square meals.” One 
tries to get “squared away,” meaning to get things in order, to be 
prepared for whatever the future may hold. A “square shooter” is 
synonymous with “straight shooter,” referring to someone who is 
scrupulously honest. To face an issue “squarely” means to con-
front it head-on and directly. To stand behind someone or some-
thing “foursquare” implies being steady, unswerving, and without 
equivocation. Two opponents will “square off” or “square up,” that 
is, face one another directly, for a fi ght. 
The literal centrality of square in American (and very likely 
Western) thought is also present in dwellings and city planning. It 
is no coincidence that major cities typically express their identi-
ties in open areas commonly called “squares.” This is so even if 
the shape of the area is not actually a square. Such is the case, for 
example, with Times Square in New York City. Some city squares 
are in that quadrangular shape, but many are not. Other venues 
such as arenas may refl ect the penchant for squares, e.g., Madi-
son Square Garden, also in New York City.
Since the area of a geometric square is the length of one side 
multiplied by itself—if a side is represented by s, then the area 
of that square is said to be s “squared.” This principle has been 
extended so that any number n multiplied by itself is said to be n
squared. This leads further to the term “square root.” The square 
root of nine is therefore three. But there is nothing literally square 
about either the number nine or threes. Mathematics has other 
connections with lines and squares. For centuries, mathemati-
cians interested in number theory have been fascinated by what 
is called the “magic square.” This consists of an arrangement of 
numbers in the form of a square so that every column, every row, 
and each of the two diagonals adds up to the same sum, this 
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total being called the “constant” (Meister 1952). A branch of ge-
ometry is called “lineal geometry,” and there are “linear algebras.” 
In addition, there are “linear equations,” and in physics there are 
“lines of force,” not to mention the “linear accelerator” by means 
of which particles are propelled in straight paths.
The contrast between the square and the circle is not just a 
matter of there not being any vicious squares. The fundamen-
tal opposition between these two basic metaphors is signaled by 
the expression about attempting to “put a square peg in a round 
hole” or the equally apt but perhaps less well known variant “to 
put a round peg in a square hole.” The phrase may be used to 
label a misfi t, someone deemed not qualifi ed or fi t to carry out a 
particular task. In the present context, the expression states that 
squareness and circularity are incompatible; they are mutually 
exclusive. Another traditional articulation of this incompatibility 
is the mathematical fool’s errand of trying to “square the circle.” 
The idea of trying to fi nd a circle and square with equal areas 
is allegedly an insoluble problem, a mathematical impossibility 
(Hobson 1913; Jesseph 1999; but see Ruthen 1989). Hence, the 
idiom is a way of suggesting the futility of a given action. Speak-
ing of futility, when some project comes to naught, one may well 
exclaim that it is “back to square one,” that is, one must return 
to the very beginning of the enterprise to start all over again (pos-
sibly an allusion to a game such as hopscotch). A wastepaper 
basket may be referred to as “the circular fi le,” that is, the place 
to deposit unneeded correspondence. It may be worth noting that 
both of the binary oppositions: straight/crooked and square/
round are reported in a single catchphrase once popular in Eng-
land. Evidently, a humorous hyperbolic way of “setting a man 
on his word” was to say, “Straight down the crooked lane and all 
round the square” (Partridge 1961, 818).
Because square signals fairness and honesty, one should not 
be surprised to see just how much squareness permeates society. 
Perhaps the most popular traditional folk dance in American cul-
ture is called the “Square Dance.” This may be contrasted with 
round dances such as the waltz, where dancers move or whirl in 
circular fashion. But for that matter, in social dancing, beginners 
are frequently taught to do the “box step.” Boxes, like squares, 
are linear in nature. One is obliged to remain in a box in the same 
sense as toeing the line and not crossing it.
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In baseball, for example, the batter steps into the “batter’s 
box,” where a pitcher from the opposing team throws the ball into 
what is called the “strike zone,” an imaginary rectangular area 
above home plate through which a pitch must pass for the um-
pire behind the plate to call it a strike. If he misses the strike zone 
(and the batter doesn’t swing), the pitch is labeled a ball, much 
as a ball hit outside the left- or right-fi eld lines (also called “foul 
lines”) is called a foul (as opposed to fair) ball. The place where 
the pitcher stands is sometimes called the “pitcher’s box,” and if 
too many batters are successful, thus forcing him to leave (to be 
replaced by another pitcher), it is said he has been “knocked out 
of the box.” The fi nal results of a baseball game, often appearing 
in newspapers and giving the statistics (e.g., runs, hits, errors, 
etc.), are called the “box score.” 
Baseball, America’s national pastime, is just one instance of 
the way boxes and lines permeate the culture. A “line drive” or 
“liner” is a sharply hit ball with little or no arc. One of a pitcher’s 
most effective pitches is a “curve” or “curveball,” that is, a ball 
that does not go in a straight line toward home plate but rather 
bends or curves in its fl ight, the aim being to fool the batter so 
he fails to hit it. In American slang, to “throw someone a curve,” 
taken from baseball, means to ask an unfair question or make an 
unreasonable demand. Again, “curve” like circle and round im-
plies a departure from the “straight and narrow,” from directness 
and honesty.
Many sports and games have lines. For example, in basket-
ball, one shoots foul shots from a position immediately behind 
“the foul line” aka “the free-throw line.” In football, there is an “of-
fensive line,” consisting of players who protect their quarterback 
when the team is on offense, or a “defensive line,” consisting of 
players who attack the opposing quarterback. When a team is on 
defense, there may be several of eleven players who are positioned 
slightly behind the defensive line to shore up the defense, e.g., 
protect against a short pass by the opposing offense. These play-
ers are called “linebackers.” In football, the playing fi eld is divided 
into ten ten-yard strips. Position on the fi eld is accordingly mea-
sured by “yard lines.”
No one likes to “boxed in,” but the fact is that Americans are 
always “behind enemy lines,” so to speak. Lines are everywhere, 
it seems, and when they meet, they frequently form rectangles 
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and squares. (One need look no further than to the shape of most 
windows and window panes, bricks and boards, picture frames, 
postage stamps, rugs, and hundreds of other mundane objects.) 
Though businessmen may look for an “angle,” there is always a 
danger of being “cornered.” It is one thing to be boxed in but even 
worse to be forced into a small corner of a quadrilateral enclosure. 
At sporting events or theaters, would-be spectators go to the “box 
offi ce” to purchase tickets. Typically, the best seats in the house 
are the “box seats.” At sporting events, spectators are not allowed 
to enter the actual playing area, e.g., the “boxing ring” (despite its 
name, a square) or the baseball or football fi eld. They are obliged 
to remain on the “sidelines.” An injured player may have to be 
“sidelined” for a period of time. In ice hockey, a player who com-
mits an infraction is punished by being sent to a particular area 
on the sidelines termed the “penalty box.”
Houses and rooms therein may resemble boxes, and in the 
bedroom, one sleeps on a rectangular mattress that sits squarely 
on a “box spring.” Offi ce workers may be forced to occupy small 
spaces called “cubicles.” (Why are pieces of ice used to chill drinks 
in the shape of cubes? Round bits of ice surely function equally 
well.) Early on, children are socialized by such rhymes as “Step 
on a line, break your father’s (mother’s) spine.” The variant uses 
terms other than line, but the message is the same: “Step on a 
crack, break your father’s (mother’s) back.” A line is a limit that 
must be respected, that is, not stepped on. In tick-tack-toe, the 
winner is the person who can draw a straight line through either 
three x’s or three o’s. In hopscotch, one must step carefully so as 
not to go outside any of the series of boxes. 
Whether it’s the military or show business, individuals are 
constantly asked to “line up.” Suspected criminals are frequently 
asked to participate in a “lineup” (to see if eyewitnesses can iden-
tify them as perpetrators of a crime). One also speaks of an out-
standing “lineup” of talent, either on a sports team or a theatrical 
stage. Drunk drivers, when stopped by police offi cers, may be 
asked to “walk a straight line” (as a sobriety test to prove that they 
are suffi ciently sober to be permitted to continue driving their 
vehicles).
It should be noted that despite the ubiquity of lines and 
squares in American worldview, the semantic associations are 
not always positive. A square in slang terms is a “strait-laced” 
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person, someone who is excessively conventional and law abid-
ing. There have even been a few proverbial attempts to denigrate 
squareness, for example, “Be there or be square.” In other words, 
show up for the event in question unless you are too inhibited or 
fearful to do so. Other traditional verbal efforts to escape the vise 
of linearity include the notion of “reading between the lines” and 
the exhortation to “think outside the box.” But it can be said that 
these very attempts to escape the boundaries imposed by lines 
and boxes confi rm the existence of such cultural restraints.
If a person is terminally ill in the hospital and the EEG moni-
tor suddenly shows that he or she has “fl atlined,” one can safely 
say that person has reached “the end of the line” and, unless 
cremated, is very likely to be shortly thereafter buried in a box 
(coffi n).
What can we conclude from this brief demonstration of the 
apparent American penchant for straight lines and squares as 
well as a complementary mistrust of round curves and circles? 
Do we, in fact, have a window on a facet of American worldview? 
Anthropologist Aidan Southall suggests in a provocative, if admit-
tedly speculative, essay devoted to an evolutionary approach to 
architecture that original “circularity” has given way to “rectan-
gularity” (1993, 378). Citing the discovery of a dome-shaped con-
struction of arched branches, unearthed in the Ukraine and said 
to be fi fteen thousand years old, perhaps one of the oldest-known 
examples of human architecture, Southall wonders if this struc-
ture in any way symbolized the “dome of heaven.” He might well 
have also considered such examples as the shape of the Eskimo 
igloo or the curious beehive-shaped trulli in the village of Alber-
obello in southern Italy. In any event, he remarks that whereas 
“sticks and stones are naturally round,” they tend to be replaced 
as building materials by the cultural invention or borrowing of 
“rectangular bricks and square stones.” He notes further, “Round 
stools precede square thrones and chairs” and that “humankind 
as a whole has clearly moved from the universal occupation of 
the round to an almost universal occupation of the rectangular” 
(1993, 379).
Here is Southall’s thesis in his own words:
It is more natural (though I use this adjective with great caution), 
to live in the round than in the square, whether it is a question of 
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dwelling or village, settlement or city. For virtually nothing in nature 
appears in rectangular form, whereas round, spherical and curved 
phenomena, both stationary and in motion are both ubiquitous and 
so impressive as to imprint themselves on the human imagination 
and consciousness. Is the rectangular city, then, a symbolic state-
ment of human culture triumphing over nature by making an op-
posite statement? Surprisingly, in all the literature on nature and 
culture I have not noticed the question raised. With the other pair 
lurking behind, it becomes a question of whether the rectangular 
city is a male statement as well.” (1993, 380)
Southall is not the fi rst to suggest an evolutionary sequence 
from circular to rectangular structures. Robbins, for instance, 
suggested that dwelling shapes and settlement patterns were 
related to whether people were nomadic or sedentary: “Consid-
erable archaeological data also indicate that as cultures have 
moved from shifting to more settled subsistence patterns tem-
porally, there has been a corresponding trend from circular to 
predominantly rectangular dwellings,” and he hypothesized “that 
circular ground plans will tend to be associated with relatively 
impermanent or mobile settlement patterns, and that rectangular 
house ground plans will tend to be associated with more perma-
nent or sedentary community settlement patterns” (1966, 7; see 
also Flannery 1972, 29–30). 
One emerging controversial issue is not so much whether 
there are round or square dwellings, but rather whether or not 
specifi c social organizational constellations are associated with 
either one (see Saidel 1993 and Flannery’s response). Of inter-
est in the present context is the possibility there may be a com-
mon observable pattern in both house type and the confi gura-
tion or grouping of multiple dwellings. Whiting and Ayres claim 
(1968, 126) that societies that build rectangular houses tend to 
arrange them in a line or square. If this is the case, it indicates 
that the pattern of circularity or squareness may apply equally to 
house or dwelling shape and the overall settlement plan. More-
over, the charter, so to speak, for such a pattern may well extend 
to the cosmos. One explanation for the priority of the circle is that 
the sun (and moon) are perceived as celestial circles (Peet 1888; 
Loeffl er-Delachaux 1947; Lurker 1966, 523), not to mention the 
perception of the horizon. Hence, architectural plans might have 
been intended to mirror the celestial model. One thinks of the 
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circular form of Stonehenge, for example, as a prime example of a 
likely sacred construction connected with sun worship.
Lest the reader think that the idea that circularity may be 
manifested in dwelling construction or other social forms is just 
pure speculation on the part of academics, one should ponder the 
following testimony given by a talented professional Oglala Sioux 
storyteller in the early twentieth century:
The Oglala believe the circle to be sacred because the Great Spirit 
caused everything in nature to be round except stone. . . . The sun 
and the sky, the earth and the moon are round like a shield. . . . 
Everything that breathes is round like the body of a man. Every-
thing that grows from the ground is round like the stem of a tree. 
Since the Great Spirit has caused everything to be round, mankind 
should look upon the circle as sacred for it is the symbol of all 
things in nature except stone. It is also the symbol of the circle that 
marks the edge of the world. . . . The day, the night, and the moon 
go in a circle above the sky. . . . For these reasons the Oglala make 
their tipis circular, their camp circle circular and sit in a circle for all 
ceremonies. The circle is also the symbol of the tipi and of the shel-
ter.” (Walker 1917, 160; italics added)
It may well be that the distinction between nature and cul-
ture is not so much matched by one between the circle and the 
square as by the presence or absence of the line. Nature does not 
necessarily come in lines. Rather, man attempts to impose order 
by perceiving or drawing lines. In terms of folk speech, there is 
a desire to “connect the dots,” but the connected dots may form 
circles as well as squares. Lines of latitude and longitude follow 
the shape of the earth. Still, Southall may be correct in identify-
ing a preference for rectangles, though I suggest that it would 
be more accurate to say a preference for straight as opposed to 
curved lines. It is a desideratum to “get all one’s ducks in a row,” 
and it is surely no coincidence that man tends to plant his crops 
in straight rows, or that the military obliges men to march in pre-
cise line formations, or that seniority and rank are indicated by 
the number of stripes, which are essentially glorifi ed lines. In the 
navy, there is a distinction between “line offi cers” as opposed to 
staff or supply offi cers, referring to an old label assigned to war-
ships or “ships of the line.” All military units, not just the navy, 
insist on performing prescribed tasks “in the line of duty.”
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While the evidence adduced from American folk speech can-
not necessarily support the evolutionary aspects of Southall’s 
argument, it seems to corroborate his “delineation” of a critical 
distinction between the circle and the square. If one accepts and 
expands upon his suggestion that the “rectangular city” is male—
and one can easily cite numerous examples of penile architec-
ture, for example, the Washington Monument or the Empire State 
Building—then one may go on to propose that roundness and 
circles belong to the realm of the feminine. In evolutionary terms, 
the (linear?) progression from circle to square then corresponds 
to the alleged schema whereby original matriarchy was in time 
replaced by patriarchy. Certainly in American folk speech, “cur-
vaceous” refers to a woman’s well-shaped fi gure, signifying vo-
luptuousness. It would not be used to refer to a man’s physique. 
Moreover, it is women, according to American male stereotypes, 
who are accused of not being able to think logically, that is, lin-
eally.
In Shakespeare’s day, we have indisputable evidence that circle 
referred to the female pudendum. In Romeo and Juliet (2.1.23–26), 
we fi nd Mercutio’s bawdy remark: “‘Twould anger him to raise a 
spirit in his mistress’ circle of some strange nature, letting it there 
stand till she had laid it, and conjured it down.” In more recent 
times, women of easy virtue were called “round heels,” presum-
ably because they spent so much time on their backs that their 
heels became increasingly rounded. (The term is also applied to 
inferior boxers, who were so frequently knocked out that they 
consequently suffered a similar fate.) So perhaps one can make a 
justifi able case that women are round while men are square. It is, 
after all, women who by nature have menstrual “cycles”; men do 
not. The stereotypical association of women with roundness and 
men with squareness (and hence women with vagueness, dissem-
blance, and dishonesty, as opposed to men with precision, direct-
ness, and candor) can easily be construed as part of the larger 
paradigm that “aligns” women with nature and men with culture 
(Ortner 1974). For that matter, the proposal that “rectilinear rep-
resents the male body image and curvilinear the female” is not 
new (see Whiting and Ayres 1968, 128).
However, I would argue that both men and women in Ameri-
can culture think in lineal terms. This may be why there is resis-
tance to the notion of reincarnation. Reincarnation implies that a 
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person’s being or soul, after death, is recycled. A person is reborn 
and begins life anew. In some religions, the recycling is repeated 
ad infi nitum. In American worldview, in contrast, the progression 
from birth through life to death is an irreversible path or line. One 
may choose to believe (in a culturally sanctioned denial of hu-
man mortality) that one continues to live on in heaven, but that 
belief does not include the possibility of being reborn on earth as 
a new baby. Americans do observe a certain cyclicity of seasons: 
spring, summer, fall, winter, a sequence from birth to death and 
then rebirth, as well as the recurrent series of the days of the 
week and months of the year, and Eliade credits the phases of 
the moon: “appearance, increase, wane, disappearance, followed 
by reappearance after three nights of darkness” as contributing 
signifi cantly to the belief in cyclical concepts of time (1954, 86). 
Nevertheless, years, the larger temporal units, are counted seri-
ally in an irreversible sequence. One can go back in time only 
through fi ction and fantasy. The point is that Americans, males 
and females alike, perceive both time and space in lineal terms. 
It is of some interest that a native Aleut environmentalist from 
Alaska claims that it is precisely the lineal bias of Western society 
that causes problems in the repeated failure to understand the 
cyclical worldview systems of many aboriginal societies (Mercu-
lieff 1994).
We may conclude, therefore, that Dorothy Lee was right when 
she alluded to the American (and Western) propensity toward cod-
ifying reality in lineal terms. In fact, the straight/circular dichot-
omy is of some antiquity; it existed in classical Greek literature 
and philosophy (Bellew 1979). However, we may wish to modify 
slightly Ruth Benedict’s pessimistic dictum that “we do not see 
the lens through which we look.” Inasmuch as folklore does en-
capsulate native cognitive categories, we may through its analysis 
indeed be able to see at least some small portion of that lens, as 
I hope these few lines have succeeded in demonstrating. On the 
other hand, perhaps I simply assumed what I planned to prove, in 
which case I am undoubtedly guilty of circulus probandi.
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